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INVITED SESSION 1
ENACTIVE COGNITION,
TOWARDS AN EMBODIED 
APPROACH TO THE STUDY
OF MIND
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INTERSUBJECTIVITY WITH 
FACIAL IMMOBILITY
JONATHAN COLE
The congenital condition Möbius Sequence (or Syndrome) has 
many variable features, from gaze palsy, tongue tethering and 
small jaw to clumsiness and hand maldevelopment. But its cardinal 
impairments are the functional absence of cranial nerves VI and 
VII, leading to an inability to abduct the eyes and an absence of 
facial expression. Poor speech and sometimes hearing can also 
be present. Examples of the consequences of these for the lived 
experience of Möbius will be given. Neonatal facial imitation does 
not occur and this may affect early bonding. Later, the visible dif-
ference can lead to teasing and a withdrawal from a social world. 
Poor coordination of face and body, and endless visits to surgeons, 
dentists and doctors, led one child with Möbius to withdraw from 
an embodied existence (since her body let her down) to inhabit a 
more cerebral, introspective and less social world. Adults with the 
condition have also described this. Some have suggested an excess 
incidence of autism and learning diffi culties with Möbius. However 
other, more recent, studies in adults with Möbius dispute this and 
suggest that the pervasive embodied diffi culties which hamper in-
terpersonal relatedness and emotional expression may lead people 
to confl ate somatic impairment with psychological ones.
Some with Möbius describe reduced experience of some emotional 
experience as children and its subsequent emergence late, through 
conscious up-regulation of gesture and prosody and through social 
imitation. The incidence and causes for this are unclear, but it 
could point towards the importance of embodied expression for 
experience and the need for social feedback. Though understanding 
of the experience of those with Möbius is important for its own 
sake and for medical and (life long) psychosocial support, its wider 
relevance is in showing what our faces do and how intersubjectivity 
is dependent on embodied expression through the face. 
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INTERSUBJECTIVITY AS
A SOCIALLY EMBODIED AND 
DISTRIBUTED PHENOMENON
JESSICA LINDBLOM
There is an intense and ongoing debate concerning the nature and 
kinds of intersubjectivity within cognitive science and related di-
sciplines. The still common and dominant view in cognitive science 
suggests that agents relate to each other in much the same way as 
they relate to other parts of the external world, i.e., by having more 
or less explicit internal representations of each other, which then 
are manipulated internally. In contrast, embodied and distributed 
versions of social interaction and cognition emphasize the way 
social cognition is shaped by the embodied agent’s interactions 
with the surrounding social and material world.  
My intention with this paper is to describe and illustrate how our 
everyday abilities for intersubjective engagement and interaction 
are grounded in socially distributed and embodied actions, functio-
ning as a basis for mutual sharing of experience in joint activities. 
The paper consists of three main parts. Firstly, I describe how the 
distributed cognition approach can be complemented with recent 
fi nding in socially embodied cognitive science in explaining inter-
subjectivity. Although embodied cognitive science pays attention 
to both the socio-cultural embedding of cognitive processes and 
their bodily basis, current theories of embodiment need to move 
beyond the present emphasis on the individual’s interactions, 
to interactions between agents and their social environment. 
The distributed cognition framework shows how some cognitive 
processes rather are properties at the system level than cognitive 
properties on the level of the individuals who participate in the 
actual situation. The emphasis in distributed cognition is, however, 
more on the socio-relational side rather than on the embodied 
side of the interactivist coin. Indeed, by using the distributed 
cognition system perspective as the unit of analysis, it functions 
as an appropriate approach of illustrating how intersubjectivity 
is enacted when embodied agents are co-operatively engaged in 
meaning-making activity. 
Secondly, I present an analysis of a real-world interaction between 
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two co-operative participants showing how deeply and profoundly 
meaning-making activity emerges from socially embodied and di-
stributed actions that form complex and intertwined organizations 
of embodied actions and experience. 
Finally, I discuss the implications of considering intersubjectivity 
from socially situated, distributed, and embodied practices. From 
this perspective, intersubjectivity is a complex, distributed and 
coordinated dynamical process that usually encompasses a range of 
socially embodied experience and actions such as gesture, speech, 
body posture and orientation, the activation of neural resonance 
systems (mirror neurons, shared neural representations) and cultu-
rally situated practices for being in and interacting with the world. 
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INTERSUBJECTIVITY: DO WE 
KNOW IT WHEN WE SEE IT?
TIMOTHY P. RACINE
These are heady times for the study of the mind, or perhaps more 
accurately, post-heady times.  The resurgence of interest in con-
cepts like intersubjectivity is occurring while a growing number of 
researchers are becoming increasingly sceptical about explanations 
of purposeful activity that rely on centralized control and single 
causes.  The investigation of intersubjectivity and its relation to 
other conceptually connected phenomena such as consciousness 
of self and other, the lived body and affectivity can, and perhaps 
should, be understood in the context of this much broader ground-
swell of related concerns.  Despite this apparent shifting of ground, 
many developmental and comparative psychologists continue to 
claim that particular inner states or simple adaptations are causally 
responsible for differences between younger and older human in-
fants, and human infants and other primates who perform similar 
or in some cases manifestly identical acts.  For example, the debates 
between Tomasello, Povinelli and their colleagues pivot in large 
part on the relative infl uence of such mechanisms.  Although the 
intersubjective capabilities of humans and other apes continue 
to merit sustained empirical attention, the extent to which inner 
states or adaptations should be taken to be the causes of purposeful 
activity is no simple matter.  And the increasing interest of many 
researchers in concepts such as intersubjectivity, embodiment, 
distributed/situated cognition and developmental systems seems 
to herald a shift away from seeing mental capacities as private, 
individual, simple effi cient causes of behaviour to something far 
more complicated and far less in-the-head that has often been 
theorized.  In a complementary vein, population genetic level 
explanations of psychological functions are being taken to task by 
evolutionary developmental psychological approaches (evo-devo), 
the latter of which is inherently systems-oriented and suspicious 
of simple, single cause genetic explanations.  However, although 
contemporary comparative work has found that capabilities which 
have often been historically understood to be uniquely human 
are proving harder to separate from those of some other species, 
it hasn’t occurred to many that they should also be suspicious of 
INVITED SESSION 1 - Enactive Cognition, towards an embodied approach to the study of mind
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the views of the relation between mind and behaviour at play.  In 
this presentation, I compare the development of intersubjectivity 
in human and nonhuman primates and argue that unproductive 
conceptions of mind may be the wellspring for many of the debates 
that occur in the fi eld.  I give examples to show how the notion of 
a static, encapsulated mind has impeded social cognitive research 
and I suggest more fruitful ways to broach these phenomena.  
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INVITED SESSION 1 - Enactive Cognition, towards an embodied approach to the study of mind
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"THE POSSIBILITY OF 
SOCIALITY PRESUPPOSES 
A CERTAIN INTERSUBJECTIVITY 
OF THE BODY"
JORDAN ZLATEV
The title is a quotation from Zahavi (2001), discussing Husserl’s 
arguments for the necessity of bodily experience for intersubjecti-
vity. The concept of intersubjectivity has become highly prominent 
in interdisciplinary studies of the mind (e.g. Thompson, 2001; 
Bråten, 2007; Zlatev, Racine, Sinha, & Itkonen, 2008). In the most 
general terms, it can be understood as the sharing of experiential 
content (e.g. feelings, perceptions, thoughts, linguistic meanings) 
among a plurality of subjects. Such “sharing” can take different 
forms, some more immediate, while others more mediated by 
higher cognitive processes, e.g. what Barresi and Moore (2008) 
call “understanding” as opposed to ”simply sharing”. Thus, in-
tersubjectivity is not only more inclusive than constructs such as 
“theory of mind” and “mentalizing” (Baron-Cohen, 1995), but 
offers a qualitatively different perspective on social cognition. In 
brief, this perspective – with roots in the phenomenology of Hus-
serl and his followers (Husserl, 1999 [1907]), the philosophy of 
Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein, 1953) and socio-cultural tradition in 
developmental psychology (Vygotsky, 1978) implies that human 
beings (and possibly some other “higher species”) are primor-
dially connected in their subjectivity, rather than functioning as 
“monads” who need to “infer” that others are also endowed with 
experiences and mentalities that are similar to their own. 
Importantly, the sharing of experiences is not only, and not pri-
marily, on a cognitive level, but also (and more basically) on the 
level of affect, perceptual processes and conative (action-oriented) 
engagements and is based on bodily interaction (e.g. empathic 
perception, imitation, gesture and practical collaboration). Finally, 
crucial cognitive capacities are initially social and interactional, 
and the specifi cs of human development are characterized by a 
process of gradual transfer of inter personal to intra-personal 
modes of thought through a process known as “internalization” 
or “appropriation”.
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INVITED SESSION 2
MIND IN INTERACTIONS,
TOWARDS A 
COGNITIVE SOCIALNESS
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METACOGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 
IN EARLY INFANCY
INGAR BRINCK1, RIKARD LILJENFORS2
Recent research suggests that social interaction enhances early 
cognitive development. Primary intersubjectivity is attached an 
increasing importance for the young infant’s growing awareness 
of others and emerging sense of self, and is held to provide the 
developmental basis for later mindreading abilities. On similar 
grounds, it might be argued that primary intersubjectivity provides 
the basis for later metacognitive capacities. Metacognition concerns 
the subject’s implicit and explicit access to his or her own cognitive 
states, in judgments of knowing or learning, feelings of knowing, 
uncertainty monitoring, categorization, evaluation, decision-based 
action, etc. It permits the monitoring and control of states and 
processes involved in the acquisition and processing of information 
about the subject itself and its environment. Intuitively, looking for 
precursors to metacognition in the young infant’s capacity for social 
interaction makes sense. We probe this intuition by evaluating the 
following exploratory hypothesis: 
(H) The capacity for metacognition has its origin in the dyadic 
interaction between infant and caregiver during the infant’s fi rst 
months in life.  
Given that (H) belongs to a domain that has been extensively 
studied and generated a lot of data, its predictive power and use-
fulness may at a preliminary stage be determined without empirical 
studies. We fi rst elaborate (H) in terms of primary intersubjectivity, 
the deliberate sharing of experiences between infant and caregi-
ver. It eventually takes the form of turn-taking, the reciprocal 
and spontaneous sequencing of behaviour in time. We describe it 
as a monitoring-and-control game that infants play with adults 
to acquire fundamental regulatory skills such as inhibitory and 
attentional control and that offers learning-by-doing. Mentaliza-
tion theory provides an alternative interpretation of (H) in terms 
of affect regulation. It emerges when the infant learns about the 
dispositional content of its affective expressions by observing their 
behavioral consequences in others, so-called affect-mirroring. The 
two interpretations disagree about the nature of the mechanism by 
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INVITED SESSION 2 - Mind in interactions, towards a cognitive socialness
which the social environment causes metacognition to emerge and 
the relative importance of attention and affect for the emergence 
of metacognitive skills. An intermediary position is sketched that 
ascribes the regulation of affect and attention a crucial role for 
the development of metacognition. We suggest that metacognition 
is procedural and process-refl exive in infancy, denying that is a 
form of metarepresentation (cf. Proust, 2003). 
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE ENACTIVE 
DEFINITION OF THE SOCIAL
HANNE DE JAEGHER1, EZEQUIEL DI PAOLO2
Most approaches to social cognition defi ne their subject matter 
only implicitly, if at all. We have proposed an enactive approach 
to social cognition based on ideas of autonomy and sense-making 
(De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007; 2008) that centres on the process 
of interacting as a special form of coupling. Accordingly, not all 
forms of coupling between individuals are social, but only those 
that engender a closed network of patterns of coordination and 
thus instantiate an autonomous dynamics, without destroying the 
autonomy of the interactors. This defi nition captures a difference 
between social cognition and other forms of sense-making: the fact 
that the other cannot be fully constituted by our own cognitive 
activity, and that her sense-making in turn affects us directly, and 
constrains ours. This also loosens the link between the intentions 
of the individual interactors and the process of interaction – we 
may engage in interactions unwittingly, and their course may turn 
out differently from that which we intended. 
The defi nition is not limited to the problem of understanding the 
other (the sole concern of most approaches to social cognition 
today), but opens up an unbiased scope for research that includes 
a multiplicity of topics such as trust, violence, relationships, tact, 
narratives, friendship, group dynamics, joint action, solidarity, 
etc. Some of these issues can be readily framed on the basis of 
our defi nition (e.g, coercion implies a signifi cant reduction of the 
autonomy of one of the interactors, trust involves a submission to 
the other’s autonomy, and so on). 
Our defi nition of social interaction favours a spatiotemporal 
contiguity and contingency between interactors and does not 
make explicit the possibility of a mediation through macro-social 
factors. There is a sense in which interesting phenomena such as 
removed understanding of social scenes, appreciation of collective 
dynamics, etc. are closer to other forms of cognitive engagements 
than to the participatory sense-making we propose as characteristic 
of social cognition. While my actions are affected by the world 
economy and in turn contribute (infi nitesimally) to it, I engage 
with such social institutions in a similar way to how I engage 
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chosocial Medi-
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with my non-social world, i.e., mostly as an individual cognizer. 
Is this also what happens in the ‘removed’ witnessing of social 
events (for instance, in a fi lm) where the coupling between the 
event and the observer is not even bidirectional? It is important 
to distinguish between social understanding (an understanding 
done socially) and understanding of social events. We see the 
latter as a developmental outcome of the former. The ‘removed’ 
understanding of social events implies not so much a simulation 
of a situation in which one is not present, but rather an expansion 
of the virtual dimension already part of sense-making into the 
direction of including a virtual other. In simulation we transport 
ourselves into the other’s situation or into him (thereby foregoing 
the other’s alterity), whereas in our proposal we engage with a 
virtual other, a skill that develops out of self-directed participa-
tory sense-making à la Vygotsky (a self-distancing that mobilises 
the alterity in ourselves). This possibility developmentally links 
engaged and removed forms of social cognition. In this sense the 
understanding of a social situation is an outcome of a history of 
knowing how to interact with others and with ourselves. 
INVITED SESSION 2 - Mind in interactions, towards a cognitive socialness
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INTERSUBJECTIVITY 
IN ATYPICAL DEVELOPMENT
FRAN HAGSTROM
The role of intersubjectivity in the development of communication 
and cognitive development is of particular importance to scholars 
and practitioners who work in the area of atypical development. 
Lack of or limited intersubjectivity has been associated with co-
gnitive delays through a number of studies over the last decade. 
As a result, intersubjectivity is now considered a diagnostic key, the 
tracking of which contributes to documentation of developmental 
change. Unfortunately, intersubjectivity and human development 
are both more complex and dynamic constructions than can be 
measured in a quick, straightforward manner. 
Understanding intersubjectivity through the lens of atypical de-
velopment can provide insight about modes of communication 
and means of sharing intentions that may be less obvious to 
neurotypical individuals. 
Atypical developments may begin as early as six months gesta-
tional age; however, it is usually identifi ed by lags or differences 
that occur within the fi rst two years of life.  In other words, de-
velopment is recognized as atypical when children do not act on 
or in the world with other people and things in expected ways. 
For individuals who manifest atypical development from early in 
life onward, personally experienced development, including the 
progression of intersubjectivity, is typical.  
The child does not experience herself as being or acting differently. 
Atypical (for the expectations of others) is typical (for the indi-
vidual). In such instances, it is reasonable to suspect that inter-
subjectivity may be embodied differently or even be problematic 
or indiscernible for social others.  
Our goal as researchers is to fi nd ways to document typifi ed atypical 
intersubjective interactions. 
Sociocultual perspectives on cognitive development are grounded 
in cultural and communicative experience, both of which are focal 
to the emergence and increased complexity of intersubjectivity.  
A sociocultural position on typical-atypical development will be 
Department of 
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INVITED SESSION 2 - Mind in interactions, towards a cognitive socialness
elaborated and linkied to intersubjectivity using Trevarthen’s 
position on mediated (secondary) intersubjectivity and Wertsch’s 
position on mediated action. Case study material will be used 
to trace intersubjective change in children with autism, a neu-
rodevelopmental disorder in which communication is the focal 
impairment. 
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INTER/SUBJECTIVITY 
IN COMMUNICATION: 
BETWEEN PHENOMENOLOGY 
AND SITUATEDNESS
MAURIZIO TIRASSA
AGENCY
A mind is the phenomenal control system of an agent. An agent is 
a conscious organism who lives in a situation, striving continuously 
to make it more to its liking. The situation is a dynamical landscape 
of meanings, that is, a subjective, open, and changeable experience 
of the world; in the case of the human species, of oneself in the 
world. Meanings are relational: they result from the interaction 
between the dynamics of the world and those of the agent’s mind; 
each meaning depends on, and in turn contributes to, the dynamics 
of the overall situation. For an agent to act is to interfere with the 
spontaneous dynamics of the world in some crucial joint, altering 
it so to try and improve the situation.
COMMUNICATION
A social agent is one whose possible actions include the intentional 
interference with other agents’ situations. Mentalist communica-
tion occurs when an agent overtly tries to interfere with another’s 
situation, possibly letting him to do the same in reverse. Overtly 
means that a partial understanding of the other’s situation be-
comes part of each agent’s situation, so that each understands, 
accepts, and acknowledges the other’s attempts to interfere with 
her situation. 
Communication thus becomes a circular and cooperative interfe-
rence in each other’s situation. Part of the evolution of each agent’s 
situation is therefore subject to the scrutiny and the partial control 
of the other. This also accounts for various social phenomena, 
including face and politeness. The whole process is only possible 
between agents capable of mindreading and of externalizing a 
description of aptly selected features of their situations. 
Mindreading is the ability to dynamically represent another in-
dividual’s mental dynamics, so to be able to understand, predict 
and interfere with his situation.
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COMMUNICATIVE ACTIONS
Communicative actions are the external result of the processes 
outlined; whatever an agent interprets as an overt attempt to in-
terfere with her situation (including silence where something else 
is expected) bears a communicative meaning. 
The semantic relations that an agent entertains with her situation 
may be divided into epistemic, motivational, and intentional; ana-
logously, the modifi cations that an agent may induce in another’s 
situation also belong to the same categories. Communication 
requires the collaboration of both the agents involved.
INVITED SESSION 2 - Mind in interactions, towards a cognitive socialness
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INVITED SESSION 3
NEUROLOGICALLY LINKED,
TOWARDS A
NEUROSCIENTIFIC ENDORSMENT
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COORDINATION IN MUSICAL 
ENSEMBLES: ADAPTIVE TIMING 
AND ANTICIPATORY CONTROL
PETER E. KELLER
Musical ensemble performance showcases the human capacity 
for temporally precise yet fl exible interpersonal coordination. 
Ensemble musicians maintain synchrony in the face of large-scale 
tempo changes, expressively motivated deviations in local tempo, 
and random variability in timing. Despite these irregularities, a 
seemingly infi nite number of isochronous and non-isochronous 
temporal structures can be synchronized, either in rhythmic 
unison or via the interlocking of complementary rhythms. The 
neurocognitive mechanisms that mediate these varieties of musical 
synchronization are specialized for entrainment, adaptive timing, 
and anticipatory action control. Entrainment occurs when neural 
timekeepers in separate individuals become phase locked, thus 
functioning as a ‘shared clock’ for the ensemble. Adaptive timing 
is facilitated by mutual error correction processes that enable these 
timekeepers to remain entrained across changeable conditions. 
Anticipatory control processes allow musicians to predict the time 
course of each others’ actions by running internal simulations 
that trigger mental images of upcoming sounds and associated 
body movements. Adaptive timing and anticipatory control are 
related in the sense that accurate predictions reduce the need for 
error correction. Two factors that modulate this relationship are 
familiarity with the music (which affects auditory imagery) and 
familiarity with the instrumental technique of one’s co-performers 
(which affects motor imagery). As familiarity with musical style 
or structure decreases, anticipatory auditory imagery — which 
is driven partly by covert vocal articulator activity - presumably 
moves from the inner singing of well-defi ned pitches to articula-
tory gestures that are relatively distant approximations of musical 
sounds. As familiarity with another’s instrumental technique de-
creases, motor imagery presumably progresses from instrument 
specifi c executive movements to relatively general forms of body 
motion such swaying, rocking, and expressive gesturing. It is pro-
posed here that such reductions in the specifi city of anticipatory 
Max Planck 
Institute for 
Human 
Cognitive and 
Brain Sciences, 
Leipzig, Germany
keller@cbs.mpg.de
28 INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP - ENACTING INTERSUBJECTIVITY
control processes are accompanied by increases in the sensitivity 
of the error correction processes that underlie adaptive timing. 
This tradeoff will be discussed with reference to musical contexts 
that differ in terms of the degree to which performers are familiar 
with each others’ instruments and the music that they are playing.
INVITED SESSION 3 - Neurologically linked, towards a neuroscientiﬁ c endorsment
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MIRRORING AND 
UNDERSTANDING ACTION
CORRADO SINIGAGLIA
ABSTRACT
Though the existence of a mirror system for action is widely ac-
cepted, its mechanism and function are still controversial. It was 
originally held that the primary function of the mirror mechanism 
is to enable an individual to understand the actions performed by 
others, by directly matching the sensory with the motor represen-
tations of those actions. Recently, however, it has proposed that 
mirror activation cannot be construed in terms of a mechanism 
that directly matches observed and executed motor acts, but must 
be based on a purely visual reconstruction of action, so that the 
primary mirror function would not be to understand other’s ac-
tions, but to emulate them. The aim of this paper is to refute this 
argument, showing that it is mostly based on a partial reading of 
the functional properties of mirror neurons as well as on a biased 
construal of both action and action understanding.  
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LOOKING FOR MYSELF: 
MULTISENSORY INTEGRATION 
ALTERS RECOGNITION 
OF ONE’S OWN FACE
MANOS TSAKIRIS
How do I know the person I see in the mirror is really me?  Is it 
because I know the person simply looks like me, or is it because 
the mirror refl ection moves when I move, and I see it being tou-
ched when I feel touch myself? We formally addressed, for the 
fi rst time, the interaction between a transient sense of self based 
on current multisensory infl ow, and a more permanent sense of 
self-identity based on the representation of one’s own face by 
quantifying the specifi c contribution of multisensory integration 
for self-face recognition in normal adult participants. Synchronous 
tactile stimulation while watching another person’s face being 
similarly touched produced a bias in recognising one’s own face, 
in the direction of the other person included in the multisensory 
experience. Asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation did not show 
this effect. Overall, participants accepted as self-stimuli faces that 
were more extensively morphed, showing that synchronous multi-
sensory integration has a signifi cant effect on self-face recognition.
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RECIPROCITY, COMMUNICATION 
AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
GABRIELLA AIRENTI
ABSTRACT
In this paper I discuss the role of sharedness  in intersubjectivity from 
a developmental point of view. I argue in favor of a distinction between 
reciprocity in communication and collective action, maintaining that only 
the fi rst is a peculiar feature of humans since their birth. My argument 
is based on the discussion of recent studies presenting experiments with 
children and chimpanzees. I suggest that establishing a distinction among 
communication, collective action and shared action is the only way to give 
account of the basic difference existing between human and nonhuman 
primates concerning intersubjectivity. My conclusion is that the bases of 
human intersubjectivity are also the cognitive bases of communication.
Keywords: communication, collective action, reciprocity
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years two trends of research, previously separated have 
converged on a common topic. On one side there is the work of 
developmental psychologists interested in explaining how young 
humans develop an attitude toward intersubjectivity. On the other 
side there is the work of the researchers who try to understand what 
makes the difference between humans and nonhuman primates. 
This turn of research is due to the work of Tomasello and his col-
laborators who, after years of investigation with young children 
and chimpanzees have come to the conclusion that what makes the 
difference between human and nonhuman primates is precisely the 
attitude towards shared action which, according to them is typical-
ly human (Tomasello & Racoczy, 2003; Tomasello et al., 2005). It 
must be noted that this result due to years of experimental studies 
corroborates what in a theoretical way had already been stated 
by Premack and Premack (1994) who considered sharedness the 
feature that makes the distinction between humans and other 
primates as well as the basis for cultural transmission. 
This point of view is profi table because it allows to progress in 
the elaboration of the concept of sharedness. Sharedness has been 
placed at the center of human interactions by many authors who 
attribute to it different functions. In the following I shall present 
some of these positions in order to clarify the concept of sharedness. 
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Discussing sharedness as it appears in action and communication, 
I will argue in favor of a distinction between collective action and 
reciprocity, maintaining that only the second is a peculiar feature 
of human beings since their birth. 
2. FROM ACTION TO SHARED ACTION
To clarify what lies behind the concept of sharedness it is useful to 
reconstruct how Tomasello and his collaborators have “discovered” 
shared intentionality. In their quest of what makes the difference 
between human and nonhuman primates their fi rst candidate has 
been intentionality. The main hypothesis at that time was that the 
crucial point is the link between imitation and intentional action. 
Children since nine months have a comprehension of others as 
intentional actors. This is at the basis of human cultural tran-
smission from one generation to the other by the so-called ratchet 
effect. The fact that children since a precocious age are able to 
understand others as intentional agents allows them to perform 
imitative learning both regarding object-directed actions and the 
use of communicative symbols. To see the other as an intentional 
agent is the fi rst step in the development of the concept of person 
whose successive developments will be to see others as mental 
agents and then as refl exive agents (Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 
1993; Tomasello, 1999). Primates do not acquire the concept of 
person as an intentional agent and do not perform imitation. This 
does not allow the transmission of knowledge that is constitutive 
of societies.
The results of research in the last years have led Tomasello and his 
collaborators to revise their position and to support the conclusion 
that the comprehension of intentionality is not suffi cient to charac-
terize cultural cognition.  In fact different studies have shown that 
nonhuman primates have a rather interesting comprehension of 
intentional action  (Tomasello, Call & Hare, 2003). In particular, 
it has been shown that in experimental situations chimpanzees 
understand attempted   and accidental actions, i.e. actions that 
do not attain the expected result (Call et al., 2004). Moreover, 
chimpanzees understand that perception has an infl uence on ac-
tion. It has been shown that in a situation of competition for food 
a subordinate individual tried to get food that was visible only to 
it and ignored food that was visible both to it and to a dominant 
individual (Hare et al., 2000; Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2001). If 
primates have these abilities and still they do not produce a social 
engagement, this means that the difference has to be sought el-
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sewhere. Nonhuman primates may have an intense social activity 
but are not motivated to share with their conspecifi c as it is the 
case for human beings since a very precocious phase in their life. 
Human beings have not only intentionality but also shared inten-
tionality (Tomasello & Racoczy, 2003; Tomasello et al., 2005).
In this way the work of Tomasello rejoins the classical philosophical 
position opposing individual intention and collective intention (see 
for instance, Gilbert, 1989; Searle, 1990; Bratman, 1992; Tuomela, 
1995).  According to this point of view humans have two different 
mental states, intentions and - taking Searle’s terminology - we-
intentions. These are causal in performing individual actions and 
collective actions, respectively. Tomasello’s work fi nds in ontoge-
netic development the appearance of we-intentions. In this view 
what is shared is the intentionality of action.  This is what makes 
the distinction between humans and other primates.   
An objection to this point of view is that it still underestimates the 
possibilities of primates regarding collective action. In fact, as we 
have seen, experimental research has already extended signifi cantly 
the possibilities we can attribute to primates in terms of individual 
action. As regards collective action, the common view has been 
that primates are able to act in situations of competition, but not 
to collaborate. But even this truth is now challenged. There is a 
simple version of collective action that implies to coordinate with 
others to pursue a common goal, i.e. to use others to extend one’s 
own capacities.  In an experimental situation pairs of chimpanzees 
had to coordinate to retrieve a weighted box too heavy for only 
one of them (Povinelli & O’Neill, 2000). This experiment proved 
that at given conditions collaboration was possible, i.e. when both 
the chimpanzees were experienced in the task. In fact in this case 
they succeeded, while in the case of pairs formed by an expe-
rienced subject and a naive one the experienced partner made no 
attempts to solicit help or to teach the adequate procedure to the 
other.  Moreover, in non-human primates observed in the wild it 
has been shown that competition and cooperation are interrela-
ted (Muller & Mitani, 2005). Chimpanzees have been observed 
coordinating and synchronizing their behaviors in hunting situa-
tions and also shifting roles and anticipate each other behaviors 
(Boesch, 1994). Primatologists have discovered in chimpanzees 
practices of meat exchange among males and have explained these 
practices as dictated by the search of coalitionary support (Mitani 
& Watts, 2001). This shows that in the wild forms of cooperation 
are not only possible but also have a fundamental part in ruling 
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the chimpanzees’ societies. It must be added that, according to 
most primatologists, for social tasks fi eldwork observations are 
more relevant than experimental results (Boesch, 2005). Recently 
the skill to collaborate has been at least partly proven also in an 
experimental setting with semi-free-ranging chimpanzees. The 
chimpanzees understood when to attain a goal a collaborator was 
necessary and chose the partner who had previously proven more 
effective (Melis, Hare, & Tomasello, 2006). 
The more sophisticated are the experiments the subtler becomes 
the distinction between human and nonhuman primates as regards 
the comprehension of action, and of collective action particularly. 
Recent experimental research and fi eldwork seem to show that 
collaboration and then collective action is possible in chimpan-
zees not only in competition situations but also to achieve a goal 
together.  So if we follow Tomasello, sharing intentions are at the 
origins of cultural cognition. However, sharing intentions cannot 
coincide with the intentions underlying simple cooperation on pain 
of loosing the distinction between humans and other primates. 
Therefore, I will argue that there is another form of sharedness 
that does not coincide with collective action and is characteristic 
of human interactions.
3. COOPERATION AND RECIPROCITY
Let us come back to sharedness studied both from an experimental 
point of view and through the analysis of observations made in 
the fi eldwork. Werneken, Chen and Tomasello (2006) have shown 
the difference between young children and chimpanzees that par-
ticipated to an experiment where the tasks required collaboration 
with an adult competent partner. Both children 18-24 months 
of age and chimpanzees achieved the coordination requested to 
collaborate. The important difference was that the children were 
motivated not only by the goal but also by cooperation itself. This 
was shown by the fact that when the children attained the goal, 
which was to retrieve a toy, they put again the toy in the previous 
position to start the game again. 
Matsuzawa (2007) has studied the development of chimpanzees 
raised by their biological mother with the Participation Obser-
vation method. With respect to the problem we are discussing he 
maintains that the children have the intrinsic motivation to copy 
the mother’s behavior. But a simple gesture that is so common 
in humans, the child who responds to her mother’s behavior of 
feeding her trying in turn to put food in the mother’s mouth, has 
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never been registered in infant chimpanzees.  He concludes that 
reciprocity may be the fundamental difference between humans 
and chimpanzees. 
We fi nd in the mentioned works two key concepts that can be 
used to defi ne sharedness, i.e. cooperation and reciprocity. To 
analyze them in more detail may be useful to better understand 
what characterizes human interactions. 
In fact cooperation has been designed within philosophy of lan-
guage as the concept describing the bases of human interactions. 
Humans are rational beings and to pursue their goals they have 
to cooperate. So cooperation is a principle of general rationality 
(Kasher, 1976, 1982). It can be performed by collective action or 
by that particular form of collective action that is communication. 
To explain the cooperation principle that in his view is at the basis 
of human communication, Grice (1975, 1978) explicitly mentions 
a situation where two persons are acting together.  To communi-
cate, in his example, is the same case of two persons mending a 
car. There is a common goal to which the participants cooperate, 
both doing the part they have been assigned in the most adequate 
way. This is true even if their ultimate goals can be completely 
divergent. For instance, one of them can look forward the car 
being mended only to fl ee with it.
On a similar position is Searle. He defi nes social behavior, of which 
communication is an instance, as dependent on a mental state that 
he calls collective intentionality.  When two persons do something 
together, like to push a car or speak, collective intentions take the 
place of individual intentions that normally cause action. In this 
case each actor performs her action as part of a shared action 
(Searle, 1990). Collective intentionality causes cooperation. Ac-
cording to this point of view people cooperate even in situations 
of confl ict or competition. Two persons who insult each other at a 
party realize a form of higher-level cooperation, in the same way 
that two players in competition cooperate in participating to a 
match. Therefore, for Searle the use of language is part of human 
action, which has two dimensions, an individual and a collective 
one. For these two dimensions the mind provides for two different 
primitive mental states, intentions and collective intentions.
Thus the defi nition of cooperation within the philosophy of lan-
guage is an engagement to make one’s part in an activity shared 
with others and communication is one of these possible activities. 
The stress put on the actors’ engagement clearly indicates that we 
are within the fi eld of rational action.
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Let us focus now on the concept of engagement. What is engage-
ment in this acceptation? Engagement is to have the explicit plan 
to do one’s part of a cooperative action. In the famous example of 
a music ensemble, the violin plays her score because she knows 
that someone else will play the alto and the cello scores of the 
same trio. The quality of the result or the way it may be acquired 
are not relevant. The result can be the product of long sessions 
of coordination.  Moreover, in principle it is possible to imagine 
that there is no difference in the performance of the violin playing 
alone or playing with her partners. What distinguishes a collective 
action is that every participant intends to do her part to attain a 
common goal and hold the belief that the others too do their part 
and share the same intentions and beliefs (Clark, 1996). Collective 
action is then the product of an agreement that has been stipulated 
before the action or is included in a conventional situation known 
to the participants. For instance, everybody knows the sequence 
of actions to be performed in a supermarket to check out.
This is not the case for chimpanzees. As both experiments and 
fi eldwork show they make collective actions because coordination 
with others simply proves useful to attain specifi c goals. Their 
behavior shows that they have expectations on others’ behavior. 
There is no reason to interpret their action as guided by reciprocal 
engagement. 
What about children? Very young children should be in the same 
situation of chimpanzees, since they have not stipulated explicit 
agreements leading to shared actions. Actually, this is not the case. 
Even infants behave, in a different way with respect to chimpan-
zees. To shed light on this point it is interesting to examine what 
happens in their fi rst months. As it appears in various studies on 
infants, they establish interactions with adults very precociously. 
More precisely they establish interactions with adults before nine 
months, i.e. before the appearance of language and before the 
comprehension of intentional action. Trevarthen  (1977) has well 
described these interactions calling them interactions without 
object. They are the implementation of intersubjectivity per se. 
Let us try to clarify what this means. A six-month-old infant is 
not able to communicate about a specifi c meaning. However, the 
infant is able to perform her part in interactions with adults using 
gestures, sounds, and face expressions. The works that more cle-
arly explain the infant’s contribution to these interactions are the 
studies on interruption. It has been proven in experimental settings 
with 6/12-weeks-olds that if the adult during an interaction averts 
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her attention, the infant will try to recuperate it (Tronick, Als & 
Adamson, 1979; Murray, & Trevarthen, 1985). In particular, in 
Murray and Trevarthen (1985) it was shown that not only infants 
acknowledged the interruption but also that they distinguished 
between a “natural” interruption when the researcher distracted 
the mother and the unnatural situation in which the interruption 
consisted in the mother suddenly presenting a blank face. While in 
the fi rst case there was only a reduction of positive excitement, in 
the second situation the infants appeared disturbed passing from 
protest to signs of distress and fi nally to withdrawal. But there was 
a third experimental condition that is particularly interesting. In 
this case the mother and the infant were in two separate rooms and 
they interacted viewing each other in a life-sized video image im-
mediately before them. After some minutes of normal interaction, 
the communication was perturbed showing mother’s behaviors 
that occurred in a previous time and were not correlated with the 
present infant’s behavior. While during live communication the 
infant behaved as in normal face-to-face interactions, in the replay 
phase the reaction of the infant was one of distress similar to the 
reaction shown in the blank phase situation. This third condition 
has been utilized also to study the effect of perturbed interactions 
on mothers. In this case it was the mother who unknowingly was 
presented with her infant’s reaction to her previous behavior and 
then unrelated with her current one. Several mothers remarked 
that the interaction was odd and all of them changed their com-
munication focusing more on their own experience than on the 
infants’ one (Murray & Trevarthen, 1986).
These results show that infants, when participating to their fi rst 
interactions already have the ability to acknowledge:
- what an interaction is 
   and 
- what counts as an interruption.
The question is then how do they get this knowledge from. In fact 
there is no necessity to think that this is an explicit knowledge. 
What the infants react to is the format of the interaction, i.e. alter-
nation: any gesture, sound of one of the participants is responded 
to by other gestures, sounds, etc. (Airenti, 2001). If this is not 
the case there has to be a good reason. The fact that the partner 
has started an interaction with someone else is a reason. On the 
contrary, for the infant a sudden blank face is distressing. The 
infant responds like an adult would do. What is interesting is that 
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to perform this completely normal behavior there is no necessity 
to understand a specifi c meaning. The compliance or not to the 
format of interaction is suffi cient. But the previous experiments tell 
us something more. In fact, alternation is not suffi cient to denote 
the situation. Would the infant be able to acknowledge only reac-
tions in a frame of alternation, any reaction should be acceptable. 
Actually, the infant is not satisfi ed if the response is taken in the 
repertoire of her mother’s responses but unrelated with her current 
behavior. As we have seen, submitted to the same conditions the 
mother too fi nds the situation incomprehensible and disturbing. 
Therefore there is a quality of the response that has to be attuned 
to the actor’s behavior (Murray, 1998). From this fact, it follows 
that to the feature of alternation another feature has to be added. 
We can denominate it reciprocity. The example mentioned before 
gives us an idea about what reciprocity means: when the mother 
puts food in the child’s mouth, the child in turn will try to put food 
in the mother’s mouth. Or if the mother tickles the child, the child 
will try to tickle the mother.  This form of reciprocity starts very 
early and is perceived as a condition of successful interaction. In 
adults’ communication we expect that others respond to the point 
and in this case meaning is involved. In the precocious interac-
tions we can see that before real communication is possible, the 
format of reciprocity is already established. It is not easy to defi ne 
what characterizes reciprocity in this sense. Trevarthen refers to 
expressive reciprocity (Trevarthen, 1998). Other authors consider 
that the main point is the mutual attunement of emotions (Stern, 
1985; Hobson, 2002). 
I would suggest that regarding at the problem in a more formal 
way, we can formulate the hypothesis that the reciprocal response 
has both to contain something of the behavior to which it responds 
and something new. Let us consider what happens in imitation. 
Reciprocal imitation is an important part of precocious interac-
tions. Imitation is the simplest way to establish intersubjectivity 
because nothing is required except for the ability to express emo-
tions by face expressions. Imitation in the context of reciprocity, 
not imitation alone characterizes the behavior of mother/infant 
pairs. Actually, imitation is performed not simply mimicking the 
other’s expression, but introducing little variations. For instance, 
often mothers repeat the infant’s gestures exaggerating them. 
Likewise, from one expression another similar or opposite can 
come out. Again, we can fi nd here the pure format of what later 
will become real communication. In adult communication the 
ORAL SESSION
41INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP - ENACTING INTERSUBJECTIVITY
partner has to acknowledge comprehension and to answer. The 
mother who fi nds her infant odd in the experiment does not fi nd 
these two features in her infant’s response. 
4. COLLECTIVE ACTION AND COMMUNICATION
The previous considerations lead us to an alternative point of 
view with respect to the one expressed by Tomasello. Tomasello 
thinks that shared intentionality establishes continuity in child’s 
development from dyadic exchanges to collaboration. In fact, we 
can argue that an intrinsic motivation to reciprocity exists, which 
is specifi cally human and not linked to purposeful action and it 
appears in the fi rst months. If instead of taking as the turning point 
the ninth month when the interpretation of intentional action and 
triadic exchange develop, we consider the preceding phase, we can 
see that the fundamental difference between humans and other 
primates emerges in the fi rst months when children show their 
motivation to relate with others before action and cooperation 
are possible. Seen from this stance collaboration in action and 
sharedness due to the motivation to be related to another human 
follow two different paths. 
Therefore, we can distinguish between two different ways to see the 
development of intersubjectivity. One considers that there are diffe-
rent phases. One early phase, before nine months, characterized by 
sharing behavior and emotions followed by a phase at around nine 
months where goals are shared and preluding to the possibility of 
collaborative engagement. According to this view the child that in 
the fi rst phase just responds to behavior and emotions afterwards 
becomes able to understand action and to share goals with others. 
Thus, the fi rst phase is overcome from the subsequent ones. The 
point of view I propose is different. Humans are endowed with a 
specifi c attitude to mutually interact. This attitude manifests itself 
in the fi rst months and overstays all life long. This means that, 
contrary to the classical position that one fi nds in the philosophy of 
language, we can defi ne communication separately from collective 
action. Communication is not just a form of collective action. We 
can change the formal features that we attribute to communica-
tion. Within philosophy of language the line of reasoning is that 
of logical derivation. In this perspective, communication derives 
its features from the features of rational action. This implies two 
major consequences. One is that to communicate the ability to 
acknowledge others’ mental states is necessary; the other is that 
it is impossible to comprehend what does the infant in the fi rst 
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interactions (Airenti, 2003). I think that we should look instead to 
what characterizes precocious interactions, i.e. interactions realized 
not only before the development of language but also before the 
development of the comprehension of the intentionality of action. 
At that stage we fi nd three main features defi ning communication. 
It must be noted that these features are independent of action and 
language. Moreover, they do not disappear with development. 
What is in place since fi rst interactions is the format of commu-
nication. We can defi ne this format as follows:
- participants share attention on each other’s acts
- the modality of interaction is alternation
- the acts must follow the frame of reciprocity
These features must be simultaneously present to characterize an 
interaction as communicative.
We can now try to respond to three possible objections. A fi rst 
objection could possibly be that these characteristics are too simple 
to defi ne communication. I think that to this it can be answered 
that even if this framework is simple, it is suffi cient to discrimi-
nate between humans and other primates. It has been shown that 
primates are able to attract others’ attention on their own acts to 
obtain assistance, but they are unable to share attention to show 
reciprocity when there is no specifi c goal to attain (Gomez, 1998). 
Moreover, this basic schema gives account of the fact that while 
the sophisticated forms of communication require language and 
the ability to understand others’ mental states, there are simpler 
forms of communication. These forms are typical of infant/adult 
interactions and sometimes they are used also by adults when a 
particular intimacy allows it. 
A second objection could be that it is not proven that commu-
nication is separated from collective action. In fact, considering 
only what happens after nine months one could say that what is 
shared is always action. But if you look at what happens earlier 
it is clear that sharedness is at the basis of interactions before the 
child acknowledges the intentionality of action. In humans the 
possibility to share actions is preceded by sharedness as a basis 
for communication. For humans not all collective actions are 
communicative.  When the only interest is in the result, the action 
even if realized in concurrence with others, is not communicative 
and no sharedness is involved. In the case of primates there is 
the possibility to act collectively but no shared action is possible 
because there is no basic communicative intent. 
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A third objection could be that there is no necessity to postulate 
continuity between infant and adult communication (Airenti, 
2004). As we have seen a possibility is to postulate that simple 
forms of interactions are replaced by more and more developed 
ones. Actually, what is characteristic of precocious interactions is 
that the format is performed without the necessity of meaning. 
This is what happens in the experiment mentioned before where 
children of 18/24 months, after having retrieved a toy, put the toy 
where it was before to start the game again. In adults the possibility 
exists to have interactions where no meanings are involved but 
the only goal is to confi rm or establish relatedness. This can be 
realized either by gestures, smiles, sounds, precisely as infants - and 
adults in relation with infants – do, or using language. Examples 
are the perfectly interchangeable utterances performed when for 
any reasons one is compelled to stay with unknown people (lift, 
doctor waiting room, etc.), or desires to comfort someone in di-
stress, and so on.  In adults exchanges as in children’s ones not 
any possible response is accepted within the format of reciprocity. 
Things are made more diffi cult by the fact that while infants have 
interactions with a very limited number of people, adults interact 
with many possible partners. Thus what counts as an acceptable 
response depends on the background constructed by all the pre-
ceding interactions (Airenti, 2005). 
   
5. ENGAGEMENT AND RECIPROCITY
We can now come back to the concept of engagement. As we 
have seen, this concept is generally used to designate two diffe-
rent phenomena, i.e. to explain both the involvement of infants 
in interactive situations and of adults in collective actions. The 
hypothesis I present here is that the two situations are fundamen-
tally different. In fact infants involved in interactions with adults 
are experimenting the fi rst basic forms of communications. In 
this sense communication is characterized as the intention to be 
in interaction with the other whether or not a specifi c meaning 
is present. Communication is a form of intersubjectivity. On the 
contrary, as far as action is involved we have two possibilities. 
One is that one actor just happens to have the occasion to profi t 
of the action of someone else. If my neighbor is entering the front 
door before me, she will probably keep the door open for me to 
come in. We do not have a shared intention. We just adjust our 
actions. In this case the motivation is typically human, politeness. 
In the majority of situations, on the contrary, when two people 
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do something together they share the intention to attain a specifi c 
goal. This can be very simple as lifting up an object too heavy for 
one person or more complex as in the case of musicians trying to 
perform a good interpretation of a trio. In this case there is the 
mutual engagement that each one will perform the part of the task 
she has been assigned.
Therefore, we can contrast two models. In the classical model we 
have two situations: individual actions, which are caused by inten-
tions vs. collective actions (including communication), which are 
caused by we-intentions and imply mutual engagement. Collective 
actions are the manifestation of cooperation.
I propose an alternative model. Three kinds of action are possible, 
individual action, caused by individual intention, collective actions, 
which are caused by individual intention plus expectations about 
others’ actions, and shared actions. A collective action can fail 
even if one of the individual actions has been completely perfor-
med. The failure can be due to two different reasons. Either one 
of the actors does not perform her part, or the cooperation is not 
suffi cient to achieve the goal, for instance the weight is too heavy 
also for two persons. Shared actions require mutual engagement. 
Often the other’s engagement is attributed on the basis of a pre-
sumed common interest to achieve the goal. Sometimes, to be 
sure that an actor will participate to a shared action an explicit 
engagement is requested, a promise, for instance or, even more 
formally, a contract.
Communication is a different form of interaction. Caused by 
communicative intention  (Airenti, Bara, & Colombetti, 1993), it 
implies sharedness and has reciprocity as a condition.  In case of 
failure, the failure of attaining reciprocity implies the failure of 
communication. This is because the acts of the participants take 
their pragmatic meaning only as part of the shared situation of 
reciprocity. If the partner does not acknowledge a communicative 
act, the act is not accomplished. This is why the non-response 
situation is far more distressing than any negative answer. 
If we accept these theoretical distinctions, the differences that we 
observe among infants, adults and chimpanzees become clear. 
Adults may perform according to all the possibilities we have just 
described. Chimpanzees participate to individual actions and 
collective actions without engagement, relying on the expectation 
of others’ actions. They do not have communicative exchanges. 
They can attract the attention of others’ to obtain their help but 
they do not perform their actions within the reciprocity frame. 
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Infants have only the communicative intention and they afterward 
develop the comprehension of the intentionality of action and later 
the comprehension of collective intentionality.They do not use 
explicit engagement in cooperation till rather late.  
In conclusion collective intentionality does not make the difference 
between young humans and chimpanzees. What makes the dif-
ference is reciprocity, which infants develop very early in life and 
that is the fundamental aspect of intersubjectivity all life long.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Humans are social beings and they develop their relationships with 
others since very early in life. If this is an obvious fact for every-
body, there are many questions that are still open to discussion. In 
particular, three problems are controversial: Which are the bases of 
human intersubjectivity? Is it possible to distinguish human inter-
subjectivity from the relations that nonhuman primates establish 
with their conspecifi cs? Finally, is there continuity between the 
precocious forms of intersubjectivity and the more developed ones 
of the adult? In this paper I have suggested that the infants not 
only share emotions with their caregivers, but also already apply 
a cognitive format that is the basic structure of all communicative 
interactions. It is this format, based on reciprocity that constitutes 
the continuity between precocious and adult interactions. How this 
format can be compelling for humans is shown by the fact that it 
is imposed any time a possible interaction is conceived even with 
animals, plants or objects. In fact, anthropomorphism, this odd 
phenomenon where we see humans for instance proposing deals 
or asking for excuses, to their pets or even to objects of everyday 
use, like a car or a coffee-maker, becomes more explicable if we 
postulate that even in these cases humans use the only format 
they have at their disposal (Airenti, 2007). I have then argued 
that the bases of human intersubjectivity are also the cognitive 
bases of communication (Airenti, in press). To cooperate with 
others in view of attaining a common goal is a very different way 
to interact. This kind of interaction is based on collective action 
and it is common to human and nonhuman primates. 
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EMPATHY BETWEEN 
PSYCHOLOGY, NEUROSCIENCES 
AND PHENOMENOLOGY: 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL, 
CLINICAL AND THERAPEUTIC 
ASPECTS FROM AN 
INTERSUBJECTIVE PERSPECTIVE
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GILBERTO DI PETTA3
ABSTRACT
Rediscovering empathy, as a basic phenomenon of human experience in 
certain strictly scientifi c fi elds, fosters the meeting between neuroscience 
and phenomenology. This represents a challenge to all those psycholo-
gists and psychiatrists who do not trust the dimension of feeling. It is 
a challenge for them to accept the lived experience as a research area. 
Phenomenological psychopathology can be more useful in the daily clinical 
practice of psychiatry and psychology, centered essentially on the inter-
personal contact between the clinician and the patient.  The development 
of empathy in a strong intersubjective perspective is the background of 
several therapeutic approaches, for example group-existential analysis 
(Gruppen-Daseinsanalyse) with psychotics and addicts and severe per-
sonality disorders, based upon the shared experience of “betweenness”. 
Keywords: psychology, psychiatry, neuroscience.
 
1. WHAT DOES EMPATHY MEAN FOR PSYCHOLOGISTS? 
Psychologists have often shown a spontaneous antipathy towards 
empathy. But this antipathy towards empathy is not just a pun: 
words play with each other only if they have something that si-
multaneously joins and separates them. The element in common 
between anti-pathy and em-pathy is the pathos: many psycholo-
gists feel that there’s something wrong in feeling, something that 
you cannot accept1. The refusal of empathy has deep roots, which 
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1 In psychoanalysis, for example, an “alarm signal” (Basch, 1983) towards emphatic 
understanding has been developed. Hartmann (1964) was already suspicious of
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are not always rational but can be found written in the history 
of psychology. The diffi culties met along the path towards the 
acknowledgment of psychology as a science, ended up causing a 
defense to the bitter end, also resisting the changes in epistemolo-
gical standards. All the vicissitudes met by the concept of empathy 
in psychology reveal that there is no agreement on the meaning of 
this term2. From Titchener (1909, 417) - who identifi ed empathy 
with “the process of humanizing objects, and reading or feeling 
ourselves inside them” - to the latest research on mind-reading, 
each defi nition refl ects the outlook of the theoretical background 
they belong to. Empathy takes the shape of its temporary holder 
each time. For example, we can fi nd it among the personality traits, 
described in operational terms through particular social behaviors 
and estimated by scales which specify the quantity of empathy 
“contained” in each individual. But even within the same fi eld, the 
measurement instruments differ both in the defi nition of the theo-
retical construct and in measurement methods. Tests on empathy 
have been divided into three categories (Bonino et al., 1998): tests 
evaluating cognitive aspects, tests evaluating affective aspects and 
multi-dimensional tests. Crumbling the phenomenon of empathy 
seems to depend on its reduction in terms of theoretical outlook, 
and especially on the meta-theoretical premises which take for 
granted the separation between cognitive and affective spheres. In 
 
what he regarded as “impressionistic” knowledge and, in the same way, psycho-
logists kept considering empathy as an inaccurate and unreliable approach to 
others. Somebody even coined the term “ecpathy” (Gonzalez de Rivera, 2004) 
which would mean a sort of counter-empathy, of resistance to feeling, needed by 
psychoanalysts in order to avoid all damage caused by emotional relationships 
with patients. Although it is really rare that psychoanalysts and psychotherapists 
refer to empathy (Clark, 2006, p. 42), in other psychological fi elds it is even rarer. 
An essay (Albiero & Matricardi, 2006) investigating the destiny of empathy in 
psychology revealed that due to its evasive and fl eeting nature, empathy has very 
soon been forgotten by psychologists, but has kept on intriguing only “the followers 
of minor knowledge niche”.
2 Psychoanalysis presents inconsistent meanings too. The term Einfühlung occurs 
only 12 times in the complete works of Freud. In the Standard Edition it has been 
translated only 3 times with the term “empathy” (Pigman, 1995), while the Italian 
version always translates it with the term “identifi cation”. Kohut, the theorist who 
most discussed empathy, fi rst (1984) considered it as “the capacity to think and feel 
oneself into the inner life of another person” and later (1959) as a “professional” 
instrument for acquiring knowledge, which needs to be controlled by the secondary 
rational process. Other authors’ tendency of assimilating different concepts within 
the theoretical background, often end up confusing empathy with other concepts, 
such as projective identifi cation.
ORAL SESSION
51INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP - ENACTING INTERSUBJECTIVITY
this way empathy becomes a measurable trait, an ability, a form 
of information transmission, a process of mediation or of cognitive 
decentralization, an emotional activation, and so on. As proof of 
this situation, many works (Bohart & Greenberg, 1997; Batson 
et al., 2005) quote more or less long lists about the different me-
anings or uses of the term “empathy”. After the experience has 
been taken to pieces, one just has to put it back together applying 
the ordinary “multifactorial” formula.
2. THE EXPERIENCE OF EMPATHY
 In recent years, the phenomenon of empathy has become central 
to those scientifi c research areas which once were remote from this 
sort of typically “psychological” subjects. We wish to quote just two 
especially signifi cant examples: the work of Varela on neurobiology 
(Varela & Shear, 1999; Petitot, Varela, et al.,1999; Varela, 2000) 
and the research on mirror neurons carried out by Rizzolati (2005; 
Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001, 2006; Rizzolatti  & Sinigaglia, 
2007) and Gallese (2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2008). Both cases 
are characterized by the resumption of the phenomenological 
method launched by Husserl and by the results of his analysis. 
What brings together these two apparently different fi elds is their 
essentially radical attitude, which considers lived experiences as 
a valid and properly scientifi c source of knowledge (Armezzani, 
2009). Husserl’s purpose was to establish a new scientifi c area 
with no distinction between science and philosophy. He wanted 
to do it through a rigorous method, which - by a decisive and 
radical discard of theories – leads to “things themselves”. He had 
expected to have a good reception of this project, especially in 
the psychological fi eld, the one he called “the decision fi eld”. On 
the contrary, one century later, his suggestion has been received 
precisely by those basic sciences which psychology struggled to 
emulate, at the risk of refusing lived experience or mutilating its 
feeling. The analysis of the other’s experience - carried out by Hus-
serl in his second book of ‘Ideas’ (1913-1928), in a series of texts 
edited with the title ‘On the Phenomenology of intersubjectivity’ 
(1973), and in his ‘Fifth Cartesian Meditation’ (1950) - unveils 
the Einfühlung phenomenon as the essential acknowledgement 
of the other as an analogon, as a term of possibility, not just for 
intersubjective exchanges, but for the very position of an objective 
world. The studies carried out by his pupil, Edith Stein (1917), 
made clear the deep nature of this phenomenon for which “we 
realize” the other’s experience, “we render present the other’s lived 
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experience”, by means of an intentional act which goes beyond 
mere observation or cognition. Finally, Merleau-Ponty (1945) 
got to the hearth of the matter underlining the role of corporeity 
in the perception of others. Following Husserl, he showed the 
chiasmus (1964, p. 147) between the sentient and the sensible 
within our own bodies: “My hand, while it is felt from within, is 
also accessible from without, itself tangible, for my other hand”. 
This experience of the ambiguity of the body, called by Husserl 
(1950) “alien belonging” and “immanent transcendence”, reveals 
a “lived duality” in my own core. There is an otherness internal 
to the embodied self and this experience is a crucial precondition 
for empathy. As Thompson and Zahavi (2007, p. 82) comment: 
“When my left hand touches my right, or when I perceive another 
part of my body, I experience myself in a manner that anticipates 
both the way in which an other would experience me and the way 
in which I would experience an other.”  
So the embodiment plays a crucial role in grounding relational 
experience. Nowadays this role is largely recognized by cognitive 
sciences (Thompson & Varela, 2001; Schwoebel & Coslett, 2005, 
Gallagher, 2005; Overton, Müller, & Newman, 2008; Morganti, 
Carassa, & Riva, 2008). A review of social neuroscience (Adol-
phs, 2007) shows that the organization of the neuronal structure 
is closely linked with embodied interactions and that there is an 
association between impaired somatic sensation of one’s own body 
and impaired ability to judge other people’s emotions. 
Such fi ndings confi rm that “empathy is a multifaceted experience 
rooted in the spontaneous and involuntary resonance of two living 
bodies with each other” (Thompson, 2007, p. 165).  Although it is 
based on perception and can involve inference, “it is not reducible 
to some additive combination of perception and inference (...). 
Rather, in empathy, we experience the other directly as a person” 
(Thompson, 2001, p. 16). 
When Varela was studying empathy as a neurobiologist, he didn’t 
think about a feeling or a particular kind of understanding, but 
about the essential form of our “being with the others”, about the 
“fact of being structurally conceived for having relations with our 
congeners, with individuals belonging to the same species” (Varela, 
2001). And this statement comes from phenomenological grounds: 
“It is one of the most impressive discoveries of the phenomeno-
logical movement to have quickly realized that an investigation 
of the structure of human experience inevitably induces a shift 
towards considering several levels of my consciousness as inextri-
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cably linked to those of others and to the phenomenal world in an 
empathic mesh”. (Varela, 1996, p. 347). That’s the reason why, as 
stated by Gallese (2006, p. 193) “today signifi cant aspects of the 
phenomenological thought fi nd a clear confi rmation in the results 
obtained by the neuroscientifi c researches on intersubjectivity”. 
Maybe “hard sciences” turn to phenomenology because “pheno-
menology is a hard thought”, which proposes a radical refl ection 
about “the way we are” (Gallese, 2006, p. 315). When we put 
ourselves in this radical attitude, we aren’t satisfi ed by well-
developed theoretical models, by multifactorial claims or by the 
sum of bio-psycho-social components. This is the challenge for 
psychology: accepting experience as a research area, without 
forgetting, during the following processes, where they all comes 
from and without building more or less rational defensive walls 
against the evidence.
3. EMPATHY IN CLINICAL PRACTICE FROM A PSYCHOPA-
THOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW
 The shift from the case - the objective case, the ‘interesting’ case 
- to the person indicates the slow, diffi cult journey, obstructed by 
many prejudices which have accumulated in medical culture and 
even in medical circles. As a result this concept of “case” has been 
something which has always conditioned us deeply3. Binswanger 
(1942) sustained that the optimism of knowledge consists in be-
lieving that the problem of psychiatry can be resolved or will be 
 
3 In psychiatry, more than a century ago, the long wave of positivist thinking, 
which at that time was in a strange and awkward juxtaposition to the Romantic 
movement, allowed a great fl ourishing of experimental medicine (following the 
model of natural sciences) and this was an extremely positive factor for medicine 
in the late 19th century. It permitted one, however, to entertain rash suggestions 
of a reductionism which could be easily erected as a system by clinicians who were 
epistemologically unprepared and unready. The alienist clinician was therefore 
infl uenced by the naturalistic environment of the worst Lombrosian type, to the 
extent of objectifying the other. That reifi cation of the other person, of the sick 
person, ended by forcing the suffering person completely into the anonymity of 
the category of objects, both in an etio-pathogenetic and nosological sense. In this 
area the famous Griesingerian thesis on mental illness as a brain disease, which 
dates from 1863, becomes wrongfully absolutized from the point of view of radical 
medicalization of a man suffering psychologically or having disturbed behavior. 
On the other hand, we cannot but recognize the fecund horizon of naturalistic 
psychiatry, which today is giving important results in biological psychiatry and in 
neuropsychology. We cannot a priori minimize or negate these results, just as we 
should take good care of not over-emphasizing them in an absolutely undeserved 
and unworthy manner.
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resolved only by following the naturalistic hypothesis. Here we 
are dealing with an act of faith which is possible only if one is not 
aware that the human being is characterized by “life” (Leben) or 
by his natural being only unilaterally. According to Binswanger 
(1942), it is necessary to fully understand characterization as 
human-presence-in-the-world (Menschliche Dasein) as is the need 
to historicize himself. Psychiatry and psychology are therefore 
basically human sciences: they are the sciences of human existence 
which can relate to medicine, but not only to medicine. Human 
existence is not only nature, but also culture and history. It is the 
Husserlian Crisis, the famous Crisis of European Science (1936), 
that is one of the fi xed points, the cornerstone on which the ope-
ning up of psychology and psychiatry towards the rediscovery of 
intentionality of the conscience, the concept of world-of-life, or 
lived world (Lebenswelt) is based. It is this very working from the 
concepts of Crisis, this opening up of the intersubjective relation-
ship and of the embodiment that enabled Merleau-Ponty (1945) 
to demonstrate the importance of the concept of the lived body. 
It is possible to perceive a bipolar tension between nature and 
existence, between the ‘case’ objectifi ed in biological parameters 
(in scales and scores, in extremely subtle biochemical, psycho-
immunitary, neuropsycho-endocrinological pathways, published 
in international papers) and the ‘case’ met here and now in its 
singular reality, which is unrepeatable and irreducible. As clinicians 
we have to say of the individual sick person: “he is depressed, 
he is the depressed person, he is that depressed person”. We are, 
however, not only observers, we are co-protagonists in an event 
which is co-existential: “esse est co-esse” (being is being-with) 
(Marcel, 1937). 
The clinician must therefore be a chameleon of methods (in 
methods, not chameleon like in structure) also because he, in his 
daily practice, meets the other person in his ambiguity between 
nature and existence, but always as a partner, never reducible to 
a clinical case. In reality, this leads us to conceive consciousness 
as intentionality and even before Husserl, it was Brentano (1874), 
who, not far from the University where Griesinger worked, said 
that consciousness is always intentional consciousness, that is, it is 
always consciousness of something (aboutness). Here is the whole 
revolutionary meaning for psychiatry and psychology when we say 
that the ‘I’ always puts itself in relation to someone or something. 
Led back to its roots, that is to say that the ‘I’, even in its widest 
metapsychological sense, does not fully cover the reality of human 
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existence and it is this which Heidegger (1927) expresses with the 
concepts of Wirzeit (the time of us) and Ichzeit (the time of me). 
This constitution of the “us” leads inevitably to the constitution 
of the other. And this is an unavoidable option for psychiatry 
and psychology: the necessity to construct a phenomenology of 
the intersubjectivity, going beyond the phenomenology of the 
‘I’, for which we are all indebted to Husserl. In this fi eld, which 
is propaedeutic, for every psychiatric clinical procedure, the ‘I 
think’ should be replaced by ‘we exist’. A ‘we exist’ in which the 
encounter reveals the other person to me not as an object, but as a 
concrete singular existence. And this must be emphasized, because 
in daily life, the ‘we’ which the phenomenologist encounters more 
often is the ‘we’ of indifference, a sort of cold, opaque, empty ‘we’: 
the ‘we’ of 4O passengers pressed together in a bus, the ‘we’ of 
human relationships in the social environment, the impersonal 
‘One’ of daily existence. Having understood this necessity in the 
relationship, the centrality of the ‘with’ reveals all the depth of 
what will become the Buberian (1937) assertion, for whom the 
fundamental fact of human existence is man with man, that is, 
human relationships. Having understood this, we should widen 
our subject matter to include the problem of the clinician-patient 
relationship, in particular in the world of psychotherapy with its 
dialogical dimensions. This is basically the moment in which one 
realizes one’s own ‘ipseitas’ in co-existential ways. The problem 
of reciprocity and participation is expressed here in its entirety 
and demonstrates how existing is also participating according to 
the interpersonal foundation of psychological consciousness. On 
such a foundation, the encounter is not to be understood only 
and simply as a “being-with” (Mit-sein), that is, as an indefi nite 
anonymous and impersonal series of daily returning to the other, 
which we always meet, but as a being-with-the-other, faithful to 
the insuppressible dialectic structure of the encounter (Begegnung, 
Rencontre) (Callieri, 2007). 
At this point the objectivated case, where we started out from, 
is transformed into alter-ego. The anthropological development, 
which derives from this dialectic and which tends to wedge itself 
between two poles made up of the anguish of the single person and 
the passion of existence, leads us to examine again in a comple-
tely different light, new subjects of primary importance in every 
psychopathology which then becomes human science: restlessness, 
awareness of guilt, solitude, envy, shame, courage, expectation, 
hope, nostalgia, love. 
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4. EMPATHY AND GROUP-EXISTENTIAL ANALYSIS: PHE-
NOMENOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
One of the most important ideas of phenomenology is the deep 
union between the subject, other people and the world-of-life. 
This idea offers an enormous potential of transformation, which is 
very useful in the clinic and in treatment4 of everyday contact with 
patients affected by psychoses, addiction and personality disorders. 
Central to this approach is the group-experience lived in a phe-
nomenological perspective Unlike classical existential analysis 
(Daseinsanalyse, Binswanger, 1942), this approach (Di Petta, 
2006) widens the application of phenomenology beyond the 
analyst-patient pair to a group of persons made up of therapists 
and patients together, in which both feel themselves as human-
beings-in-the-world. Consequently the emotional atmosphere is 
extremely intense. The “epochè” is the preliminary condition of 
this setting. The lived experiences mix freely, without expressed 
interpretations, in a totally emotional context. The lived experience 
recalls another lived experience, becomes another lived experience, 
and looks for another lived experience. The lived experience, here 
(including delusional or hallucinatory experiences), has its inten-
tionality (aboutness). These experiences in the emotional context 
of phenomenological group freely mix with each other, producing 
change and transformation in all participants. The passage from 
initial negative emotions to fi nal positive emotion in each group 
session is crucial: from helplessness to hope, from pain to light, 
from aloneness to intimacy of nearness. The function of the thera-
pist is to give a sense to this experience. Thus empathy, in this way, 
is a truly lived intersubjective dimension that is meaningful, made 
up of pain and pleasure, helplessness and happiness, aloneness 
and nearness, anger and friendship: these are the “fundamental 
affective positions” (Heidegger’s Befi ndlischkeit, 1927). This idea 
of a plural phenomenology (being-we-in-the-cure), a realization of 
Binswanger’s weness-which-loves (Die liebende Wirheit, 1942) in 
an emotional group made up of therapists and patients together, is 
applied in a public context of cure. This phenomenological appro-
ach among some of these lost existences has become a sort of way 
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we used to have three basic approaches in mental disorders: social, biological and 
psychological. These models don’t pay attention to internal experiences of patients 
as persons at all.  
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out, all together, through cure, towards freedom and the world. 
It is essential to adapt a philosophical level of Husserl’s ideas from 
one hundred years ago to the therapeutic fi eld, in the “here and 
now” of the intersubjective encounter. What is it possible to achieve 
with one’s bare hands relying entirely on one’s own experience with 
phenomenology in the treatment of patients who have dropped-out 
of conventional treatment? The phenomenological background has 
been extremely useful especially in a close encounter (face-to-face) 
with the patient respected more as a real person and not just as 
another clinical case5, a sort of “sight zero” phenomenology?6 In 
this conception what we feel about another person is the ground 
of our own existence: to start from a common emotional land in 
which we can fi nd our lost parts, in which we can give to others 
the parts they have lost and which we can fi nd in our own internal 
experience. The possibility to search and fi nd these parts which 
are still alive. In many cases the human sense of identity is lost 
even where positive psychotic symptomatology does not exist. 
In these cases the only way to survive is to be born in the self 
of another person, on the basis of the other person’s emotional, 
affective dimension. So the phenomenological group experience 
comes into being, in which the ideas of Husserl’s phenomenology 
 
5 This phenomenological approach to group therapy is quite different from the 
psychoanalytical approach to group therapy. In fact it is based on consciousness and 
not on the unknown. The phenomenologist sees the essence of phenomena, doesn’t 
use interpretation, whereas the psychoanalyst is more interested in recording the 
hidden meanings beyond the phenomena. In the atmosphere of the phenomeno-
logical group the emotional dimension is fundamental and of greater importance 
than words and rational conversation. Another point of difference compared to 
psychoanalysis is the complete involvement of the therapist as a human being in 
the emotional dimension of the group, in the same way and at the same level as 
the patient. The therapist here is not outside the group, but completely inside. Both 
therapist and patient leave their roles and are in the phenomenological group as 
human beings body-to-body, existence-to-existence, as persons who love, cry and 
feel without the barrier that exists between clinician and their patient. From being 
one next to another and from being one in front of another to being one with another.
6 This is a military metaphor. When the enemy is very near, a telescopic sight is 
useless, guns are utilized with “sight zero”, the fi ght is man to man. Optic devices 
are, here, the metaphor of the complicated metapsychological models, which sup-
port other psychotherapy models. The engagement between therapist and patient, 
in this case, is short, quick and direct. The other man is here, in front of you, in 
visual contact, consciousness to consciousness. All is here and now, between me 
and you. From man to man. In this condition many clinicians avoid their patients 
and patients feel a paradoxical failure of encounter.  
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(1913-1928), Jaspers’s (1913) and Schneider’s (1959) psychopa-
thology and Binswanger’s existential analysis (1942) have become 
therapeutic experience.
 
5. THE EXPERIENCE OF EMPATHY IN GROUP-EXISTEN-
TIAL SESSIONS: INTERSUBJECTIVITY AS “BETWEEN-
NESS”.
 The experience shared by therapists and patients, session after 
session, is characterized by focusing consciousness on one’s own 
internal experience, searching for the lost structure of one’s own 
being-in-the-world (In-der-welt-sein): the encounter between one’s 
own self and another one, the rebirth of one’s own existential mo-
vements, fi nding one’s self and losing one’s self and fi nding one’s 
self again. An endless game of swapping and changing the intimate 
parts of one’s own self7. Group participation is open; anyone from 
anywhere is admitted to this experience. The initial silence within 
the group is total. The leader can feel the emergence of the anxiety 
of waiting in this silence. The therapist in a group existential session 
is in search of a starting point from somewhere within his own 
personal experience in order to begin the group therapy. He fi nds 
the concrete intersubjectivity of the participants as betweenness 
within the experience of his consciousness about the world of life 
(Lebenswelt). This has specifi c color, form, smell and sound. 
He can see the profi les of the faces, he can see the eyes, the bodies 
of everyone. He speaks with simple words about his own lived 
experience, what he has in his heart and he uses words from his 
heart. He does not interpret anything8, he looks for the form and 
the sense of the lived experience. He is the clinician, the group 
leader, but, at same time, he is the fi rst patient of the group. He 
talks about what he is feeling authentically as an ordinary human 
being at that moment: his anger, his pain, his tiredness, his shame, 
his guilt. This “bracketing” (epochè) of his being a clinician has 
helped him to discover himself as a human being in contact with 
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7 Lack of preselection; free accessibility into the group unrestricted by rigid rules; 
less structured actions, the presence of addicts, psychotics and normal people side 
by side; assumption of the space and time of addicts (here and now) as group time: 
all the above elements make up the particular group atmosphere.  
8 The concept of the form of the lived experience here is crucial. He sees this form 
and his consciousness constitutes it. It is even clearer in his mind. The form of 
lived clarifi es itself.
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other human beings. After having spoken, after he has looked eve-
ryone in the face, he invites everyone to do the same thing: to say 
what they feel, to speak about their own internal experience, here 
and now, anything at all. He invites everyone to utilize any form of 
expression: mouth, hands, eyes, the whole body. The atmosphere 
becomes more and more pregnant after each patient speaks. If 
anyone needs help in order to express themselves, he helps them. 
If anyone is unable or unwilling to express themselves, he leaves 
them in their dimension of emotional silence. It is important to say 
only what one feels not what one thinks. During this fi rst circle of 
experiences, the therapist understands who is emotionally ready to 
meet with another. Now there are two chairs, which were already 
placed in the middle of group. What are they waiting for? The 
encounter. The sensations, the moods, the emotions expressed are 
all in the air. Who will sit in the centre of the group? Who will 
encounter whom? Who wants to open himself towards the other? 
If nobody presents himself, the leader chooses.  He calls. He invi-
tes. Two profi les of men slowly come out of the circle towards the 
centre of the group. They sit in front of each other. Two persons, 
meet who knew nothing of each other before. They hold each 
other’s hands and they look into each other’s eyes. Their words 
are very simple: “What do you feel?”. The rest of the group listens 
in silence. A collective warming spreads to all participants. If 
anyone in the centre of the group needs help, someone stands up 
and sits behind that person and puts his hands on his shoulders 
in order to support him. The therapist tries to be in tune with the 
living experience of the two persons who are in the centre of the 
group. Sometimes the persons in the centre of the group change. 
Slowly the atmosphere changes and becomes more positive. Pain 
and anguish are replaced by hope and brightness. The group 
continues at this point with another circle of experiences. All the 
participants speak about their group feelings.  At the end of the 
group session everyone can feel empathy. The therapist concludes 
speaking about his lived experience. The mix of pain, anger and 
helplessness results in relief. At the end of the group experience it 
is evident that not even heroin is able to calm anyone more than 
a warm hug between two human beings and that life itself is a 
greater excitement than cocaine. 
6. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES 
In conclusion, the correspondence between the basic intuitions of 
phenomenologist’s and neuroscientifi c fi ndings, well exemplifi ed 
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by Varela and Gallese’s works, suggests the human intersubjective 
experience is situated at an inner and neuralgic level, which is 
the pre-condition of cognitive ability to attribute mental states to 
an other individual. At long last phenomenological accounts of 
intersubjectivity are seen not only as a philosophical topic, but as 
a basis for developing a new research attitude closely linked with 
human-presence-in-the-world. In the clinical area this attitude gets 
to the heart of the problem of the clinician-patient relationship. 
Both clinician and patient can meet if the former has discovered 
the original intersubjectivity in his own experience after bracketing 
his own prejudices toward the lived experience of empathy. This 
requires a true and precise work of intentional consciousness and 
require its embodiment as  condition for enactment.
The phenomenology of intersubjectivity is waiting to be construc-
ted not only in a theoretical sense, but in daily practice, following a 
path full of obstacles, which needs existential responsibility of the 
clinician. In fact, intersubjectivity remains a radical philosophical 
problem for those who have come after Husserl. It must be added 
that no one has to confront this problem in such a peremptory way 
as the clinician. The body becomes the central intermediary of this 
intersubjectivity in the sense that the body makes the encounter 
with the other person possible,  as embodiment of its subjectivi-
ty. The application of existential analysis to groups of psychotic 
patients or addicts is a natural extension of phenomenological 
fi ndings and can lead us to unexplored and stimulating perspec-
tives which, in turn, lead to a closer psychotherapy of particularly 
diffi cult patients, based upon the lived experience of empathy.
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ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE NEURAL PROCESSING 
OF SOCIAL EMOTIONS
STEPHANIE BURNETT1, GEOFF BIRD2, JORGE MOLL3, 4, 
CHRIS FRITH5, 6, SARAH-JAYNE BLAKEMORE1
ABSTRACT
Social emotions, such as guilt and embarrassment, are here defi ned as 
emotions which require the representation of another’s mental state. This 
is in contract to the basic emotions, such as visceral fear and disgust, 
which do not. In this fMRI study (Burnett et al., in press), we investiga-
ted the development between adolescence and adulthood of the neural 
processing of social emotions. Nineteen adolescents (10–18 years) and 
10 adults (22–32 years) were scanned while they imagined scenarios in 
which either a social or a basic emotion would be felt. In both age groups, 
anterior rostral medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), a brain region involved 
in mental state representation, was activated during social versus basic 
emotions. However, adolescents activated a lateral part of MPFC for social 
versus basic emotions whereas adults did not. Relative to adolescents, 
adults showed higher activity for social versus basic emotions in left 
temporal pole, a brain region thought to be involved in semantic repre-
sentations of social objects, or ‘social scripts’. These results show that the 
neural processing of social emotion shifts subtly between adolescence and 
adulthood. While MPFC is activated during social emotion in both age 
groups, adolescents recruit anterior (MPFC) regions more than do adults, 
and adults recruit posterior (temporal) regions more than do adolescents. 
Combined anatomical, functional and social cognitive studies are needed 
to ascertain to what extent this shift is due to developing social cognitive 
strategies, or neuroanatomical maturation.
Keywords: Theory of mind, social cognition, adolescent development, 
emotion
1. INTRODUCTION
Adolescence is a period of social and psychological development 
during which social awareness and behaviour undergoes profound 
change (Eisenberg & Morris, 2004; Brown, 2004). One possible 
underlying cause of these cognitive changes is the anatomical 
development in brain areas involved in social cognition, including 
the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and the posterior superior 
temporal sulcus at the temporo-parietal junction (pSTS/TPJ) 
(Giedd et al., 1999; Sowell et al.,1999a,b; Gogtay et al., 2004). 
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Together with temporal lobe structures such as the amygdala and 
temporal poles, these regions constitute a ‘social brain’ network for 
understanding and interacting with conspecifi cs (Brothers, 1990; 
Adolphs, 1999; Frith & Frith, 2003; Frith, 2007). In humans, suc-
cessful interaction with conspecifi cs requires the ability to represent 
mental states such as beliefs, feelings and desires (‘mentalising’) 
(Frith & Frith, 2003; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). Mentalising tasks 
consistently activate anterior rostral MPFC, pSTS/TPJ and tem-
poral poles (Frith & Frith, 2003; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Frith, 
2007). Mentalising is also needed to experience social emotions 
(Olsson & Ochsner, 2008), which include guilt, embarrassment, 
shame and pity. In order to feel embarrassment, for example, you 
must represent someone else’s belief that you have acted foolishly. 
In contrast, basic emotions such as disgust and fear only require the 
awareness of one’s own somatic state. When adults refl ect upon so-
cial emotions such as guilt and embarrassment, components of the 
social brain network involved in mentalising are active, including 
anterior rostral MPFC (Shin et al., 2000; Berthoz, Armony, Blair, 
& Dolan, 2002; Takahashi et al., 2004; Moll et al., 2002; Moll, 
Zahn, de Oliveira-Souza, Krueger, & Grafman, 2005). The ability 
to describe situations in which a social emotion will be experienced 
emerges at around age seven (Harris, Olthof, Terwogt, & Hardman, 
1987). By adolescence, the experience of social emotion permea-
tes everyday social exchange (Zeman, Cassano, Perry-Parrish, & 
Stegall, 2006; Elkind & Bower, 1979). However, recent structural 
imaging research has demonstrated that the neural structures that 
underlie social emotion processing and mentalising, in particular 
MPFC, undergo considerable development during adolescence. Se-
veral studies have reported an increase in white matter volume and 
decrease in grey matter volume in this region during adolescence 
(Giedd et al.,1999; Sowell et al., 1999a,b; Gogtay et al., 2004). 
Whether there are concurrent changes in the neural processing of 
social emotion during adolescence has not previously been investi-
gated. Recent studies looking at other aspects of mentalising have 
reported differential activity within the social brain network in 
adults versus adolescents (see Blakemore, 2008, for review). For 
example, thinking about one’s own intentions was found to recruit 
anterior rostral MPFC more strongly in adolescents (aged 12-18) 
than in adults (aged 22-38) (Blakemore, den Ouden, Choudhury, & 
Frith, 2007). In contrast, adults activated posterior regions (right 
STS) more than did adolescents when thinking about intentions. A 
similar developmental shift in brain activity was found with a task 
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based on decoding communicative intentions (Wang, Lee, Sigman, 
& Dapretto, 2006). When adolescents (aged nine to 14) and adults 
(aged 23-33) judged whether a series of ironic communications 
were sincere or not, adolescents showed stronger activation of 
anterior rostral MPFC than did adults. Adults activated posterior 
regions including the superior temporal and fusiform gyri more. 
Thus, these studies both showed evidence that MPFC activity 
during social cognition tasks decreases between adolescence and 
adulthood, while activity in the temporal lobes shows the opposite 
developmental pattern. The current fMRI study (Burnett et al., in 
press) was designed to investigate whether a comparable deve-
lopmental trajectory takes place for the neural correlates of social 
emotion processing. We scanned 19 adolescents (aged 10-18) and 
10 adults (aged 23-32) as they read a series of sentences that were 
designed to elicit either a social emotion (guilt or embarrassment) 
or a basic emotion (disgust or fear). We predicted that thinking 
about social versus basic emotion scenarios would activate com-
ponents of the social brain network, including anterior rostral 
MPFC, in both age groups (Moll et al., 2002, 2005; Takahashi et 
al., 2004). We further predicted that adolescents would activate 
MPFC more for social compared with basic emotion than adults 
would, as has been found in previous developmental studies of 
mentalising (Wang et al., 2006; Blakemore et al., 2007). The 
social and basic emotion scenarios pertained either to the self or 
to another person (the participant’s mother) (see section 2.2.2). 
We included this additional factor for two reasons. First, in adults, 
there is a difference in neural activity when thinking about emo-
tion in the fi rst versus third person perspective (Ruby & Decety, 
2004). Second, a recent developmental fMRI study (Pfeifer et al., 
2007) has shown that the neural correlates of self/other seman-
tic knowledge retrieval (deciding whether statements such as ‘‘I 
like reading,’’ apply to the self, or to Harry Potter) differentially 
activate components of the mentalising network in adults com-
pared to adolescents. Specifi cally, self versus other retrieval was 
associated with greater activity in the MPFC in adolescents, and 
greater activity in the lateral temporal cortex in adults. Because 
we were specifi cally interested in these brain regions, we decided 
to use self/other versions of each emotional scenario to investigate 
whether a similar developmental pattern would be seen for self/
other processing of emotional scenarios. Our choice of participants’ 
mother as the protagonist in the ‘‘other’’ condition was motivated 
by a need to select an ‘‘other’’ who would be distinct from the self, 
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but suffi ciently familiar to participants that they would be able to 
adopt her emotional perspective (cf. Ruby & Decety, 2004). To 
investigate how similar each participant perceived herself to be to 
her mother, participants completed two versions (self and mother) 
of the NEO-V Factor Personality Inventory. The absence of group 
differences in this measure indicates that any group differences in 
brain activity between the self and other condition was not due 
to group differences in the perceived similarity of participants’ 
mothers to themselves.
2. EXPERIMENTAL METHODS
2.1 Participants
19 female adolescents (10.83 - 18.17 years; mean = 14.8), and 
10 female adults (22.92 - 31.83 years; mean = 26.41), with 
no history of psychiatric or neurological disorder, took part in 
the study. Participants were all female, in consideration of the 
signifi cant gender differences in the neuroanatomical changes 
that take place during adolescence (Giedd et al., 1999) which 
may impact on neural processing. Written informed consent was 
obtained prior to the study from all adult participants, and from 
a parent or guardian of participants younger than 18. The study 
was approved by the UCL National Hospital for Neurology and 
Neurosurgery Ethics Committee. To ensure a consistent level of 
intelligence between groups, the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence (WASI, Harcourt Assessment, Inc., 1999) was ad-
ministered to participants. Mean (± SD) full scale IQ (FSIQ) was 
115.52 (± 6.63) for the adolescent group and 111.14 (± 14.10) 
for the adult group. An independent samples t-test revealed that 
there was no signifi cant difference in FSIQ between groups (t (22) 
= -1.052, P > 0.3). Three adult participants did not complete the 
WASI, but since they had completed university-level education 
their level of intelligence was judged to be comparable to that of 
the other participants.
2.2 Experimental design
The fMRI experiment was split into two 12 min sessions. Within 
each session, each participant underwent 277 scans. We employed 
a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed factorial design, comprising within-subjects 
factors emotion (social versus basic) and protagonist (self versus 
other), and between-subjects factor group (adolescent versus 
adult). Participants read 144 emotional sentences describing social 
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or basic emotion scenarios pertaining either to the self or to their 
mother (see Table 1 for examples of scenarios). After reading each 
scenario, participants rated to what extent the protagonist would 
feel a given emotion, on a discrete rating scale from 1 (not at all) 
to 4 (very much), using a button box.
Table 1. Examples of social (embarrassment, guilt) and basic (disgust, fear) 
emotion scenarios from the self condition
ORAL SESSION
Emotion Sentence
Social:  “Your dad started doing rock ‘n’ roll dances in the 
Embarrassment  supermarket”
 “You were quietly picking your nose but your friend
   saw you”
 “You tripped over in front of a boy you liked”
 “Your friend said you had a wet patch on your backside 
  all the way home”
 “Your were eating with your friend and you dribbled
  down your top”
Social: Guilt “You laughed at a quiet girl you know and it made her sad”
 “You laughed when your friend told you she was feeling
  upset”
 “You pretend to be sick so you don’t have to visit your
  gran”
 “You joined in when people were laughing at your best
  friend” 
  “You lied to your dad when you wanted to go out with
  your friend”
Basic: Disgust “Your friend was vomiting next to you and you could
  smell it”
 “You were in your friend’s garden and you ut your 
 hand in slimy cat poo”
 “You saw a big hairy fl y laying eggs on your friend’s lunch”
 “Your dad told you that the fridge was infested with
  maggots”
 “You saw a pile of rotting guts near the dustbin at
  your friend’s house”
Basic: Fear “Your friend screamed that there was a wasp inside
  your jumper”
 “An angry dog was barking and running towards you
  and your friend”
 “You suddenly woke up as someone screamed by your bed”
 “Your dad slammed on the brakes as a lorry hurtled
  towards you”
 “You were with your friend and a creature ran up your neck”
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2.2.1 Emotion factor
Each scenario featured either a social emotion or a basic emotion. 
The social emotions were embarrassment and guilt, and the basic 
emotions were disgust and fear. The emotion sentences were taken 
from a pilot in which adolescent and adult participants rated their 
emotional response to a series of emotion sentences in a question-
naire. Sentences that were rated highly by both age groups were 
chosen for use in this fMRI study. In addition, the sentences were 
designed to maximize the difference in mentalising between so-
cial and basic conditions. Therefore, the basic emotion sentences 
featured immediate, visceral disgust- and fear-evoking situations. 
Both social and basic scenarios featured the protagonist plus one 
other person. This ensured that the difference between the social 
and basic emotion conditions was the need to take into account 
another person’s mental state, not the mere presence of another 
person in the scenario. 
2.2.2 Protagonist factor
The protagonist in each scenario was either the participant (self) 
or the participant’s mother (other).  The same emotional sentences 
were used for the self and other conditions. We ascertained that 
all participants had a living, healthy mother. The mean (plus 
the range) word length, and the number of clauses, was equated 
between all emotion conditions and both protagonist conditions. 
Sentences were presented in blocks of three. Participants had 
9 secs to read silently, imagine and rate their response to each 
emotion sentence. The experiment was blocked by emotion and 
protagonist such that within a block, all three scenarios featured 
the same emotion (disgust, embarrassment, fear or guilt) and the 
same protagonist (self or other). At the start of each block, a 1 
sec cue screen informed participants which emotion and which 
protagonist the proceeding three sentences would feature. Each 12 
min session of the fMRI experiment contained 24 emotion blocks, 
each lasting 28 secs. Condition order was fully randomised. In 
addition there were two 28 sec visual fi xation blocks per session, 
occurring one third and two thirds of the way through each of the 
two sessions. Stimulus presentation was programmed in Cogent 
(www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent/index.html) running in Matlab 6.5, 
which recorded participant responses. Prior to scanning, all par-
ticipants completed a practice session consisting of four scenarios 
from each of the emotions. The sentences used in the practice task 
did not appear inside the scanner.
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2.3 Participants’ perceived similarity to mother
To quantify any age-related differences in participants’ perceived 
similarity to their mothers, which might cause between-group 
differences in brain activity in the protagonist condition, parti-
cipants’ perceived similarity to their mothers was quantifi ed by 
administering two separate versions of the NEO-V personality 
questionnaire (Costa & McCrae, 1991), after the scanning session. 
The two questionnaires were identical except that in one version 
participants answered personality questions about themselves, 
while in the other version they answered the same questions about 
their mother.
2.4 Data acquisition
A 1.5T Siemens Sonata head MRI scanner was used to acquire both 
3-D T1-weighted fast-fi eld echo structural images and multi-slice 
T2*-weighted echo-planar volumes with blood oxygenation level 
dependent (BOLD) contrast. Each functional brain volume was 
composed of 33 3-mm axial slices with a 1.5mm gap and in-plane 
resolution of 3*3 mm, angled at 30° to cover the whole brain and 
minimize signal dropout from the facial sinuses. Repetition time 
was 3 s. Functional data were acquired in two scanning sessions 
of approximately 12 min each, in which a total of 554 volumes 
were acquired, or 277 scans per session. The acquisition of a 
T1-weighted anatomical image occurred after the two functional 
scanning sessions for each participant. The total duration of scan-
ning was approximately 35 mins per participant. 
2.5 Data analysis
Behavioural and fMRI data were analysed by collapsing the four 
emotions disgust, embarrassment, fear and guilt into two emotion 
conditions, social and basic. This was because our hypothesis re-
lated to differential neural effects of social versus basic emotion, 
not to the neural effects of specifi c emotions. Behavioural data 
(emotion ratings) were analysed with the SPSS statistical package. 
Main effects of emotion and protagonist in both groups, as well 
as two- and three-way interactions between emotion, protagonist 
and group, were analysed using mixed model repeated measures 
ANOVA with within-subjects factors emotion and protagonist and 
between-subjects factor group. We used a signifi cance threshold of 
P < 0.05. Imaging data were analysed using SPM2 (http://www.
fi l.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The fi rst six functional image volumes from 
each run were discarded to allow for T1 equilibrium effects, lea-
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ving 542 image volumes per participant. Preprocessing included 
rigid-body transformation (realignment) and slice timing to correct 
for head movement and slice acquisition delays. The images were 
then stereotactically normalised into the standard space defi ned 
by the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template using the 
mean of the functional volumes, and smoothed with a Gaussian 
fi lter of 6mm full-width at half maximum to increase the signal-
to-noise ratio and to facilitate group analyses. The time series 
for each participant were high-pass fi ltered at 128 s to remove 
low-frequency drifts. The analysis of the functional imaging data 
entailed the creation of statistical parametric maps representing 
a statistical assessment of hypothesised condition-specifi c effects 
(Friston et al., 1994), which were estimated with the General 
Linear Model. The effects of interest were the four scenario block 
types (2 emotion * 2 protagonist) and the visual fi xation blocks. 
We also modelled the six realignment parameters as effects of no 
interest, in order to account for possible group differences in head 
movement. Each component of the model served as a regressor in 
a multiple regression analysis for each participant. The resulting 
parameter estimates for each regressor at each voxel were then 
entered into a second level analysis where ‘participant’ served as 
a random effect in a within-subjects ANOVA, enabling population 
inferences to be made. The main effects and interactions between 
conditions were specifi ed by appropriately weighted linear con-
trasts, and determined using the t-statistic on a voxel-by-voxel 
basis. Statistical analysis at the second level was performed for 
each group separately to examine the main effects of all scenarios 
versus fi xation, the main effects of emotion (social > basic, ba-
sic > social) and protagonist (self > other, other > self), and the 
interactions between emotion and protagonist ([self social > self 
basic] – [other social > other basic]; [other social > other basic] 
– [self social > self basic]). To compare directly group differences 
in activation to emotion and protagonist, we looked at two-way 
interactions between group and emotion, and between group and 
protagonist, using the appropriate contrasts. Finally, we looked 
at the three-way interactions between emotion, protagonist and 
group. Statistical contrasts were used to create an SPM{t}, which 
was transformed into an SPM{Z} and thresholded at P < 0.05 
(corrected on the basis of the theory of random Gaussian fi elds for 
multiple comparisons across the whole brain volume examined). 
We report regions that survive correction at P < 0.05, as well as 
activations within regions we had an a priori hypothesis on and 
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Emotion Protagonist Group Mean Std. Deviation
Social Self Adult 2.98 0.349
  Adolescent 2.94 0.397
 Other Adult 3.34 0.343
  Adolescent 3.07 0.514
Basic Self Adult 3.16 0.283
  Adolescent 3.11 0.417
 Other Adult 3.29 0.395
  Adolescent 3.24 0.427
which survived small volume correction (SVC; 12 mm radius 
sphere unless otherwise specifi ed) at P < 0.05. These regions were 
MPFC (Gilbert et al., 2006; Blakemore et al., 2007, 8 mm), pSTS/
TPJ (Frith & Frith, 2003; Aichhorn, Perner, Kronbichler, Staffen, 
& Ladurner, 2006), temporal pole (Blakemore et al., 2007, 8 mm) 
and precuneus (Blakemore et al., 2007) for social versus basic 
emotion; anterior insula (Moll et al., 2002) and inferior frontal 
gyrus (Moll et al., 2005) for basic versus social emotion; postcentral 
gyrus for self versus other (Ruby & Decety, 2004); and the medial 
frontopolar gyrus, left STS, left temporal pole, posterior cingulate 
gyrus and the right inferior parietal lobule for other versus self 
(Ruby & Decety, 2004).
3. RESULTS
3.1 Behavioural data
3.1.1 Emotion ratings
Participants rated to what extent the protagonist of each scenario 
would feel a given emotion, on a discrete rating scale from 1 (not 
at all) to 4 (very much). Mixed design, repeated measures 2x2x2 
ANOVA showed that mean emotion ratings did not differ betwe-
en groups (F (1, 26) = 0.60; P > 0.4) (see Table 2). There were 
no signifi cant two- or three-way interactions between age group 
and the factors emotion and protagonist (all P > 0.2). For both 
groups, basic emotion scenarios were given higher ratings than 
social emotion scenarios (F(1,26) = 9.44, P < 0.01), and other 
scenarios were given higher intensity ratings than self scenarios 
(F(1, 26) = 4.47, P < 0.05). 
Table 2. Mean and standard deviation of the emotion ratings (from 1 to 4), by 
group (adult, adolescent), emotion (social, basic) and protagonist (self, other). 
Ratings for basic emotions were signifi cantly higher than for social emotions. Ho-
wever, there were no signifi cant group differences and no signifi cant interactions.
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3.1.2 Perceived self-mother difference
Data were not available for one adult participant. For the remai-
ning participants, perceived self-mother difference (PSMD) scores 
were computed by calculating the square root of the summed squa-
red self-mother differences for all fi ve dimensions of the NEO-V 
‘self’ and ‘mother’ personality questionnaires. This yielded PSMD 
scores ranging from 5.57 to 37.03 (mean (± SD) = 20.34 ± 9.14). 
A median test of the PSMD scores revealed no difference between 
adult and adolescent participant groups (?2 = 0; P > 0.99). Linear 
regression revealed no relationship between age and PSMD score 
(r2 = 0.009; P > 0.6). 
3.2 Functional imaging data
Data from both imaging runs of one adolescent participant, and 
one run of a second adolescent participant were excluded due to 
excessive head movement (> 5 mm). We report group-level ac-
tivations in hypothesised regions that survived SVC at P < 0.05. 
 
3.2.1 Main effect of sentences vs. visual fi xation
In both adult and adolescent groups, the main effect of all sce-
narios vs. visual fi xation resulted in expected activation of visual 
and motor areas, as well as areas involved in reading (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Main effect of scenarios versus visual fi xation in adult and adolescent 
groups (adult image shown at P < 0.05, fully corrected across the whole brain, 
with minimum spatial extent = 10 voxels; adolescent image shown at P < 0.01, 
fully corrected across the whole brain, with minimum spatial extent = 10 voxels).
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3.2.2 Main effect of emotion for each group separately
In the adult group, the main effect of social emotion (social > ba-
sic) resulted in activation of anterior rostral MPFC, left pSTS/TPJ 
and the left temporal pole (Table 3, Figure 2). In the adolescent 
group, the main effect of social emotion (social > basic) resulted 
in activation of anterior rostral MPFC, left and right pSTS/TPJ 
and the precuneus (Table 3, Figure 2). The main effect of basic 
emotion (basic > social) did not yield any signifi cant activations 
in either group.
Figure 2. Three way interaction between emotion, protagonist and group in left 
TPJ, shown at P < 0.001 on a sagittal glass brain projection. Parameter estimates 
are shown (minus fi xation). This region of left TPJ is most active in adult self-
social emotions and other-basic emotions, and in adolescent self- and other-social 
emotions.
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Table 3. MNI co-ordinates, Z-values and cluster size (in mm3) for regions of acti-
vation in the main effect of emotion, the interaction between emotion and group, 
the main effect of protagonist, the interaction between protagonist and group, and 
the three-way interaction between all three factors.
Contrast Region of activation MNI Z Size in  mm3
  co-ordinates value at P<0.001
Emotion: Adults
social>basic Anterior rostral MPFC -14 44 2 3.82 96
  4 48 18 3.56 216
  6 42 12 3.28 (part of above cluster)
 Left pSTS/TPJ -56 -62 28 3.48 32
 Left temporal pole -36 8 -30 3.43 24
 Adolescents
 Anterior rostral MPFC -10 52 18 4.13 1600
  -6 62 22 4.03 (part of above cluster)
  -4 50 28 3.64 (part of above cluster)
  -18 42 16 3.65 128
  -4 52 -8 3.43 64
  -16 48 34 3.37 40
 Precuneus -4 -56 28 4.64 1360
  14 -56 34 3.49 (part of above cluster)
  -4 -62 40 3.32 64
 Left TPJ -38 -66 42 4.00 2032
  -48 -62 36 3.98 (part of above cluster)
  -38 -62 32 3.62 (part of above cluster)
 Right pSTS/TPJ 44 -48 28 3.31 40
Interaction [Adult (social>basic) – 
between adolescent (social>basic)] 
emotion and Temporal pole  -40 -6 -26 3.43 32
group [Adolescent 
 (social>basic) – 
 adult (social>basic)]
 Left lateral anterior -16 42 20 3.39 32 
 rostral MPFC
Protagonist: Adolescents 
self>other Left postcentral gyrus -24 -40 52 4.32 112
Interaction Adults 
between Left TPJ -42 -66 40 3.83 264 
emotion and Antero-dorsal MPFC 14 42 36 3.38* 5 
protagonist Adolescents
[(Self social Antero-dorsal MPFC  14 38 44 3.29* 8
>self basic)- 
(other social 
> other basic)]
Interaction  (For contrast, see fi gure 5)
between Left TPJ -42 -68 44 3.60 264 
emotion,   -52 -58 34 3.50 40
protagonist 
and group
* = active at P < 0.001, uncorrected 
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3.2.3 Interactions between group and emotion
To identify differences in brain activity to social vs. basic emotion 
between groups, we tested for signifi cant interactions between 
group (adult, adolescent) and emotion (social, basic). 
3.2.3.1 [Adult (social > basic) – adolescent (social > basic)]
This analysis revealed a cluster in left temporal pole (Table 3, 
Figure 3). Inspection of the parameter estimates (Figure 3), as 
well as inclusive masking (with adult social > basic), showed that 
this region was activated more to social than to basic emotion in 
adults, and more to basic than to social emotion in adolescents.
Figure 3. Main effect of social emotion (social > basic) in both groups. Sagittal and 
transverse glass brains showing average group activation for adults and adolescents. 
Shown at P < 0.005; minimum spatial extent = 10 voxels; smoothed with a fi lter 
of 6mm full width at half-maximum at the second level.
3.2.3.2 [Adolescent (social > basic) – adult (social > basic)]
A cluster in left lateral anterior rostral MPFC (Table 3, Figure 4) 
was activated by the contrast [adolescent (social > basic) – adult 
(social > basic)]. Inspection of the parameter estimates (Figure 
4), as well as inclusive masking (with adolescent social > basic), 
showed that this region was activated more to social than to basic 
emotion in adolescents, and more to basic than to social emotion 
in adults.
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Figure 4. Interaction between group (adult, adolescent) and emotion (social, basic): 
activity in left temporal pole ([-40 -6 -26]) resulting from the contrast [adult (social 
> basic) - adolescent (social > basic)], shown at P < 0.005 projected onto a sagittal 
T1 image, with crosshair at [-40 8 -30]; graph showing parameter estimates in left 
temporal pole for social emotion minus fi xation and basic emotion minus fi xation, 
in both groups; positive correlation between age and adjusted BOLD signal in left 
temporal pole ([-40 -6 -26]) in the contrast [social > basic] (r = 0.572; P < 0.001).
3.2.4 Main effect of protagonist
In the adult group, the main effect of self (self > other) did not yield 
any signifi cant activations. In the adolescent group, the main effect 
of self (self > other) resulted in activation of left postcentral gyrus 
(Table 3). The main effect of other (other > self) did not yield any 
signifi cant activations in either the adult or the adolescent group. 
3.2.5 Interactions between protagonist and group
No brain regions showed a signifi cant interaction between prota-
gonist and group.
3.2.6 Interactions between emotion and protagonist
To identify differences in brain activity to social vs. basic emotion 
which differed as a function of protagonist (self, other), we tested 
for signifi cant interactions between emotion (social, basic) and 
protagonist (self, other), in both groups.
3.2.6.1 Adult [(self social > self basic) - (other social > other basic)]
The adult group activated left TPJ in this contrast (Table 3; Figure 
5, top left). At a less stringent threshold (P < 0.001 uncorrected), 
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the adult group activated an antero-dorsal portion of MPFC for 
this contrast (Table 3; Figure 5, top left). Inspection of the para-
meter estimates, as well as inclusive masking (with social > basic 
for self only; and basic > social for other only), showed that the 
MPFC region was more active in self-social emotions than in any 
other condition (Figure 5, bottom left). In contrast, left TPJ was 
more active in self-social emotions and other-basic emotions than 
in the other conditions (shown in the graph in Figure 6). 
Figure 5. Interaction between group (adolescent, adult) and emotion (social, basic): 
activity in MPFC ([-16 42 20]) resulting from the contrast [adolescent (social > 
basic) - adult (social > basic)], shown at P < 0.005 projected onto a sagittal T1 
image, with crosshair at [-16 42 20]); graph showing parameter estimates of activity 
in the MPFC for basic emotion minus fi xation and social emotion minus fi xation, in 
both groups; negative correlation between age and adjusted BOLD signal in MPFC 
([-16 42 20]) in the contrast [social > basic] (r = 0.541; P < 0.005).
ORAL SESSION
79INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP - ENACTING INTERSUBJECTIVITY
Figure 6. Adult and adolescent activity in MPFC in the contrast [(self social > self 
basic) - (other social > other basic)], shown at P < 0.005 on sagittal glass brain 
projections. The adult interaction in left TPJ, containing the region showing a three-
way interaction, can also be seen. Parameter estimates for the interaction between 
emotion and protagonist (all minus fi xation) in MPFC in adults and adolescents are 
shown. This antero-dorsal region of MPFC is most active in self-social emotions.
3.2.6.2 Adolescent [(self social > self basic) - (other social > other 
basic)]
At a less stringent threshold (P < 0.001 uncorrected), the ado-
lescent group showed activity within a similarly antero-dorsal 
region of MPFC for this contrast (Table 3; Figure 5, top right). 
Inspection of the parameter estimates, as well as inclusive masking 
(with social > basic for self only; and basic > social for other only), 
showed that the MPFC region was more active in self social than 
in any other condition (Figure 5, bottom right).
3.2.6.3 Adult and adolescent [(other social > other basic) - (self 
social > self basic)]
No brain regions were signifi cantly active for this contrast, in 
either group.
3.2.7 Three-way interaction between emotion, protagonist and 
group
Left TPJ (MNI co-ordinates [-42 -68 44]; Z = 3.60, P < 0.05 
SVC; Figure 6, top left) was signifi cantly active in the three-way 
interaction between protagonist (self > other), emotion (social > 
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basic) and group (adult > adolescent). Activity in this region was 
driven by the main effect of social > basic emotion in adolescents, 
whereas the adult group showed the same pattern as in the inte-
raction between emotion and protagonist (Figure 6, bottom).The 
opposite contrast with respect to group (adolescent > adult, social 
> basic, self > other) did not yield any signifi cant activations. 
3.3 Regression between age and activation to social > basic 
emotion
Whole-brain linear regression analysis revealed that activity to 
social > basic emotion was positively correlated with age in the 
left temporal pole (MNI co-ordinates [-40 -6 -26]; r = 0.572; P 
< 0.001; Figure 3, lower panel). Activity in the contrast social > 
basic emotion was negatively correlated with age in the left lateral 
anterior rostral MPFC (MNI co-ordinates [-16 42 20]; r = 0.541; 
P < 0.005; Figure 4, lower panel).
4. DISCUSSION
This fMRI study (Burnett et al., in press) investigated the neural 
correlates of social emotion processing in adults and in adolescents. 
When participants imagined social versus basic emotion scenarios 
featuring either themselves or their mothers, both adults and ado-
lescents activated anterior rostral MPFC. However, there was an 
interaction between group and condition in lateral anterior rostral 
MPFC such that the adolescent group activated this region more 
than did adults for social relative to basic emotions. The adult 
group activated a region of the left temporal pole more for social 
relative to basic emotions. 
4.1 Brain activations associated with social emotion in both groups
Social emotions, in contrast to basic emotions, require the ability to 
represent people’s mental states (mentalising). In other words, so-
cial emotions require insight into the mental states of other people 
(Olsson & Ochsner, 2008) – whether they are physically present, 
imagined, or perhaps represented by the concept of societal norms 
(Moll et al., 2005). For example, guilt is experienced when one 
believes that one’s actions warrant disapproval or punishment, or 
that they have caused harm to another individual. In the current 
study, both adults and adolescents activated brain regions known 
to be involved in mentalising, namely MPFC and pSTS/TPJ (Frith 
& Frith, 2003; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Amodio & Frith, 2006), 
during social versus basic emotion processing. 
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An anterior, rostral sub-region of MPFC (MNI ‘y’ co-ordinates 
from 30 to 60; ‘z’ co-ordinates from 0 to 40) is activated by adult 
participants during a wide range of tasks that involve mentalising 
(Amodio & Frith, 2006; Gilbert et al., 2006). It has been propo-
sed that the cognitive role of MPFC in these tasks is to decouple 
mental states from physical reality (Frith, 2007). An alternative, 
but not necessarily incompatible explanation of the role of MPFC 
in mentalising tasks is that it represents the motivational relevance 
of social behaviours (Moll et al., 2005). The current results do not 
distinguish between these possibilities. Several previous studies 
have demonstrated activity within the anterior rostral MPFC in 
adolescents during mentalising tasks (Wang et al., 2006; Blake-
more et al., 2007; Moriguchi et al., 2007). Our data are also in 
agreement with fMRI studies of social emotion in adults, which 
have reported activity within MPFC (Berthoz et al., 2002; Moll et 
al., 2002; Takahashi et al., 2004). The current result extends our 
understanding of the neural correlates of social emotion processing 
to the adolescent population.
Adults and adolescents also activated pSTS/TPJ for social versus 
basic emotion, with activity greater on the left than on the right. 
The left TPJ is consistently activated during mentalising tasks, and 
is thought to play a role in reasoning about the beliefs of others 
(Frith & Frith, 2003; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Samson, Apperly, 
Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004). The pSTS/TPJ is also activa-
ted during mentalising in adolescents (Blakemore et al., 2007; 
Moriguchi, Ohnishi, Mori, Matsuda, & Komaki, 2007). Activity 
within this region in the current study may be related to the need 
for representing or reasoning about other people’s beliefs when 
imagining social versus basic emotion situations.
 
4.2 Differences in social emotion processing between adults and 
adolescents
While both age groups activated anterior rostral MPFC for social 
versus basic emotion, a more lateral part of anterior rostral MPFC 
was activated for this contrast by the adolescent group, but not 
by the adult group. This region was contiguous with the region 
activated by adolescents in the main effect of social versus basic 
emotion. Activity to social versus basic emotion at this locus was 
also negatively correlated with age. Our results therefore suggest 
that, as well as showing greater activity than adults within parts of 
MPFC for social versus basic emotion, adolescents also activate a 
greater volume of MPFC for social emotion processing. The current 
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result is consistent with recent developmental neuroimaging studies 
looking at other aspects of social cognition, such as thinking about 
how intentions cause behaviour (Blakemore et al., 2007) and 
understanding the intended meanings of sarcastic remarks (Wang 
et al., 2006). These studies demonstrated an age-related decrease 
in activity in anterior rostral MPFC, in a similarly lateral dorsal 
location to that found in the current study (see Blakemore, in press, 
for meta-analysis). Our result is also consistent with studies that 
report more extensive activation of PFC in adolescents compared 
with adults for non-social tasks (e.g. Durston et al., 2006). 
The left temporal pole demonstrated a signifi cant group by con-
dition interaction (Figure 3) such that the adult group showed 
more activation in this region than did adolescents for social 
versus basic emotion processing. Activity to social versus basic 
emotion in the left temporal pole was also positively correlated 
with age. The temporal poles are thought to store abstract social 
knowledge (Funnell, 2001; Zahn et al., 2007; Frith, 2007). 
Therefore the current result suggests that adults might use social 
semantic knowledge when thinking about guilt and embarrassment 
situations. This hypothesis needs to be tested by developing novel 
behavioural measures of the different cognitive strategies used in 
social emotion situations (Poldrack, 2008).
4.3 Brain activations associated with self/other processing
In the current study, participants imagined the emotion scenarios 
either from a fi rst person (self) or a third person (mother) perspec-
tive. This additional factor was included because a previous study 
in adults showed that neural activity to emotion differs between 
self and other perspectives (Ruby & Decety, 2004). In this study, 
thinking about emotion from a fi rst person versus third person 
perspective resulted in activation in right postcentral gyrus in 
adolescents. Activation of this region is consistent with previous 
studies (Ruby & Decety, 2004; Decety & Grezes, 2006), and may 
be related to imagining the sensory consequences of emotional 
scenarios. 
4.4 Interactions between social emotion and self/other processing
A region of MPFC showed a signifi cant interaction between pro-
tagonist and emotion, in both groups. This region of MPFC was 
similarly located in both groups, and was more antero-dorsal 
than the main foci of activation to social versus basic emotion. 
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Inspection of the parameter estimates for this region revealed that, 
in both groups, antero-dorsal MPFC was most active to social 
emotion in the fi rst person perspective. 
We also found a signifi cant region of activation in the left TPJ 
for the three-way interaction between emotion, protagonist and 
group. Although the left TPJ was more active for social versus basic 
emotion in the adolescent group, the adult group showed highest 
activation of this region for basic emotion in the third person 
perspective and for social emotion in the fi rst person perspective. 
The role of this brain region in thinking about others’ beliefs has 
been highlighted in adult neuroimaging and lesion studies (Frith 
& Frith, 2003; Samson et al., 2004). The differential recruitment 
of left TPJ in adults and adolescents in the current study may 
indicate that different cognitive strategies are being used for the 
attribution of social and basic emotions to self and other (althou-
gh see Poldrack, 2008). For a given emotion, left TPJ seems to 
differentiate better between self and other in adults than it does 
in adolescents. A possible interpretation of these data, which has 
been proposed elsewhere (Moriguchi et al., 2007) and which needs 
to be investigated using behavioural paradigms, is that adolescents 
rely more heavily on a simulation-based strategy when imagining 
another person’s emotional response than adults do. It is notable 
that this difference in brain activity occurred despite a lack of 
group difference in perceived self-mother similarity (see Results). 
4.5 Role of MPFC in social cognitive development
An interesting perspective on the role of MPFC in social cognition 
has recently been raised in the adult lesion and neuroimaging li-
terature. While MPFC is robustly activated by mentalising tasks, 
and adults presenting with MPFC lesions usually show mentalising 
defi cits (Frith & Frith, 2003; Rowe, Bullock, Polkey, & Morris, 
2001; Stuss, Gallup, & Alexander, 2001; Gregory et al., 2002), 
there is one report of an individual who suffered extensive bilate-
ral MPFC damage during adulthood but who was unimpaired on 
mentalising tasks (Bird, Castelli, Malik, Frith, & Husain, 2004). 
The MPFC is not recruited when adults make semantic discrimi-
nations among abstract social concepts, such as ‘brave’ or ‘stingy’ 
(Zahn et al., 2007). Rather, this task activates the superior tem-
poral poles. In addition, a small number of social emotion studies 
in adults fail to fi nd MPFC activation, but do fi nd activity within 
other regions of the social brain network such as STS and tempo-
84 INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP - ENACTING INTERSUBJECTIVITY
ral poles, and in more ventral and/or anterior prefrontal regions 
such as the frontopolar and orbitofrontal cortex (Takahashi et al., 
2007; Moll et al., 2005). The current study, as well as previous 
studies, found greater MPFC activity in adolescents than in adults 
for social cognition tasks (Blakemore et al., 2007; Wang et al., 
2006; Pfeifer et al., 2007). This suggests that MPFC activity to 
a particular social cognition task may lessen with age. Reasons 
for this could include the accumulation of social experience and 
the use of alternative cognitive strategies, resulting in less requi-
rement for MPFC activation. This hypothesis needs to be tested 
with behavioural paradigms designed to tease apart the different 
cognitive strategies used for social processing. Alternatively or 
additionally, increased co-ordination between components of the 
social brain network due to anatomical brain development (Paus 
et al., 1999; Durston et al., 2006; Kuhn, 2006) may play a role. 
Further work is needed on the development during adolescence of 
the cognitive strategies used for understanding people. For exam-
ple, we do not know whether the type of mentalising needed for 
social emotion understanding changes with development. It may be 
the case that a more explicit mentalising process is needed to learn 
about social emotions initially, but that more scripted, heuristic 
or intuitive strategies are employed later on (Haidt, 2001). Novel 
social cognition tasks which dissociate the cognitive sub-processes 
involved in social understanding are needed to address this issue: 
in other words, tasks which bring us closer to establishing an on-
tology of social cognition (Price & Friston, 2005; Poldrack, 2008).
Work is also needed to investigate developmental patterns of activi-
ty during social cognition tasks across the brain, rather than simply 
looking at the relative magnitude of activation within particular 
neural structures of interest. This should be done by implemen-
ting analyses of functional and effective connectivity. It would be 
relatively straightforward to begin to do this using existing fMRI 
datasets. Studies looking at the development of functional/effective 
connectivity in non-social domains have recently been published 
(resting state: e.g. Fair et al., 2008; go/no-go: e.g. Stevens et al.). 
We are currently using psychophysiological interaction (PPI) 
analysis to look at functional connectivity within this social emo-
tion dataset (Burnett & Blakemore, in press.).
Also needed are multi-modal studies which assess functional activi-
ty/connectivity, neuroanatomical maturity, and behavioural indices 
of social cognition within the same paradigm. Only by conducting 
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studies such as these will questions begin to be answered regarding 
the functional signifi cance of changes in neural activity to social 
cognition tasks, such as the frontal-to-temporal shift in activity 
to social emotion reported here.
4.6 Conclusion
This fMRI study shows that the neural processing of social emotion 
from a fi rst and third person perspective develops between ado-
lescence and adulthood. Although components of the social brain 
network including MPFC were active in both groups, adolescents 
activated lateral rostral MPFC more for social versus basic emotion 
whereas adults did not. Adults activated left temporal pole more 
for social versus basic emotion than did adolescents. These results 
indicate that the neural processing of social emotion continues to 
develop between adolescence and adulthood, such that the pre-
dominant activity moves from anterior (MPFC) to more posterior 
(temporal) regions with age. Further work is needed to ascertain 
how this is related to neuroanatomical development within social 
brain regions, and to changes in cognitive strategy resulting from 
developing social ability and experience. Finally, our study was 
conducted only with female participants; whether there are gender 
differences in social emotion processing and its development is an 
empirical question. 
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I FEEL WHAT I SEE, IF THE 
OTHER IS SIMILAR TO ME
FLAVIA CARDINI1,2, GIULIA GIOVAGNOLI1,2, 
ANDREA SERINO1,2, ELISABETTA LÀDAVAS1,2 
ABSTRACT
In the present paper we present a new form of visuo-tactile integration 
specifi cally linked to the body, i.e. the Visual remapping of touch effect. 
This effect consists of a modulation of tactile perception on one’s own 
body when observing the body of others being touched.  Here we present a 
new experimental paradigm to quantify this effect: near-threshold tactile 
perception on the face was measured when subjects observed different 
visual stimuli being touched or not by fi ngers. Using this paradigm, we 
found that the strength of visual remapping of touch varies systematically 
as a function of the similarity between the observed and the observer’s 
face: tactile perception was maximally enhanced when viewing the image 
of one’s own face being touched, intermediate when observing another 
person’s face and null when observing an object. In addition, the effect 
is modulated by the physical (e.g. ethnical membership) characteristics 
of the observed face. Indeed, the effect was stronger when viewing a face 
of another person belonging to the same ethnic group as the observer, 
compared to viewing the face of a member of a different ethnic group. 
An interesting insight from these new results is that a basic form of visuo-
tactile integration also incorporates information about self-perception and 
social categorization of others.
Keywords: Self/Other, multisensory integration, body representation.
Visual and tactile information interact with each-other, especially 
when both sensory channels convey information about the same 
source, that is the body. In the present paper we will review data 
concerning one form of visuo-tactile integration specifi cally linked 
to the body, i.e. visual remapping of touch and we will consider how 
such basic form of multisensory integration also incorporates in-
formation about self perception and social categorization of others.
Vision can infl uence primary levels of tactile processing (see 
Spence & Driver, 2004 for a review) and, in particular, visual 
information pertaining to the body seems specially effective in 
modulating tactile sensation (Tipper, Lloyd, Shorland, Dancer, 
Howard, & McGlone, 1998; Kennett, Taylor-Clarke & Haggard, 
2001). In addition, also visual information about touch on a 
part of the body can affect tactile perception. Observing touch 
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on another person’s body activates brain regions involved in 
tactile perception, even when the observer’s body is not directly 
stimulated (Keysers, Wicker, Gazzola, Anton, Fogassi, & Gallese, 
2004; Blakemore, Bristow, Bird, Frith, & Ward, 2005; Ebisch, 
Perrucci, Ferretti, Del Gratta, Romani, & Gallese, 2008). However, 
this activity does not induce a tactile perception when observing 
touch on the body of others. An interesting exception is the case 
of some synaesthetic subjects (i.e., visuo-tactile synaesthetes), who 
experience tactile sensation when they see other people’s bodies 
being touched (Banissy & Ward, 2007). Because, in synesthetes, 
brain activity induced by observation of touch is greater than in 
non-synesthetes (Blakemore et al., 2005), it is possible to hypothe-
size that the different perceptual experience between synaesthetic 
and non-synaesthetic subjects might refl ect different degrees of 
activation induced in the tactile system by visual information. A 
previous study (Serino, Pizzoferrato, & Làdavas, 2008) from our 
laboratory shows that if perceptual thresholds are experimentally 
manipulated, viewing touch can modulate tactile experience in 
non-synesthetes as well. Subjects watched a movie showing their 
own face (self condition), another person’s face (other condition), 
or a house (house condition). Human fi ngers either touched (touch 
condition) or simply approached (no-touch condition) the image, 
on the right, the left, or both sides. In order to test touch around 
perceptual threshold, we set stimulus intensity such that the tactile 
stimulus was stronger on one cheek than on the other. In dual-
stimulation condition, the stronger stimulus usually extinguishes 
the weaker one, because the competition between the two spatial 
positions. Subjects were instructed to press a button with the hand 
corresponding to the side where they felt the tactile stimulus (see 
Figure 1, upper panel). 
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Figure 1. Upper panel: Experimental paradigm measuring Visual remapping of 
touch. Subjects receive either unilateral (left or right) or a bilateral tactile stimu-
lus on their cheeks, and are instructed to report the side, or sides, of stimulation. 
Concurrently they are required to pay attention to screen in front of them showing 
a movie where an image is touched, or only approached, by human fi ngers, on 
its right, left or both sides. In this sample, illustrating the experimental set-up by 
Serino et al., (2008) the shown image was the subject’s own face, another person’s 
face or an object, namely the picture of a house. 
Lower panel: Results. Visual information enhances tactile perception on the 
subjects’ face: this effect is specifi c for viewing a human face being touched, and 
not present when the face is only approached, or when an object is shown. The 
effect is maximum for viewing one’s own face (Serino et al., 2008).
The results showed that when observers saw a face being touched 
by hands, rather than a face being merely approached by hands, 
there the detection of sub-threshold tactile stimuli on their own 
faces was enhanced, i.e. perception of bilateral tactile trials incre-
ased. This effect was specifi c to observing touch on a body part, 
and was not found for touch on a non bodily stimulus, namely, 
a picture of a house (see Figure 1, lower panel). Thus, observing 
touch can activate the tactile system, and if perceptual thresholds 
are manipulated, such activation can result in a behavioural effect 
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also in non-synaesthetes; multisensory integration, in this case 
visuo-tactile integration, is maximum when unimodal informa-
tion per sè is not suffi cient to drive a clear percept (for a review, 
see Làdavas, 2008). These fi ndings suggest that the mechanism 
underlying the effect of observation of touch on tactile processing 
in synaesthetes and non-synesthetes is the same; the difference 
between these groups might be only that sensitivity to the effect 
is stronger in synaesthetes. We have called this effect Visual Re-
mapping of Touch (VRT) (Serino et al., 2008).
Another interesting result found in the previous study was that the 
effect was stronger when subjects viewed their own faces rather 
than another person’s face. This self-other difference suggests 
that visual remapping of touch increases if the observer’s body 
and the observed body match. In order to re-map a sensation 
from one sensory modality, namely vision, to another sensory 
modality, namely touch, the remapping is probably favoured if 
the two modalities share a common reference system, that is, the 
same body. The improvement of tactile perception for viewing 
the self suggests that such enhanced activity due to self-related 
visual information might cross-modally modulate the processing 
of tactile information: when the match between the observer and 
the observed body is stronger, the visuo-tactile resonance is greater. 
In a series of further experiments, we studied how visual in-
formation about the body modulates visuo-tactile integration. 
Visual information about the body is critical in every-day life 
and in social interactions. Images of the body provide physical 
information about oneself and conspecifi cs (Rumsey & Harcourt, 
2005; Schilder, 1935). This information is crucial in determining 
similarity between self and others, and to categorize individual as 
similar or dissimilar to the self. Such categorization might affect 
intersubjective communication and relationships with others (Gal-
lese, 2001). For instance, when viewing another person, physical 
features of his/her face immediately contribute to defi ne whether 
that person belongs to one’s own ethnic group or to a different 
ethnic group. Might this ethnic categorization of others infl uence 
the way in which visual information about touch is remapped 
onto one’s own body? Specifi cally, does visual remapping of touch 
vary when viewing others belonging to one’s own or to another 
ethnic group?
To study this issue, Caucasian and Maghrebian subjects were asked 
to observe a face, while they received sub-threshold tactile stimuli 
on their own face (Serino, Giovagnoli, & Làdavas, in press), set as 
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in Serino et al.’s (2008) study. In different conditions, the shown 
face was similar or dissimilar to that of the observer, i.e. belonging 
to the same or to a different ethnic group, respectively. If visual 
remapping of touch depends on the ethnic similarity between the 
observed and the observer’s body then tactile perception should 
be boosted when people observe touch directed towards a member 
of their own ethnic group than when they observe touch directed 
towards a member of a different ethnic group. That was actually 
what we found: tactile detection of bilateral stimuli was enhanced 
when Caucasian observers viewed a Caucasian face compared to 
when they viewed a Maghrebian face, and the effect was exactly 
reversed for Maghrebian observers. Importantly, this effect was 
specifi cally related to the observation of touch, and was not due 
to a general arousal effect depending on observing different faces. 
Indeed no-tactile modulation in relationship to ethnic member-
ship was found when participants viewed a face being merely 
approached by human fi ngers, but not being touched. Thus eth-
nic similarity between the self and other bodies modulates visual 
remapping of touch. 
It is interesting to note that at the end of the experiment, we also 
asked our participants to judge for pleasantness the faces they 
had seen during the tactile task. No difference was found when 
Caucasian and Maghrebian observers judged the pictures of other 
unknown Caucasian and Maghrebian persons. Although ethnic 
membership did not affect explicit judgments towards individual of 
different ethnic groups, the effect of ethnic membership did affect 
the visual remapping of touch effect, showing that a sensation seen 
on another body is remapped onto one’s own body if the other 
is similar to oneself. Taken together these fi ndings suggest that 
visual remapping of touch is a quite automatic process, which is 
modulated by high-order representations of the self and other, but 
acts independently of explicit judgment towards others. 
When an individual observes the face of another, he/she auto-
matically categorizes it as belonging to the same or to a different 
group as the observer: face to face interaction is indeed a crucial 
aspect of group representation (Lickel, Hamilton, Wieczorkowska, 
Lewis, Sherman, & Uhles, 2000). It is well known that in-group 
versus out-group categorization infl uences one’s own judgments 
and behaviors towards others (see for reviews Hewstone, Rubin, 
& Willis, 2002; Brewer & Brown, 1998). Recent evidence suggests 
that in-group out-group categorization modulates automatic acti-
vation of approach or avoidance behaviors toward others (Castelli, 
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Zogmaister, Smith, & Arcuri, 2004; Paladino & Castelli, 2008). 
This mechanism might have a great impact for survival and the-
refore might have been selected through evolution (Allport, 1954): 
the human species has evolved relying on cooperation between 
individuals from small, strongly interconnected groups (e.g., Krebs 
& Denton, 1997), most of the time in competition with members 
of different groups. The results from the experiments presented in 
this paper suggest that this basic form of self-other and in-group 
out-group categorization also appears in multisensory integration 
between touch and vision. Visuo-tactile interaction underlying 
visual remapping of touch can be viewed as a basic, primitive 
form of empathy towards the other.
This form of empathy might be important for social interaction and 
inter-subjectivity. During social interactions, we try to understand 
other’s thoughts, feelings, sensations etc...  In particular, remapping 
visual information about touch on the body of other onto one’s own 
body might be functional to understand what the other is feeling 
(Gallese, 2003; Ebisch et al., 2008). In this way, the observer and 
the observed share a common representation of tactile sensation. 
(Decety & Chaminade, 2003). An analogous mechanism might 
act in case of a multiplicity of states, such as emotions, pain or 
thoughts. It is reasonable to hypothesize that the more the other 
is similar to the self, the more this sharing is effective and more 
information can be inferred from such mechanism. The present 
fi nding that visual remapping of touch is maximum when viewing 
similar others, strongly supports this view and suggests that inter-
subjectivity might be more automatic in case of interpersonal 
relationships between members of the same ethnic group. Future 
studies should investigate whether such automatic ethnical bias 
can be compensated by other more “cognitive” top-down factor, 
such as knowledge about others. In summary, observing touch on 
a body induces a remapping of tactile input onto the observer’s 
tactile system, resulting in an enhanced ability to perceive a tactile 
stimulus. The amount of enhancement depends of the similarity 
between the body of the observer and that of the observed: the 
effect is maximum for observing one’s own body; when observing 
the body of others, the effect is stronger to the extent that the other 
body is perceived as similar to the self. Similarity here is defi ned in 
terms of physical features of the body, such those shared between 
members of the same ethnic group.
The neural mechanism underlying this effect is yet to be explored. 
Neuroimaging studies show that observing touch modulates the 
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activity of primary (Blakemore et al., 2005) or secondary soma-
tosensory (Keysers et al., 2004; Ebisch et al., 2008) regions. This 
enhanced somatosensory activity might potentially boost tactile 
perception, in that a pre-activated somatosensory system might 
become more sensitive to detect incoming sensory events. Indeed, 
it is well known that tactile sensitivity is determined by the re-
sponse of neurons in primary somatosensory cortex (Mountcastle, 
Talbot, Sakata, & Hyvärinen, 1969; de Lafuente & Romo, 2005). 
In the present paper, we show that tactile perception, as measured 
with our tactile confrontation paradigm, is modulated by quite 
elaborated levels of visual processing, such as the identity, or even 
the ethnic appearance, of a shown face. Such complex analysis of 
visual information cannot be computed within somatosensory cor-
tices, but could be computed in high-order visual and associative 
cortices. For instance, Uddin and colleagues showed that neural 
activity in parietal (inferior parietal lobe) and frontal (inferior 
frontal gyrus) areas is specifi c (or is more activated when) for 
viewing one’s own face compared to viewing the face of another 
person (Uddin, Kaplan, Molnar-Szakacs, Zaidel, & Iacoboni, 
2005; Uddin, Iacoboni, Lange, & Keenan, 2007).  Furthermore, 
Mitchell and colleagues identifi ed functionally discrete sub-regions 
of medial-prefrontal cortex, which differently process information 
about others as a function of how similar for socio-political views 
another person is perceived to be to oneself (Mitchell, Macrae, & 
Banaji, 2006; Jenkins, Macrae, & Mitchell, 2008). These prefrontal 
and parietal regions might be critical to link visual information 
about a face with the self. The same regions might directly project 
to somatosensory cortices to modulate visual remapping of touch. 
Future research will shed light upon the dynamics of the neural 
mechanism underlying visual remapping of touch. 
In the present paper we have described one type of visuo-tactile 
interaction that we called visual remapping of touch. This effect 
shows how visual information derived from observing a body 
being touched is integrated within the one’s own somatosensory 
system to improve tactile perception.  An interesting insight from 
our new results is that such basic form of multisensory integration 
also incorporates high-level information about the observed body, 
such as categorization of others as similar or dissimilar to the self.
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DO I CARE FOR OTHERS’ MONEY 
AS MUCH AS FOR MY OWN?
PLAYING THE ULTIMATUM 
GAME TASK IN BEHALF 
OF A THIRD-PARTY
CORRADO CORRADI-DELL’ACQUA, 
CLAUDIA CIVAI,  RAFFAELLA I. RUMIATI
ABSTRACT
Classical economical theory sees rejections of unfair offers by people 
playing the Ultimatum Game (UG) as “irrational”. Recent studies sug-
gested that these are triggered by negative emotions, such as frustration 
(Sanfey et al., 2003; van’t Wout et al., 2006) and by the urge to punish 
those who made the offers (Fehr & Gachter, 2002). Another account 
postulates that rejections are instead “rational” according to the rules of 
social exchange reasoning, in that they will increase the chance of future 
players to receive fair offers (Zamir, 2001). We tested these two accounts 
by employing healthy participants in modifi ed version of the UG in which 
players knew that their putative rejections were not harming those who 
made offers. The analysis of skin conductance responses shows that this 
task was signifi cantly less emotionally arousing than the traditional UG 
game. However, unfair offers were rejected at a comparable rate in both 
the classical and modifi ed versions of the Ultimatum Game. In light of 
these results, theories holding rejections as triggered by emotional arousal 
and by the urge to punish who made the offers should be re-discussed; 
in fact, our data suggest that the emotional response might be triggered 
whenever one’s own interest is at stake, and is not the ultimate cause 
of this behavior. We believe instead that any offer leading to an unfair 
distribution of money within the group is suffi cient to trigger a rejection 
and, therefore, that psychological mechanisms which account for social ex-
changes dynamics might be better candidates for explaining this behavior.
Keywords: Economical Decision-Making; unfairness; altruistic puni-
shment; frustration; skin conductance.
1. INTRODUCTION
Social interpersonal exchange is an ancient and cross-culturally 
universal feature of many species including insects, high-level 
primates and humans (e.g., Hamilton, 1964a, 1964b; Trivers, 
1971). In most of its expressions, interpersonal exchange results 
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in the ability to assign social credit or blame for shared outcomes 
and to act appropriately according to these assignments (Tolmin et 
al., 2006; Trivers, 1971): for instance, people might identify and 
encourage those behaviors which maximize the aggregate welfare 
and discourage those who lead to unfair distributions of goods.
In recent years, the study of interpersonal exchanges has become 
a prominent issue in both experimental psychology and cognitive 
neuroscience. Indeed, studies employing behavioral techniques 
have shown that reasoning in a context of social interpersonal 
exchanges diverge from reasoning in other domains. For instance, 
studies investigating conditional reasoning revealed healthy vo-
lunteers as uneasy at understanding conditional rules (e.g., “if P 
then Q”), as less that 30% of the interviewed people were able to 
identify their possible violation (“P and non-Q” – e.g., Watson & 
Johnson-Laird, 1972). However, more than 65% of the interviewed 
people were able to solve the task if the conditional rules were 
expressed as social contracts (e.g. “If John takes this benefi t, he 
must pay this price”) and their violations as a cheating behavior 
(e.g. “John takes this benefi t, without paying this price” – e.g., 
Cosmides, 1989; Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992; Platt & Griggs, 1993; 
see also Stone et al., 2002).
Another example of reasoning in a context of social interpersonal 
exchanges is provided by the Ultimatum Game (UG) task. In this 
task, one player (the proposer) makes offers to a second player 
(the responder) of how to split an amount of money given by the 
experimenter; the responder, in turn, can either accept or reject 
the offer. If the responder accepts, the money will be divided as 
the proposer has decided, otherwise both players will end up with 
nothing. Classical economical theories posit that, to maximize his/
her own gain, the responder, following the principle that “few is 
better than nothing”, should always accept every offer. However, 
the behavioral fi ndings clearly show that he rejects offers which 
favor the proposer too much, and that he/she considers unfair 
(Bolton & Zwick, 1995). Importantly, this behavioural pattern has 
also been observed in both the single-shot UG, in which the two 
players interact only once, and in the covered UG, in which the 
proposer is not informed about the responder’s reaction (Abbik, 
Sadrieh, & Zamir, 1999; Zamir, 2001), and therefore rejections 
lose their role as negotiating tools.
One plausible interpretation of the behavioural pattern is that 
people behave irrationally, as they are driven by negative emo-
tions and by the desire to punish the proposer. According to one 
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of these theories, punishment, even if costly and yielding no direct 
benefi t for the responder (as in the case of covered UG), is used to 
penalize the proposer’s selfi sh behavior (Fehr & Gachter, 2002). 
It has been suggested that the irrational rejection might be caused 
by negative emotions, such as frustration, that drive participants 
to punish rather than making an utilitarian choice (Pillutla et 
al., 1996; Fehr & Gachter, 2002). Consistently with this view, 
Sanfey et al. (2003) have recently associated the rejection of un-
fair offers with an increase of both the neural activity in anterior 
insula, traditionally correlated with feelings of anger and disgust 
(Calder, Lawrence, & Young, 2001; Phillips et al., 1997), and the 
skin conductance response (van’t Wout, Kahn, Sanfey, & Aleman, 
2006), as a measure of emotional activation (Boucscein, 1992).
Another plausible interpretation states that the responder’s rejec-
tions, although irrational according to the classical economical 
theory as they do not increase the chance of having better offers 
in the remaining part of the experiment, are rational according 
to the rules of social exchange reasoning, in that they discourage 
unfair behavior of future proposers and, therefore, increase the 
overall gain of the population of the responders (Zamir, 2001).
These two accounts – although never mentioned in literature as 
antithetic one to another – generate different predictions. Indeed, 
the former account postulates that rejections are driven by (1) 
proposer’s unfair treatment enhancing the responder’s emotional 
arousal and (2) the responder’s being aware that his choices are 
harmful for the proposer. Thus, no rejections should be seen in a 
modifi ed version of the UG in which none of these assumptions are 
met. This is not the case of the second account, according to which 
any offer leading to an unfair distribution of money within the 
group should be rejected. We tested our prediction by measuring 
skin conductance response while participants played as responders 
in a modifi ed version of the UG. In one condition, they carried out 
the classical UG, whereas, in a second condition, they were told 
that both proposers and responders were playing in behalf of a 
third-party. Thus, in the latter condition, neither the proposer’s 
offers addressed directly the responder’s payoff, nor responder’s 
choices addressed directly the proposer’s payoff. Our assumption 
(confi rmed by the analysis of skin conductance responses) is that 
responder’s emotional arousal should be signifi cantly lower when 
playing in behalf of a third-party than in the classical UG. Thus, 
the account according to which rejections and negative emotions 
are causally related (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002; Sanfey et al., 2003; 
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van’t Wout et al., 2006) predicts that such a putative decrease in 
skin conductance response during the third-party, together with the 
awareness that the proposer cannot be punished by the responder, 
should lead a similar decrease in the rate of rejections. On the other 
hand, the account positing rejections as rational according to the 
rules of social exchange reasoning predicts that, irrespective of the 
amount of emotional arousal measured by the skin conductance 
response, participants should exhibit the same amount of rejections 
when playing in behalf of a third-party than in the classical UG.
2. METHODS
Thirty-one healthy Italian volunteers (20 females), who ranged 
in age from 18 to 35 years (M=23.56, SD=3.90), took part in 
the experiment. They were required to play as responders in 
a modifi ed version of the UG in which they either accepted or 
rejected the offers the proposer made, following the classical rules 
explained above. Before starting the game, they were introduced 
to a collaborator of the experimenter, who pretended to play as 
the proposer, in order to strengthen the illusion of playing against 
a human adversary, whereas they were actually playing against 
a computer. They were told that the opponent had been given a 
number of 10 euros bank notes and would have made offers on 
how to split each of these bank notes. At each trial offers could 
range from 1 to 5 euros out of 10. Furthermore, participants were 
informed that, in one condition, they and their opponent would 
play for themselves (consistently with the classical UG), whereas, 
in a second condition, they would play on behalf of those players 
acting as proposer and responder in the upcoming testing session. 
In order to make our task compatible to the single-shot UG, parti-
cipants were told that the opponent would not have received any 
feedback until the very end of the experiment, when they have both 
been informed on how much each of them had gained, depending 
on the choices they had made; in this way, they knew rationally 
that they could not affect the opponent’s behaviour through their 
rejections. In addition, they knew that a percentage of the money 
split on behalf of third parties would be given to next players; they 
were also informed that, following the same principle, their starting 
stakes were percentages of the money that previous players have 
split on their behalf. To control for the social interactive nature 
of the UG, participants performed a control task (Free Win [FW] 
task) in which they either accepted or rejected a variable amount 
of money given by the computer (1-5 euros). As in the case of 
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the UG, they could have decided for themselves or on behalf of 
the next participant. If they accepted the offer, they/the third 
party would have received that amount, otherwise they/the third 
party would receive nothing. This yields to a 2*2*5 design with 
task (UG vs. FW), target (myself vs. third-party) and gain (1-5 
euros) as within-subjects factors. Participants were informed that 
their compensation for participating in the experiment would be 
proportional to the amount of money gained during the myself 
condition. Moreover, they knew that a percentage of the money 
split on behalf of third parties would be given to next players; they 
were also informed that, following the same principle, their starting 
stakes were percentages of the money that previous players had 
split on their behalf. Irrespective of their performance on the task, 
participants received the same amount of money as compensation.
During the experimental session the offer appeared on the screen 
for fi ve seconds, followed by a six-second blank screen. Partici-
pants were required to respond by button press, highlighted on 
the computer keyboard, as soon as the question “Do you accept?” 
appeared on the screen, where it lasted for two seconds. The 
inter-trial interval was averaged around 11 seconds, to allow skin 
conductance to return to its baseline. All 20 conditions, each of 
which were repeated four times, were randomized through the 
experiment, with duration of approximately 32 minutes (80 trials 
* 24 seconds of trial duration). Skin conductance was recorded 
during the whole experiment using a pair of prewired 8 mm Ag/
AgCl electrodes, attached to the distal phalanx surfaces of the in-
dex and little fi nger of the non-dominant hand. The electrode pair 
was excited with a constant voltage of 0.5 V and the conductance 
was recorded using a DC amplifi er with a low pass fi lter set at 64 
Hz and a sample frequency of 256. Values of skin conductance 
were automatically transformed to microsiemens values by the 
Procomp Infi nity System and further analyzed using Ledalab 
2.1.3 freeware software (Benedek & Kaernbach, 2008). A phasic 
increase in conductance of 0.05 µS or more was counted as a Skin 
Conductance Response (SCR). Our analysis focused on the average 
phasic increase in the four seconds prior to the moment in which 
subjects were instructed to provide a response.
        
3. RESULTS
For each subject, and for each condition, the rejection rate and 
the average phasic increase in conductance were calculated across 
all 4 repetitions, and used in a 2 (TASK: UG, FW) x 2, (TARGET: 
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myself, third party) x 5 (GAIN: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Euros) Repeated 
Measures ANOVA as implemented in SPSS 11.5 Software. The 
analysis of Rejection Rates revealed a signifi cant main effect of 
TASK (MSE = 2336.51, F(1, 30) = 58.96, p < .001, ηp
2 = .66), 
with the UG eliciting a larger amount of rejections (myself: 37.26 
± 3.89%;third-party: 40.54 ± 4.64%) than the FW (myself: 5.32 
± 2.12%; third-party: 12.83 ± 3.64%). The TASK x GAIN inte-
raction was also found signifi cant (MSE = 544.065, F(4, 120) = 
39.67, p < .001, ηp
2 = .57), refl ecting low offers being rejected 
signifi cantly more than the high offers in the UG and not in the 
FW. Polynomial contrasts revealed that the difference between UG 
and FW changed linearly across all gain levels (MSE = 1030.95, 
F(1, 30) = 78.09, p < .01, ηp
2 = .72).
The analysis of SCRs revealed a signifi cant TASK x TARGET 
interaction (MSE = .012, F(1, 30) = 6.24, p < .05, ηp
2 = .17), 
refl ecting the largest phasic increase in skin conductance whilst 
playing the UG for oneself (0.14 ± 0.02 μS), with respect to the UG 
on behalf of a third-party (0.11 ± 0.02 μS), or to the FW (myself: 
0.11 ± 0.02%; third-party: 0.13 ± 0.02%). None of the remaining 
effects of the ANOVAs were found to be signifi cant
       
4. DISCUSSION
We have investigated the nature of “irrational” rejections during 
the Ultimatum Game by having participants perform a modifi ed 
version of the paradigm in which they were asked to play for 
themselves or on behalf of a third party. Our analysis of the con-
ditions in which participants played for themselves confi rmed all 
previous fi ndings associated with the classical UG task: fi rst, we 
replicated the well-documented pattern of accepting fair offers and 
increasing the rate of rejection as offers become less fair (Bolton 
& Zwick, 1995; Roth, 1995; Guth, Huck, & Muller, 2001; Sanfey 
et al., 2003); this pattern was not found in the control task, in 
which participants had to either accept or reject money given by 
the computer, supposing that, even though the responder’s personal 
gain is the same, the perception of an unfair division drives him/
her to reject unfair offers choosing the so called non-utilitarian or 
“irrational” solution. Secondly, skin conductance data show that, 
when participants played for themselves, the UG elicited a larger 
emotional arousal than when played the FW task.
More importantly, the analysis of SCRs revealed a TARGET*TASK 
interaction, which refl ects a signifi cant increase of SCRs associated 
with the UG (but not the FW), when their own interests (but not 
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that of others) were at stake. The fact that playing the UG for 
oneself is more emotionally arousing than the other three condi-
tions, confi rm our initial assumption that the amount of negative 
emotions elicited by the UG is smaller when one’s own payoff is 
not directly at stake.
If rejections are not utilitarian in nature, as they are driven by 
negative emotions and by the desire to punish the proposer (Sanfey 
et al., 2003; van’t Wout et al., 2006), these should not be found (or 
should be found in a lesser degree) whilst playing the UG in behalf 
of a third party as (1) participants are aware that their putative 
rejection is not affecting the proposer’s payoff and (2) this condi-
tion is less emotionally arousing. Our analysis of the rejection rates 
go against this prediction: indeed no TARGET*TASK interaction 
was found to be signifi cant, as in the case of the analysis of SCRs, 
but the TASK main effect was, refl ecting the amount of rejections 
associated with playing the UG for both targets (myself: 37%; 
third-party: 40%) being signifi cantly larger than the amount of 
rejection associated with the FW task (myself: 5%, third-party: 
12%). In light of our results, the account according to which 
rejections are irrational responses, driven exclusively by emotions 
and by the desire to punish the proposer, needs to be reconsidered.
An alternative explanation for the responder’s behavior can be rela-
ted to the notion of context dependent fairness proposed by Zamir 
and colleagues (Winter & Zamir, 2005; Zamir, 2001), according 
to which the sense of equity may change depending on both the 
person engaged in the social exchanges dynamic, and the nature 
of this dynamic. Winter and Zamir (2005), for instance, reported 
a modifi ed version of the UG in which the proposer played with 
virtual-responders which could be either much more tolerant or 
unforgiving to unfair offers than real human responders. They 
found that the proposers quickly adapted their behavior to the 
virtual-responders, by behaving unfairly with the tolerant and 
fairly with the unforgiving responders. This is similar to what 
happens in the Dictator Game (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Saf-
ton, 1994; Bolton & Zwick, 1995), in which the proposer cannot 
have his offers rejected by the responder and, therefore, behaves 
far less fairly than in the UG. All these observations suggest that 
in the UG proposers’ behavior is directly affected by the tolerance 
to unfairness he expects in the responder. Thus, rejections in the 
UG are indeed rational in that, although they do not increase the 
responder’s chance of having better offers in the remaining part 
of the experimental session, they lead the proposers to play fairly 
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and, in turn, to an increase the overall gain of the population of 
the responders (Zamir, 2001). Such behavior is not predicted by 
classical economical theory, which is based on the assumption 
(present in the experimental instructions of many experiments, 
but less frequently believed by participants) that player’s choices 
have effects which are limited to the experimental session (Zamir, 
2001). The account according to which the responder’s rejections 
are utilitarian is in agreement with our behavioral results. In our 
study, participants were told prior to the experiment that their 
starting stakes depended on how previous players had decided 
to split the money; it is therefore likely that they felt part of a 
group in which cooperation led to a maximization of everyone’s 
gain. Thus the participants’ prosocial behavior showed when 
they rejected the unfair offers on behalf of the third party, might 
refl ect the will to strengthen the public good for the population of 
the responders (Zamir, 2001). This is also consistent with studies 
of social psychology in which participants decided give up some 
money in order to punish other’s unfair behavior, even when their 
payoffs are not directly affected by a violation of fairness (Fehr 
& Fischbacher, 2004). 
This account is in agreement also with our psychopshysiological 
data, in that it does not predict that the rejection rates are asso-
ciated with an increased emotional response. Emotions do play 
a role in the UG, as demonstrated by previous studies (Sanfey et 
al., 2003; van’t Wout et al., 2006) as well as by the present study 
when participants played in the myself condition (i.e. the classical 
version of the UG). However, the dissociation we have reported here 
between the physiological and the behavioral pattern when par-
ticipants performed the task in the third-party condition, implies 
that emotions are not always the key mechanism underlying the 
responder’s rejections. The emotional response might be triggered 
whenever one’s own interest is at stake, and not the ultimate cause 
of this behavior.
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THE OPEN BODY
JOEL KRUEGER1, DOROTHÉE LEGRAND2
ABSTRACT
In this paper we characterize the body as constitutively open. We fi rst 
consider the notion of bodily openness at the basic level of its organic con-
stitution. This will provide us a framework relevant for the understanding 
of the body open to its intersubjective world. We argue that the notion of 
“bodily openness” captures a constitutive dimension of intersubjectivity. 
Generally speaking, there are two families of theories intending to charac-
terize the constitutive relation between subjectivity and intersubjectivity: 
either the self is considered as (1) being constituted prior to, and as a 
condition of, its potential relation to the outside (intersubjective) world, 
or, contrastively, (2) the self is considered as being constituted as a result 
of its (intersubjective) relations with the outside world. Here, we pursue 
a conciliatory path, as we intend to show that these two positions are not 
necessarily in opposition to each other. But how can selfhood/subjectivity 
be both and at the same time primary and secondary, relative to otherness/
intersubjectivity? Stated thusly, the question seems to border on incohe-
rence but our intention here is to reconsider it in a framework that allows 
for the dissolution of this opposition. In particular, we will characterize 
the relational autonomy of the self: neither fully enclosed “inside” nor 
fully dissolved in or determined by what’s “outside”, the bodily self is 
best characterized by its fundamental “openness”, which we will explore 
in a framework where autonomy and relationality are not contradictory 
but co-constitutive dimensions. 
In the fi rst section, we introduce the notions of “relational autonomy” 
and “openness” at the most basic level, i.e. the organic constitution of 
the body. We then specify the links we intend to tie between the organic 
and the intersubjective modes of being of the body. This then allows us 
to exploit the notions of “relational autonomy” and “openness” to better 
characterize bodily intersubjectivity. We conclude by considering the 
implication of our view for the understanding of the constitutive relation 
between subjectivity and intersubjectivity
Keywords: relational autonomy, organic constitution of the body, deve-
lopmental psychology, enacted intersubjectivity, co-constitution of self 
and others.
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we characterize the body as constitutively open. We 
fi rst consider the notion of bodily openness at the basic level of its 
organic constitution. This will provide us a framework relevant for 
the understanding of the body open to its intersubjective world. We 
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argue that the notion of “bodily openness” captures a constitutive 
dimension of selfhood and intersubjectivity. Generally speaking, 
there are two families of theories intending to characterize the 
constitutive relation between subjectivity and intersubjectivity: 
either the self is considered as (1) being constituted prior to, and 
as a condition of, its potential relation to the outside (intersubjec-
tive) world, or, contrastively, (2) the self is considered as being 
constituted as a result of its (intersubjective) relations with the 
outside world. 
Descartes’ formulation of the autonomy of the nonphysical cogito 
is perhaps the most vivid and well-known example of the fi rst 
position. More recently, the phenomenologist Michel Henry (1973) 
has developed a radically internalist conception of subjectivity as 
pure non-relational interiority: a passive self-affection or ipseity 
said to be ontologically independent of any form of alterity (for 
extensive discussion and criticism, see Zahavi, 1999). Even more 
recently, Galen Strawson has argued for a “Pearl View” of the 
self. We are, Strawson argues, sequences of single, self-suffi cient, 
“ontically distinct” mental things (or subjects of experience) that 
are nevertheless distinct from that which we experience as well as 
all other things. But as a “thing”, Strawson insists that the self is 
nevertheless part of “a set of neuron-and-neurotransmitter-(etc)-
constituting atoms or fundamental particles in a certain state of 
activation” (Strawson, 1999, p. 21). Others argue that the self is 
identifi able with the brain itself (Brooks, 1994) or with the neural 
mechanisms underwriting the brain’s self-representational capa-
cities (Churchland, 2002). The common thread of these disparate 
views is that the self is in some important sense autonomous, that 
is to say, dissociable from the rest of the world. Put differently, 
subjectivity is not essentially intersubjective; the self is not deter-
mined by otherness.   
With respect to the second position, George Herbert Mead’s model 
of the social self is a prominent philosophical example. According 
to Mead, “The self is something which has a development; it is 
not initially there, at birth, but arises in the process of social 
experience and activity, that is, develops in the given individual 
as a result of his relations to that process as a whole and to other 
individuals within that process” (Mead, 1934, p.135). A more 
recent view along these lines is developed by Daniel Dennett. 
According to Dennett (1992), the self is a locus of personal and 
public narratives—a “center of narrative gravity”, in other words, 
ultimately constituted by the stories that it tells and has told about 
ORAL SESSION
111INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP - ENACTING INTERSUBJECTIVITY
it. A consequence of this view is that the self is really “an abstract 
object” or a “theorist’s fi ction” always constructed after-the-fact. 
Like Mead, Dennett’s narrative self is wholly a product of its social 
world, essentially constituted by intersubjectivity and otherness 
(i.e., shared linguistic practices and narrative structures). In short, 
this model of the self is relational all the way down.  
Here, we reject the validity of this contrastive opposition. Instead, 
we pursue a conciliatory path, and intend to show that these two 
positions are not necessarily in opposition to each other. But how 
can selfhood/subjectivity be both and at the same time primary and 
secondary, relative to otherness/intersubjectivity? Stated thusly, 
the question seems to border on incoherence. Our intention here 
is to reconsider it in a framework that allows for the dissolution of 
this opposition. In particular, we will characterize the relational 
autonomy of the self: neither fully enclosed “inside” (e.g., the 
cogito or neural structures) nor fully dissolved in or determined 
by what’s “outside” (e.g., social relations or linguistic/narrative 
structures), the self is instead a bodily self best characterized by 
its fundamental “openness”, which we will explore in a framework 
where autonomy and relationality are not contradictory but co-
constitutive dimensions. 
In the fi rst section, we introduce the notions of “relational auto-
nomy” and “openness” at the most basic level, i.e., the organic 
constitution of the body. We then specify the links we intend to 
establish between the organic and the intersubjective modes of 
being of the body. This allows us to exploit the notions of “re-
lational autonomy” and “openness” to better characterize the 
bodily self and intersubjectivity. We conclude by considering the 
implication of our view for the understanding of the constitutive 
relation between subjectivity and intersubjectivity. However, note 
that we do not intend to describe in any detail how the outer 
realm plays a constitutive role within the self. This is so because 
the present paper intends to be programmatic. We assume that 
the theoretical description here developed is the necessary basis to 
then develop further empirical investigations of how the physical 
and social environments are, respectively, involved in particular 
cases of self-constitution.
2. THE ORGANIC OPEN BODY
2.1. Self-constitution
Our characterization of bodily openness at the organic level 
112 INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP - ENACTING INTERSUBJECTIVITY
draws extensively on the work initiated by Francisco Varela and 
Humberto Maturana and pursued by Evan Thompson. To start 
with, the following defi nitions will be useful. A “system” can be 
defi ned as a “collection of related entities or processes that stands 
out from a background as a single whole…” (Thompson, 2007, 
p. 39). A system is said to be “autonomous” when it is “a self-
determining system, as distinguished from a system determined 
from the outside” (Id., p. 37). “An autonomous system… is defi ned 
by its endogenous, self-organizing and self-controlling dynamics” 
(Id., p. 43). The notion of autopoiesis (from the Greek: auto for 
“self” and poiesis for “production”) is meant to characterize the 
autonomy of living systems. An autopoietic system “embodies a 
circular process of self-generation…and…continually re-creates 
the difference between itself and everything else” (Thompson, 
2007, p. 99; See also Varela, 1979; Maturana & Varela, 1980). 
The autopoietic unity is self-sustaining (as it actively maintains 
its own organization) through self-renewal (as it actively renews 
its own material constituents). 
Varela and Thompson exploit these notions to defi ne an “organic 
self”, following the lead of Jonas for who “the introduction of the 
term ‘self,’ …indicates the emergence, with life as such, of internal 
identity – and so, as one with that emergence, its self-isolation too 
from all the rest of reality” (1966, pp. 82-83; our emphasis). For 
Thompson, too, autopoietic processes allow the “self-production 
of an inside” (Id., p.79; our emphasis) and “an autopoietic system 
is …an individual in a sense that begins to be worthy of the term 
self” (Id., p. 75, see also p. 48). This view is quite radical and 
we do not intend to defend it here (but see Legrand, 2004. To 
remain neutral on this issue without confusing system and self, 
we will talk about “system/self”). We believe that, whether or not 
one assumes such conception of organic selfhood, the notion of 
autopoietic autonomy can be relevantly exploited to clarify the 
issue at stake here, i.e., bodily openness.
Note that (contrary to our current aim, but as italicized in the 
previous paragraph) emphasis is often put on the “inside” that 
is constituted autopoietically; fairly so, since without such an 
inside that differentiates itself from the rest by self-generating a 
boundary, there would be no living system/self at all. However, 
this does not suffi ce to defi ne the system/self as merely an inner 
realm. In fact, such characterization would miss the specifi city of 
autopoietic self-constitution. To better understand the latter, let 
us consider the notion of “structural coupling”.
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2.2. Structural coupling 
The notion of “structural coupling” captures the constitutive 
openness of the living organism to its surrounding world. Since it 
involves the perpetual renewal of the system/self’s constituting ma-
terial, the process of autopoietic constitution relies on its openness 
to its surrounding world. Therefore, “the relation of the organism 
to its material substance is of a double nature: …Dependent on 
their availability as materials, it is independent of their sameness as 
these… the organic form stands in a dialectical relation of needful 
freedom to matter (Jonas, 1966, p.80). For this very reason, the 
relation of the organism to the outside world where matter is to 
be found is, as well, as relation of needful freedom.
Understanding in its specifi city the reliance of self-constitution on 
the outside world involves a reappraisal of the paradigm of input-
output informational systems. Here, information is not reifi ed 
“into something that preexists ‘out there’” (Thompson, 2007, p. 
186). Rather, the idea is that “autonomous systems …enact an 
environment inseparable from their own structure and actions” 
(Id., p. 59). At the organic level, the relation of the living organism 
to its world is not adequately conceived of as the mere ingestion 
of nutriments which are ready to be consumed. Rather, the “in-
formational stimulus is not equivalent to the physical stimulus. 
The latter is defi nable independently of the organism; the former 
is not. The informational stimulus is the stimulus as informed by 
(the form or structure of) the organism” (Id., p. 69). Therefore, 
the relation with the outer realm should not be confused with a 
relation with an already constituted outside environment. Rather, 
the “outer” information relevant for autopoietic self-constitution 
is not determined independently of this very process of self-
constitution. The outer world is characterized by the organism 
processing it, according to the “vital signifi cance” of the stimulus 
for the organism in question. 
2.3. Inner realm
On this basis, and as underlined above, the emphasis has mostly 
been put on the “inside” of the autopoietic system/self. To better 
understand the status given to this “inside”, let us quote at length 
Varela (1992): 
“the living system must distinguish itself from its environment, 
while at the same time maintaining its coupling…. Now, in this dia-
logic coupling between the living unity and the physico-chemical 
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environment, the balance is slightly weighted towards the living 
since it has the active role in this reciprocal coupling. In defi ning 
what it is as unity, in the very same movement it defi nes what 
remains exterior to it, that is to say, its surrounding environment. 
A closer examination also makes it evident that this exteriorization 
can only be understood, so to speak, from the “inside”: the auto-
poietic unity creates a perspective from which the exterior is one, 
which cannot be confused with the physical surroundings as they 
appear to us as observers, the land of physical and chemical laws 
simpliciter, devoid of such perspectivism” (p. 7; emphasis altered). 
The “slightly weighted” balance described here by Varela is cha-
racterized by Thompson in a more radical way: “although inside 
and outside are dynamically co-emergent, they do not share the 
same symmetrical relation. As Moreno and Barandiaran [2004, 
p. 17] explain: ”the (self) generation of an inside is ontologically 
prior to the dichotomy in-out’” (Thompson, 2007, p. 79). But 
there is a tension here. For how would such ontological priority 
of the “inside” cohere with the characterization of the autopoietic 
system as structurally coupled to its environment? 
2.4. Constitutive openness
Rather than giving too much weight to the inside, we wish to 
insist on the “dialogical”, bi-directional, reciprocal relationship 
between self and world. We choose to focus on the inseparability 
of the “inside” and “outside” by interpreting the “outside” as 
playing a genuine constitutive role. This is not to say that the role 
played by the inside and the outside are entirely symmetrical. The 
dissymmetry at stake, however, involves no ontological prioritizing 
of inside over outside. 
If you wish, think of it as dissolving the chicken-egg dilemma: to 
the question “which comes fi rst?” the current framework replies 
“both”. Instead of picking-up information in an independent 
external environment, the system/self “shapes” its world by enac-
ting relevant “information” inseparable from the self-constituting 
system itself; conversely, this process of self-constitution is itself 
inseparable from the world in which it occurs (Varela et al., 1991; 
Thompson, 2007). 
To clarify: this approach is not meant to contradict autopoiesis as 
defi ned in a Varelian fashion and as we understand it. The diffe-
rence between Thompson’s approach and ours is mostly a matter 
of focus. We argue that what the autopoietic view is attempting to 
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achieve, i.e., the grounding of a genuine concept of autonomy as 
self-constitution, is misconceived if it is thought to contradict the 
process of structural coupling and the constitutive openness rela-
ted to it. Of course, a view of autopoietic systems as being “made 
externally” would be a contradiction in terms. But the two radical 
views assuming either purely independent constitution or pure 
heteronomy are not the only options, and we oppose to them both 
a process of constitution through “relational autonomy”, which 
we take to be faithful to autopoiesis as originally defi ned. Indeed, 
it is clear from the very notion of autopoiesis that the system/self 
defi ned here is not self-enclosed. Rather, otherness is correlative of 
selfhood (Thompson, 2007, p. 49). The “self-isolation” defi ned by 
Jonas thus “cannot mean outright independence from the world” 
(Id., p. 150). Rather, Jonas himself insists on the constitutive 
“transcendence of life”: “life is turned outward and toward the 
world in a peculiar relatedness of dependence and possibility… 
its self-concern… is essential openness for the encounter of outer 
being. Thus “world” is there from the earliest beginning…” (1966, 
p. 84). Likewise, Varela characterizes the autopoietic system/
self by its “operational closure” but it should be clear that “the 
qualifi cation “operational” emphasizes that closure is used in its 
mathematical sense of recursivity, and not in the sense of closedness 
or isolation from interaction, which would be, of course, nonsense” 
(Varela, 1992, p.10). Therefore, “it is essential to understand that 
the idea of closure does not contradict that of openness. Closure 
doesn’t mean a closed system” (Rudrauf et al., 2003, p. 28. See 
also Thompson, 2007, p. 45, p. 448). 
One may agree that an autopoietic system is open while balking at 
considering that it is constitutively open. However, that would miss 
the specifi city of the structural coupling characterizing autopoie-
tic processes. Again, such coupling involves that the autopoietic 
unit is not fi rst constituted to be related to the outer realm only 
secondarily. Rather, the autopoietic unit is constituted by being 
related to the outer realm, hence the notion of what we term “re-
lational autonomy”. “Autonomy” comes from the Greek auto for 
“self” and nomos for “law”. An autonomous being is thus defi ned 
as self-governing and independent We argue here that biological 
systems (like organisms, persons, etc.) are both constitutively 
open and autonomous. We thus propose to conceive of a form of 
autonomy which is relational. Biological systems are relationally 
autonomous in that they are constituted by their bodily openness 
without thereby losing their autonomy. The notion of “relational 
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autonomy” is not redundant with the notion of “autonomy” sin-
ce the latter means independence while the former, importantly, 
involves dependence. We therefore intend here to reconcile the 
notions of constitutive relationality and autonomy. Conceiving 
of the notion of relational autonomy involves cutting across the 
divide between inner and outer realms since, in this framework, 
the inner realm cannot be defi ned without its domain of interaction 
with the outer realm.
To further clarify: We take here the term “constitution” in its 
etymological meaning, i.e., the Latin cum for “together” and 
statuo for “the fact to establish”. Hence, an act of constitution 
corresponds to an act organizing the relationships between the 
different components (i.e., constituents) of a given unit. Consti-
tuents are elements/states/processes that are constitutive of the 
unit in question. Constituents cannot be merely defi ned negatively: 
to determine whether a given element/state/process is constitutive 
of a given unit, it is not enough to check whether this element/
state/process is necessary for the unit to survive as such, since 
some elements/states/processes are necessary without being con-
stitutive (e.g., H2O is necessary for the survival and functioning of 
biological organisms but is not constitutive of personhood). What 
matters for determining whether a given element/state/process is 
constitutive of a given unit is whether this element/state/process 
is specifi c to the given unit. The specifi city of the element/state/
process is defi ned by (1) its necessity and (2) its exclusivity (Ruby 
& Legrand, 2007; Legrand & Ruby, in press). A unit U is con-
stituted by a given element E if E is specifi c to U, i.e., if E does 
not characterize non-U (exclusivity) and if changing or losing E 
would amount to changing or losing U and/or its distinction from 
non-U (necessity). For example, as described above, it is thought 
that autopoietic processes constitute living units (Jonas, 1966; 
Maturana & Varela, 1996; Thompson, 2007): autopoiesis does 
not characterize non-living entities (exclusivity) and a rupture of 
autopoiesis amounts to death (necessity). On this basis, we argue 
here that openness is constitutive of the biological body. Such 
openness does not characterize non-biological machines (exclusi-
vity) and bodily closeness is incompatible with biological bodily 
processes (necessity). Following the same line of thought, we will 
now argue that a specifi c form of bodily openness is constitutive 
of intersubjective encounters. Such bodily openness characterizes 
intersubjective encounters, while it does not participate to non-
intersubjective encounters (exclusivity) and bodily closeness di-
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srupts intersubjective encounters (necessity). Space does not allow 
us to detail here the effects of bodily closeness and the forms of 
non-intersubjective encounters. We will rather focus on the way 
bodily openness characterizes intersubjective encounters.
To state it differently, according to our reading of the notion of 
“autopoiesis”, an autonomous system/self is constituted jointly by 
its inner organization and its openness. Here, we will assume the 
former (inner organization), and will focus on the examination 
of the latter dimension (openness). In what follows, the charac-
terization of autonomous system/self as structurally coupled, i.e., 
constitutively open to its surrounding world, will be exploited 
beyond the organic level that we considered up to now. In parti-
cular, we will export the notion of relational autonomy to the fi eld 
of intersubjectivity. In this fi eld, the idea that selfhood is an inner 
realm or inner dimension of being is either assumed or rejected. 
Here, we argue that the self is an autonomous being but we avoid 
enclosing it within an inner realm by connecting this inner dimen-
sion with its co-constitutive counterpart: openness.
3. FROM ORGANIC RELATIONAL AUTONOMY TO INTER-
SUBJECTIVITY
As argued above, the body is organically open. This open body, 
we will now argue, is fundamentally an openly intersubjective 
body. Before spelling out what this means, a word needs to be 
said about the bridge we intend to cross between the organic and 
the intersubjective orders. Our point is not to reduce the social 
order to the organic one, nor to generalize organic processes to the 
social domain. Our aim is more modest. We intend to argue that 
the body, both as organic and as intersubjective, is open in a way 
that can be better understood through the reading of the notion 
of relational autonomy offered by the theory of autopoiesis. We 
acknowledge that the immersion in an intersubjective environment 
involves an “identity generation underdetermined by metabolism” 
(Di Paolo, 2009). In an intersubjective domain, forms of selfhood 
and subjectivity emerge which otherwise do not if the world is not 
lived intersubjectively. According to the very notion of structural 
coupling (see above), any modifi cation of the outer domain (e.g., 
from a solitary to an intersubjective world) impacts the inner 
organization of the system/self in ways allowing the latter to ac-
tually relate to this new environment (Jonas, 1966, pp. 106-7). 
We thus do not advocate that intersubjectivity is constitutive of 
bodily openness but rather that bodily openness is constitutive of 
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intersubjectivity. We return to the issue of intersubjective consti-
tution in the concluding section.
Our motivation is to propose a conception of intersubjectivity in 
a naturalistic, non-reductionist framework. The most basic requi-
rement for this to happen is to consider that the understanding 
of organic self-constitution proposed above, and the conception 
of intersubjectivity that we will propose below, are reciprocally 
constraining: one order should not violate what is viable for the 
other order. The simplest way to see that two orders are compa-
tible with each other is to detect that they are characterized by 
equivalent dimensions. As we saw above, at the organic level, the 
body is constitutively characterized by its openness; we thus now 
need to check whether an equivalent dimension of bodily openness 
constitutes intersubjectivity. In this non-reductionist approach, we 
consider that the body cannot be fully understood by conceiving it 
merely as a physical organism; nor is it exhaustively categorized as 
a lived, subjective perspective on the world, over against a world 
of physical things and other subjects. Rather, it is both of these. 
In this sense, the living body has a unique “two-sidedness”. As 
phenomenologically sensitive thinkers such as Husserl, Kitaro 
Nishida, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty (among others) have insi-
sted, the body is an organism embedded in the world as well as a 
subjective perspective on the world. Our concern in what follows 
is to explore how this two-sidedness is opened up within our in-
tersubjective engagements. 
4. THE INTERSUBJECTIVE OPEN BODY
4.1 Bodily intersubjectivity 
Let us exploit a suggestive remark by Merleau-Ponty as a platform 
to expose our view. This passage serves to clarify several ways that 
the open body is an intersubjective body—a perceiving, acting, 
and feeling body-in-relation. Merleau-Ponty writes:
I experience my own body as the power of adopting certain forms 
of behavior and a certain world, and I am given to myself merely 
as a certain hold upon the world; now, it is precisely my body 
which perceives the body of another, and discovers in that other 
body a miraculous prolongation of my own intentions, a familiar 
way of dealing with the world. Henceforth, as the parts of my 
body together comprise a system, so my body and the other’s 
are one whole, two sides of one and the same phenomenon…” 
(1962/2003, p. 412).
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For our purposes, we can take two lessons from this rich passage. 
The fi rst concerns the intermingling of embodiment and inter-
subjectivity: “it is precisely my body which perceives the body 
of another”. As psychologist Peter Hobson notes, it appears that, 
developmentally, we come into the world automatically recognizing 
that “a person is the kind of thing with which one can feel and share 
things, and the kind of thing with which one can communicate…
We have a basic response to expressions of feeling in others—a 
response that is more basic than thought” (Hobson, 2002, p.59-
60). Before we acquire the multiple concepts or folk psychology 
underlying a “theory of mind” (Premack & Woodruff, 1978), we 
are fi rst coupled to other subjects by a more primitive relation 
of “interaffectivity” (Stern, 1993, p.210). This interaffectivity is 
rooted in our bodily relatedness to others. Intersubjectivity, the 
ability to understandingly relate to others, is fi rst and foremost 
an embodied skill; it is not primarily detached mind-reading but 
interactive bodily practices (Gallagher, 2001, 2008). We will return 
to this issue below with the discussion of data from developmental 
psychology. 
The second point we wish to extract from Merleau-Ponty’s words 
concerns the bi-directional relation entertained by self and others 
though the encounter of their body. The expressive body of the 
other is implicitly recognized as “a miraculous prolongation of my 
own intentions”. My relation to another is robustly bodily in that 
it involves a kind of “bodily resonance”.1 I experience others by 
interacting with their body as well as by experiencing my own bo-
dily reaction to others’ presence/behavior. The expressive gestures 
of another person (e.g., broad smile, clenched fi st, or expectant 
posture) are not only perceived as conveying intersubjectively 
salient information, such as that person’s mood or particular 
emotional states at that moment. Beyond this, these gestures elicit 
bodily (affective) reactions and are experienced as marking motor 
possibilities for my own action—possibilities that I can actualize 
in virtue of my having the sort of body that I do, and in virtue of 
 
1 This way of putting things clearly echoes the notion of “motor resonance” one 
fi nds in the mirror neuron/shared representations literature (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 
2007). Our use of this term differs, however: the “motor resonance” discussed 
in the mirror neuron literature is active at the neuronal (i.e., subpersonal) level 
and thus cannot be spoken of as a structure of consciousness with which we are 
concerned here.  
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my implicitly2 experiencing that the body I have can also do the 
things it experiences another person’s body doing. In this sense, 
the other’s body resonates with my own and conversely: my and 
others’ body are coupled at the behavioral and experiential levels. 
As Merleau-Ponty puts it, “my body and the other’s are one whole, 
two sides of the same phenomenon” in ways which remind the 
structural coupling of inner and outer realms at the organic level 
(described above). Like at the organic level, what matters here is 
that bodily openness is bi-directional. On the one hand, the open 
body is poised to perceive, feel, explore and respond in emotional 
ways to the people it encounters. On the other hand, the behavior, 
attention, and expressiveness of other people disclose the bodily 
subject to herself as a bodily subject, a subject capable of inte-
racting with and being responsively affected by the world and by 
other people. The form of the intersubjective body’s “responsive 
comportment” thus opens up the bodily self in its two-sidedness: 
that is, as both object (i.e., a concrete organism in a physical 
world) and subject (i.e., a lived body). To use the terminology 
introduced above: this mode of poised and responsive inhabitation 
within the social world involves the bodily self as an autonomous 
being (characterized by its subjective experience) who is, at the 
same time, relational (characterized by its encounter with others)3.
4.2. Affective openness to others
The body’s intersubjective structure emerges from its sensorimotor-
affective openness to a world inhabited by other subjects. By 
labeling this form of openness “sensorimotor-affective”, we are 
intentionally stressing the tight link between perceiving, acting and 
feeling. When we understandingly engage with another person, 
perception and affect are both co-present as two intermingled 
aspects of a single coherent process. To engage with another person 
“understandingly” is simply to interact with another as an em-
bodied and emotional agent, and to interact with their expressive 
behavior in a way suggesting that I implicitly recognize them as 
 
2 By this we simply mean that these action-potentials of the body are immediately 
known without the agent having to refl ect on them in any second-order way.
3 There are two additional points worth noticing in Merleau-Ponty’s quote, but we 
will not develop them here: fi rst, the idea that I primarily experience my body in 
the world (Legrand, 2007), secondly, the idea that I experience others by sharing 
a common world with them (De Preester, 2008).
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possessing a unique emotional life that I can engage with and, to 
a certain extent, manipulate by calibrating my own embodied re-
sponses to their expressive behavior (e.g., by smiling and laughing 
coyly, or by frowning and sneering menacingly). Remember that 
at the organic level, the organism does not pick up information 
which is already pre-determined out there (see above the notion 
of “structural coupling”), but rather enacts such information as 
a function of its vital signifi cance. Likewise here, we do not fi rst 
perceive the movements, actions, intentions, and utterances of 
another person as neutrally-given information and only later 
develop affective/emotional interpretations and felt responses to 
them. Rather, our intersubjective engagements are always given 
with a certain affective coloring, however subtle it may be. In 
other terms, intersubjectivity is enacted in resonance with bodily 
subjectivity: according to the affective relevance of others’ state 
for the bodily state of the subject himself. This affective satura-
tion allows us to intuitively and meaningfully engage with other 
subjects as embodied and intersubjectively embedded subjects 
with minds, experiences, and emotions similar to our own. Jointly 
to the encounter with others based on the experience of both their 
body and one’s own, it is crucial to underline that, reciprocally, 
one’s experience of one’s own body is itself mediated by others. 
This is best evidenced by the feeling of shame or shyness. Recent 
evidence suggest that such “relation emotions” are present very 
early in infancy (from two-month old; see Reddy, 2008) and 
“emerge because we have relations …not internal states…[but] 
ways of beings with the other person” (Reddy, 2005, p. 202). Her 
observations have led Reddy to argue that “Being self-conscious 
might leave us not with images of the self but instead with images 
of the things and people that stirred the ‘self-conscious’ feelings or 
thoughts” (Ibid). In this view, “interpersonal awareness… is not 
seen as one in which a “self-contained” self, as it were, engages with 
a “self-contained” other” (Draghi-Lorenz et al., 2001, p. 295). 
Rather, self and others are “coupled” in ways which lead them 
to enact each other’s bodily states. In this sense, intersubjectivity 
is constitutively bodily, and this is made possible by the fact that 
the body is constitutively open.
4.3. Empirical evidence from developmental psychology
Much work in developmental psychology indicates that the body 
is open in an intersubjectively-sensitive way even from birth. A 
look at some of these fi ndings will assist in characterizing the open 
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intersubjective body. Consider the fact that neonates appear to be 
almost immediately capable of intentionally imitating a range of 
facial, vocal, and gestural expressions (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977, 
1983, 1997; Kugiumutzakis, 1985, 1999).4 They can even do so 
after a delay, and work to improve their imitative abilities with 
practice (Meltzoff & Moore, 1994). Moreover, neonates recognize 
imitative episodes as instances of meaningful interpersonal inte-
raction. They intentionally imitate gestures and vocalizations to 
complete the communicative dialectic inaugurated by the bodily 
gestures and vocalizations of the model they are imitating (Kugiu-
mutzakis, 1999). By 15 days, infants seem to take pleasure from 
the sustained interest—the attentiveness and self-exertion, in other 
words—required for imitation (Kugiumutzakis et al., 2006, p.167).
This capacity for genuine (i.e., intentional, as opposed to refl exive) 
imitation was traditionally thought not to appear until the age of 
8-12 months. Indeed, it was assumed that since infants lack folk 
psychological concepts such as “self”, “other”, “beliefs”, “desires”, 
“communicative intentions”, etc., they are incapable of attributing 
any sort of genuine interpersonal or communicative signifi cance 
to episodes of imitation. Minimally, being able to attribute false 
beliefs to another has been taken to be the benchmark of having 
developed a theory of mind, that is, the ability to understand ano-
ther person as a psychological being harboring beliefs and desires 
relevantly similar to one’s own. Without such a theory, mindrea-
ding remains unattainable. Therefore, since intentional imitation 
involves the ability to recognize another’s gestures as meaningful 
intentional imitation is simply too cognitively complex an activity 
to be undertaken by the developmentally immature neonate. We 
should note that this presupposition stemmed from a wide-spread 
and well-established tendency to dramatically underestimate the 
neonate’s native capacity for genuine intersubjective engagement. 
As Colwyn Trevarthern underlines, it was long assumed “that the 
mind of the infant is incoherent, with undefi ned perceptions and 
incapable of contributing to communication, except to solicit help 
refl exively for biological functions” (Trevarthen, 1992, p.121). 
However, there are now strong reasons to doubt this “blooming 
and buzzing confusion” model of the early infant’s world. Despite 
obvious constraints relative to the developmental immaturity of 
 
4 For a brief review of infant imitation research, see Nadel and Butterworth (1999).
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their perceptual systems, neonates and young infants nevertheless 
exhibit the intersubjectively-signifi cant forms of bodily poise and 
responsiveness mentioned earlier. They can and indeed do initiate 
various preparatory movements intended to bring about other-di-
rected bodily practices which indicate their self-aware, intentional 
efforts to participate in intersubjective engagements (Trevarthen, 
1992, pp.133-135). This suggests that even newborns and very 
young infants are able to intentionally mobilize the sensorimotor 
resources of the open body to meaningfully engage with others. 
This “embodied attending” (Downing, 2000, p.256) to an inter-
subjectively signifi cant context precedes the formation of a folk 
psychology or theory of mind. Rather, it has the form of a skill 
that is a function of the body’s sensorimotor-affective openness.  
Bodily imitation is only one example of such skillful and self-aware 
interpersonal engagement. This early imitation soon takes on a 
more robust form as the infant becomes more adept at intersubjec-
tive exchanges. A premature infant at 30 weeks’ gestational age 
can complement a partner’s expression, such as an affectionate 
vocal greeting, with an emotionally appropriate response (e.g., a 
smile) (Trevarthen, 1992, p. 145). By two months, if not even ear-
lier, infants can engage in “proto-conversations” (Bateson, 1971) 
consisting of “extended bouts of mutual gaze, turn-taking, cooing, 
showing lip and tongue movements, waving of arms, turning 
wrists and extending fi ngers”; in short, “they seem to experience 
our conversational acts as communication and must respond ex-
pressively” (Reddy & Trevarthen, 2004). Around this time they 
also begin to exhibit coyness, shyness, and embarrassment; a bit 
later they become capable of teasing others and showing off to call 
attention to themselves (Reddy & Trevarthen, 2004; Reddy, 2008). 
The upshot of these fi ndings is that, long before they master any 
theory of mind, neonates and infants are active bodily participants 
within intersubjective engagements. They exhibit the embodied 
skills needed for modulating both the responses of their interlocutor 
(e.g., doing things to encourage or discourage further interaction), 
as well as their own affective responses to these embodied engage-
ment (e.g., throwing themselves more fully into playful situations, 
or bashfully withdrawing and becoming shy or embarrassed). This 
mobilizing of the sensorimotor-affective open body to modulate 
another’s affective states while simultaneously regulating one’s own 
states speaks to the “bi-directional regulation” (Beebe, 2003) at 
the heart of our interpersonal engagements, which are founded on 
a shared body-to-body coordination. From the start neonates are 
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active and self-aware participants within intersubjective contexts, 
equipped with “(a) embodied skills for the “sending” of emotion 
to another person; (b) skills for the “receiving” of emotion from 
the other; (c) skills for “negotiating” such exchanges; and (d) 
skills for using shared affective states jointly to disclose aspects 
of the world” (Downing, 2000, p.263). Once again, such skills 
involve the bodily self as an autonomous being (characterized 
by its subjective experience) who is, at the same time, relational 
(characterized by its encounter with others).
5. INTERSUBJECTIVELY AUTONOMOUS
The question that opens up here is the following: is this inter-
subjective opening of the body coincidental or constitutive? First 
of all, note that our reliance on developmental psychology and on 
the earliest stages of intersubjective encounter is meant not only 
to provide empirical arguments supporting our thesis but also to 
underline both that the body is intersubjectively relevant and that, 
additionally, intersubjectivity is bodily relevant from birth on. This 
already indicates that bodily intersubjectivity is not an add-on 
but that it is, rather, basic and primary. Interestingly, this point 
is compatible with the idea that the body is intersubjectively open 
in a constitutive way. This is a strong claim that we will not spell 
out in full details here. Just to scratch the surface of the issue at 
stake, let us clarify that we advocate here a conception of the self 
as multi-layered. In the present context, this implies that at least 
some of its dimensions are not intersubjectively constituted (for 
example, one can presumably feel one’s body proprioceptively even 
if there is no other person involved at all). But the question remains: 
is the dimension of the self which is factually intersubjective con-
stitutively or contingently intersubjective? More specifi cally, is the 
open body interacting with others constitutively or contingently 
intersubjective? The most we can do here is to dismiss a (classical 
but fl awed) reply which involves dissociating the organic from the 
intersubjective: these two dimensions of embodiment would belong 
to two different orders, organized according to different princi-
ples (again, a radical form of such a view would be a Cartesian 
dualism). Accordingly, the organic and intersubjective orders are 
simply neighbors constituting complementary but quite discon-
nected dimensions of the body. As should be clear by now, we do 
not favor such dualistic view, since we intend to remain faithful 
to a naturalistic (non-reductionist) approach. As explained abo-
ve, the notion of autonomy is not incompatible with the notion 
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of openness and we believe that it is fruitful to understand both 
organic and intersubjective bodily openness as relying on different 
implementations of the same organizational principle, namely, 
relational autonomy. To clarify, we do not want to argue that each 
and every form of selfhood is constituted intersubjectively but 
rather that selfhood is constituted by its bodily openness, be it at 
the organic level or at the intersubjective level.
Like the organic system/self constitutes itself (its own inner spa-
ce) by being structurally coupled with its external world, so does 
the subject when living in a world populated with others. It is by 
being related to others that the subject constitutes its mode of 
being at this level. This formulation, however, may be misleading. 
We are not saying that self-constitution at the experiential level 
is a result of prior intersubjective encounters. Conversely, we are 
not stating either that intersubjective encounters are the result of 
prior self-centered subjective experiences. What is misleading in 
these two (opposite) considerations is their way of considering the 
issue at stake in terms of “result”. Doing so necessitates to fi rst of 
all conceive of subjectivity (or more generally: inner realm) and 
intersubjectivity (or more generally:  outer realm) as two separable 
or even separate orders, only one of which being “the fi rst” to be 
constituted and giving the key for the constitution of the second 
one. Such “unplugging” of subjectivity (or more generally: inner 
realm) and intersubjectivity (or more generally: outer realm) is 
precisely what the current framework avoids. Self and world are 
not fi rst separated to be then integrated to each other. The “who’s 
fi rst?” question is thus dissolved: not one, not two, self and others 
penetrate each other co-constitutively through the coupling of 
their open body. 
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ABSTRACT
According to phenomenological tradition we consider empathy a basically 
prerefl exive experience of another as an embodied subject of experience 
like oneself. However, empathy is a complex neuropsychological ability 
strictly linked with complex intersubjective processes, therefore involving 
conscious-refl exive cognition as well. 
According to Dziobek et al. (2008) two main approaches have been used 
to study empathy: First one focuses on cognitive empathy or the ability 
to take the perspective of another person and to infer his mental state 
(Theory of Mind). The second approach emphasizes emotional or affective 
empathy (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987) defined as an observer’s emotional 
response to another person’s emotional state. To the best of our knowledge 
empathy has been studied mostly within psychopathological subjects. 
The nature of empathy as a process with at least partially dissociated 
sub-components becomes evident (Blair, 2005).
Our purpose in this paper is to verify whether healthy subjects show dif-
ferent ways of empathizing according to their personality style. Previous 
researches on the topic demonstrated a connection between personality 
styles and the recruitment of different neural networks as a consequence 
of exposure to emotional stimuli. As a measure of empathy we admini-
stered the Interpersonal Reactivity Index -IRI- (Davis, 1980). Different 
personality styles have been evaluated by the administration of Personality 
Style Questionnaire (QSP; Picardi et al., 2003).
We expect that high levels of outwardness positively correlate with emo-
tional empathy. Outwardness is a measure of the tendency to focus on 
a frame of references that predominantly uses an externally anchored 
coordinate system, i.e. contexts or persons, to discriminate among own 
internal emotional states. Specifi cally, we found a correlation between 
high levels of IRI “Personal Distress Scale” and outward personality style. 
Interestingly, we also found a positive correlation between PD sub-scale 
and fi eld-dependent participants. Results show that as much as a person’s 
emotional domain depends by evaluation of others, the more a person is 
sensitive to emotional empathy. 
Keywords: empathy, psychopathology, Personality Styles.
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1. DEFINING EMPATHY
Empathy is a polysemic notion: “There are probably nearly as 
many defi nitions of empathy as people working on the topic” 
(De Vignemont & Singer, 2006). According to phenomenologi-
cal tradition we consider empathy - or Einfühlung - a basically 
prerefl exive experience of another as an embodied subject of 
experience like oneself. Recent works on mirror neurons system 
(MNS) lead neuroscience to build up a coherent phenomenological 
conceptual framework about the nature of empathy. In his work 
(2008), Gallese asserts that the other’s emotion is constituted and 
directly understood by means of embodied simulation producing 
an “as-if” experience engendered by a shared body state. It is the 
body state shared by observer and observed that enables direct 
understanding.
According to this approach, a common underlying functional me-
chanism—embodied simulation—mediates our ability of sharing 
the meaning of actions, feelings and intentions with others, thus 
grounding our identifi cation with others. 
However, empathy is strictly linked with complex intersubjective 
processes, therefore involving conscious-refl exive cognition. Social 
emotions like envy and gloating (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2008) 
necessarily involve super-ordinate cognitive abilities. Therefore, 
Preston and de Waal (2002) have argued that ‘‘empathy [is] a 
super-ordinate category that includes all sub-classes of phenomena 
that share the same mechanism. This includes emotional contagion, 
sympathy, cognitive empathy, helping behavior, etc.’’ (p. 4). Ano-
ther position, assumed by Blair (2005), point out that ‘‘empathy’’ 
subsumes a variety of dissociable neurocognitive processes. 
Three main divisions, each reliant on at least partially dissocia-
ble neural systems, will be identified: cognitive (the individual 
representation of the internal mental state of another individual), 
motor (occurs when individual mirrors the motor responses of the 
observed actor) and emotional empathy (dissociable in two forms: 
the response to the emotional  display of others and the response 
to other emotional stimuli). According to Dziobek et al. (2008) 
two main approaches have been used to study empathy: First one 
focuses on cognitive empathy or the ability to take the perspective 
of another person and to infer his mental state. This ability could 
be assimilated to Theory of Mind (ex.: Kohler, 1929; Baron-Cohen 
& Wheelwright, 2004). The second approach emphasizes emotio-
nal or affective empathy (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987) defined as an 
observer’s emotional response to another person’s emotional state. 
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Finally, other researchers suggest a multi-dimensional approach 
that considers emotional and cognitive empathy as two separate 
but related constructs (Davis, 1980; 1983). 
By a neuropsychological perspective, Theory of Mind, emotional 
empathy and motor empathy do share a degree of anatomical 
overlap in superior temporal regions. Theory of Mind seems related 
to acitivity in anterior paracingulate cortex, the temporal-parietal 
junction and inferior temporal cortex. Inferior Frontal Gyrus (IFG) 
seems crucial for a correct functioning of emotional empathy 
(Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2008). For a review about neuroanatomical 
components of the different constructs of empathy see Blair (2005). 
Interestingly, a recent research (Minio-Paulello et al., 2008) on 
Asperger’s subjects observation of other’s pain demonstrates 
absence of embodied empathy in Asperger Syndrome (AS). This 
research provides neurophysiological evidence for reduced empa-
thic sensorimotor resonance although AS competences in affective 
qualities of imagined pain was similar to control participants. This 
could be an evidence to the nature of empathy as a process with 
at least partially dissociated sub-components. 
Finally, in a review on this topic by Singer (2006), it is proposed 
that even though T.o.M. and empathy  are often used as syno-
nyms in the literature, they represent different abilities that rely 
on different neuronal circuitry. ToM refers to human ability in 
understanding mental states such as intentions, goals and beliefs, 
and relies on structures of the temporal lobe and the pre-frontal 
cortex, while empathy refers to our ability to share the feelings 
(emotions and sensations) of others and relies on sensorimotor 
cortices as well as limbic and para-limbic structures. In his review, 
the autor sudgest
“It is further argued that the concept of empathy as used in lay 
terms refers to a multi-level construct extending from simple forms 
of emotion contagion to complex forms of cognitive perspective 
taking. Future research should investigate the relative contribution 
of empathizing and mentalizing abilities in the understanding 
of other people’s states. Finally, it is suggested that the abilities 
to understand other people’s thoughts and to share their affects 
display different ontogenetic trajectories refl ecting the different 
developmental paths of their underlying neural structures. In par-
ticular, empathy develops much earlier than mentalizing abilities, 
because the former relys on limbic structures which develop early 
in ontogeny, whereas the latter rely on lateral temporal lobe and 
pre-frontal structures which are among the last to fully mature”.
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2. EMPATHY AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
Every impairment of the ability in sharing another person’s inner 
life causes inevitably a  diminished ability to relate with others 
human beings, producing a defi cit in social functioning.  The link 
between empathy and psychopathology will be at fi rst described 
according to three major syndromes: Pervasive Developmental 
Disorders (Autism and Asperger Syndrome), Psychopathy, and 
Alexithymia (ALEX). 
2.1. Autism and Pervasive Developmental disorders
Autism is a severe develompmental disorder. The main criteria 
for the diagnosis in DSM-IV-r can be syntetized as a qualitative 
impairment in social comunication, and restricted and repetitive 
patterns of behaviors and interests. With respect to empathy dy-
sfunction in autism, several studies demonstrate Theory of Mind 
impairment (es.: Hill & Frith, 2003). Neuroimaging studies  have 
reported reduced activation in three brain critical regions for 
mentalization in healty subjects (the temporal poles, temporal-
parietal junction and medial prefrontal cortex; Castelli et al., 
2002). Motor empathy is reasonable impaired in autistic subjects 
for clear evidence of their defi cit of imitation. With respect to 
emotional empathy is still diffi cult to affi rm autistic subjects are 
effectively impaired. Several studies have found emotional defi cit 
in autistic subjects but it is reasonable that these researches have 
used complex cognitive emotions requiring the representation of 
the mental states of others (es.: Bormann-Kischkel et al., 1995). 
Recently, Minio-Paluello, Baron-Cohen et al. (2008) have explored 
whether people with Asperger Syndrome differ from neurotypical 
control participants in their empathic corticospinal response to 
the observation of others’ pain. Briefl y, corticospinal excitability 
recorded from the specifi c body part that is vicariously affected 
by the observed painful stimulation is reduced in neurotypical 
subjects. Using a single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS) Minio-Paluello et al., outline that AS subjects do not di-
splay signifi cative sensorimotor contagion, that is no signifi cant 
reduction of corticospinal excitability. 
However, Hamilton et al. (2007) reported that children with 
autistic spectrum disorders, despite their defi cit in ToM tasks, 
have no impairments on a complex performance on a gesture 
recognition task, even though all of these tasks are thought to 
rely on the classical motor MNS in healthy subjects. In addition, 
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autistic people showed lowered MNS-related neural activity than 
normative controls when observing emotional facial expressions 
(Dapretto et al., 2006) and meaningless hand movements (Wil-
liams et al., 2006) as well as lower neural activity on a ToM task 
as above mentioned. Indeed, Hamilton et al. (2007) proposed that 
the classical MNS involved in object-directed hand movements 
is intact in autistic people, though other MNS components (e.g., 
regarding emotional recognition) are impaired.
On the other way round, in a research by Dziobek et al. (2008), 
authors by using a new photo-based measure to assess empathy 
multidimensionally - Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET) -, have 
found that while individuals with AS are impaired in cognitive 
empathy, they do not differ from controls in emotional empathy. 
Level of general emotional arousability and socially desirable an-
swer tendencies did not differ between groups. Internal consistency 
of the MET’s scales ranged from .71 to .92, and convergent and 
divergent validity were highly satisfactory. 
2.2. Psychopathy
A psychopathology often considered as symptomatically specular 
to  Asperger is Psychopathy. This psychopathology shows signi-
fi cant impairment in emotional empathy but normal processes in 
cognitive empathy
As Blair (2005) points out psychopathy is a developmental 
disorder, usually appearing in early childhood and continuing 
throughout the lifespan. Individuals with psychopathy are marked 
by pronounced emotional (considerably reduced empathy and 
guilt) and behavioral disturbance (criminal activity and violence). 
Psychopathy can be considered one of the prototypical disorders 
associated with empathic dysfunction. Reference to empathic dy-
sfunction is part of the diagnostic criteria of psychopathy. There 
are no indications of Theory of Mind impairment in individuals 
with psychopathy. Three out of four studies assessing the ability 
of individuals with psychopathy on Theory of Mind measures have 
reported no impairment. As noted above, the clinical description 
of psychopathy includes reference to a lack of empathy. This 
description has been substantiated empirically. Individuals with 
psychopathy show reduced vicarious conditioning; i.e., reduced 
autonomic responses to stimuli associated with the distress of 
another individual. In addition, both adults with psychopathy and 
children with psychopathic tendencies show reduced autonomic 
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responses to the sad expressions of others. Several studies have 
examined the ability of individuals with psychopathy to recognize 
the facial or vocal emotional expressions of others. In short, the 
empathic dysfunction shown by individuals with psychopathy 
appears relatively selective. Individuals with psychopathy are 
impaired when processing fearful, sad (in adulthood, if respon-
siveness is indexed by skin conductance responses (SCRs), in 
childhood whether by SCR or recognition score), and possibly 
disgusted expressions. No study has yet reported that individuals 
with psychopathy show impairment for the processing of angry, 
happy or surprised expressions.
2.3 Alexithymia
Another psychopathology that has been correlated with empathies 
impairment is alexithymia (ALEX), (Moriguchi et al., 2007; 2008). 
Although the concept of alexithymia was originally used to describe 
the characteristics of psychosomatic patients, recently it has been 
used to refer to deficits in emotional functioning in broader po-
pulations (ex.: Taylor & Bagby, 2004). Infact, because awareness 
of Self emotional states is a prerequisite to recognizing such states 
in others, alexithymia - difficulty in identifying and expressing 
one’s own emotional states - should involve some impairment in 
empathy.  
Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), Moriguchi 
et al., (2007) compared an ALEX group with healthy subjects for 
their regional hemodynamic responses to the visual perception of 
pictures depicting human hands and feet in painful situations. 
Subjective pain ratings of the pictures and empathy-related psy-
chological scores were also compared between the 2 groups. 
The ALEX group showed less cerebral activation in the left dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), the dorsal pons, the cerebellum, 
and the left caudal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) within the pain 
matrix. The ALEX group showed greater activation in the right 
insula and inferior frontal gyrus. 
Furthermore, alexithymic participants scored lower on the pain 
ratings and on the scores related to mature empathy. In conclu-
sion, the hypofunction in the DLPFC, brain stem, cerebellum, 
and ACC and the lower pain-rating and empathy-related scores in 
ALEX are related to cognitive impairments, particularly executive 
and regulatory aspects, of emotional processing and support the 
importance of self-awareness in empathy.  Interestingly, ALEX 
group scored lower on the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) 
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scales assessing ‘‘perspective taking’’ and ‘‘empathic concern,’’ 
suggesting that they were less able to take the perspective of ano-
ther and had less empathy but, on the other hand,  alexithymics 
had significantly higher ‘‘personal distress’’ scores on the IRI. In a 
subsequent research, Moriguchi et al. (2008) measured the hemo-
dynamic signal to examine whether there are functional differences 
in the mirror neuron system’s (MNS) activity between participants 
with ALEX and without ALEX, in response to a classic MNS task 
(i.e., the observation of video clips depicting goal-directed hand 
movements). Both groups showed increased neural activity in the 
premotor and the parietal cortices during observation of hand 
actions. However, activation was greater for the ALEX group 
than the non-ALEX group. Furthermore, activation in the left 
premotor area was negatively correlated with perspective-taking 
ability as assessed with the IRI. By following these results, authors 
suggest that the stronger MNS-related neural response in indivi-
duals scoring high on ALEX is associated with their insuffi cient 
self-other differentiation. 
Authors’s investigations demonstrate that, although ALEX itself 
refers to defi ciencies in emotional self-awareness, it is often marked 
by a lack of understanding of the feelings of others. ALEX has 
been repeatedly found in broad spectrum of psychiatric disorders 
(e.g., substance use disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and 
dissociative disorders). At the same time, it is noteworthy that there 
is a considerable group of psychiatric disorders characterized by 
ALEX involving defi cits in the recognition of feelings belonging to 
the self and identifi cation with others, such as autism and Asper-
ger Syndrome (AS), schizophrenia, and borderline personality 
disorder. These disorders are characterized by reduced self-other 
distinction and immature empathy, such as higher self-oriented 
personal distress or emotional contagion. Furthermore, recent 
studies utilizing functional neuroimaging revealed that individuals 
with ALEX have reduced mentalizing capability, cognitive empa-
thy, and perspective-taking ability. These results point to common 
components in the recognition of the self and others; therefore, 
ALEX involves impairments both in self-awareness and also in 
understanding the perspective of others at a higher cognitive level.
3. EMPATHY AND PERSONALITY
Until now, individual differences in empathizing have been 
described as a consequence of psychopathology (ex.: Asperger, 
Psychopathy, ALEX, etc.). Although these researches cannot be 
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summarized into a clear conceptual framework for empathy, we 
try to point out some experimental evidences.
Empathy is a upper-ordinate category that includes different 
sub-classes of phenomena. This includes emotional contagion, 
sympathy, cognitive empathy, helping behavior, etc. (Preston & de 
Waal, 2002). By following these authors, the different sub-classes 
of phenomena share the same basic mechanism. Gallese (2008) 
asserts that a common underlying functional mechanism—embo-
died simulation—mediates our ability of sharing the meaning of 
actions, feelings and intentions with others, thus grounding our 
identifi cation with others. Furthermore, Blair (2005) considers 
these phenomena as neurocognitive dissociable modules. By the 
way, is yet to be demonstrated that:
- a) Those sub-classes of phenomena compose a continuum path-
way of a single ability, being embodied simulation and ToM 
the continuum extremes;
- b) It is not clear how different forms of empathy are neurological-
ly dissociable, that is, how they share common and different 
neural networks.
Authors found some researches on the relation between empathy 
and personality traits, for example psychometric studies on the 
relation between personality inventories vs. empathy scales (es.: 
Johnson et al., 1983). Interestingly, some researches have evaluated 
how different personality styles are associated with differential 
modulation of brain activity during explicit recognition of fearful 
and angry facial expressions (Rubino et al., 2007). Authors found 
that different personality styles are associated with differential 
modulation of brain activity during explicit recognition of fearful 
and angry facial expressions. 
The supporting theory of personality is the cognitive post-ra-
tionalist one (Arciero & Guidano, 2000). Results can be shortly 
summarized: Inward subjects (whose identity is more focused on 
the inner experience and around control of environmental threat) 
recruit greater neuronal resources in medial prefrontal cortex 
(mPFC) compared to outward subjects (subjects, whose identity 
is more focused on external referential contexts and much less 
around control of threatening stimuli). MPFC activity is associated 
with cognitive aspects that are closely intertwined with emotional 
processing. In a previous study, Bertolino, Arciero et al. (2005) 
found that aspects of personality style are rooted in biological 
responses of the fear circuitry associated with processing of envi-
ronmental information.
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4. A PRELIMINARY STUDY ON DIFFERENT WAYS OF EMPA-
THIZING ACCORDING TO INWARDNESS-OUTWARDNESS 
PERSONALITY DIMENSIONS
4.1. The rationale 
Our aim was to verify whether healthy subjects show different ways 
of empathizing according to their personality style. As a measure 
of empathy we administered the  Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
(IRI) (Davis, 1980; 1983; 1996). The IRI consists of four scales, 
each measuring a distinct component of empathy: 1) Empathy 
Concern, feeling emotional concern for others; 2) Perspective 
Taking, cognitively taking the perspective of another; 3) Fantasy, 
emotional identifi cation with characters in books, fi lms etc.; 4) 
Personal Distress, negative feelings in response to the distress of 
others. Different personality styles have been evaluated with the 
Personality Style Questionnaire (QSP) (Picardi et al., 2003).  QSP 
is based upon Guidano’s post-rationalist theory (Guidano, 1991; 
Arciero & Guidano, 2000) as later modifi ed by Arciero (2006). 
Personality styles are grouped into four clusters, respectively: 
obsessive-prone, dap-prone, depressive-prone, phobic-prone. By 
following post-rationalist theory, obsessive-prone and dap-prone 
are outward personality styles, that is, they are more focused on 
a frame of references that predominantly uses an externally an-
chored coordinate system, i.e. contexts or persons, to discriminate 
among own internal emotional states. The other group, composed 
by depressive-prone and phobic-prone, are inward personality 
styles, that is, they are more focused on the inner frame of re-
ferences that predominantly uses a body-centered coordinates 
system: they focalize primary on emotions starting with visceral 
activation to evaluate the events in the world (for example fear). 
Inward and outward personality styles are on the dimensional 
continuum inwardness-outwardness. The four main personality 
styles can be grouped into another pathway by following Witkin 
theory of fi eld dependence/independence cognitive styles (Witkin 
et al., 1977). That is, a cognitive style characterized by the pro-
pensity to differentiate perceptual and other experiences from 
their backgrounds or contexts, a person with a weak propensity 
of this kind being fi eld dependent and a person with a strong 
propensity fi eld independent. We expected no relevant  empathy 
impairment, meseaured on IRI-scoring, because participants are 
healthy subjects. Anyway we expected some correlation between 
self-report scores on IRI and QSP ones. Foremost, we expected 
outward subjects to score high level of emotional empathy in IRI’s 
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subscale. Our hypothesis comes from previous mentioned studies 
on alexithymic empathy impairment (Moriguchi et al., 2007; 2008) 
and, partially, on Asperger subjects (AS) (Minio Paulello et al., 
2008). IRI’s Personal Distress (PD) subscale, taps the tendency 
to experience self-oriented distress and discomfort in response to 
somebody else’s distress or misfortune. PD scores may in fact be 
even higher in AS than control participants. Alexithymic parti-
cipants showed lower pain ratings than non-alexithymics. They 
scored lower on the IRI scales assessing ‘‘perspective taking’’ and 
‘‘empathic concern,’’ suggesting that they were less able to take 
the perspective of another and had less empathy. Alexithymics 
scored lower on the SCI scales of ‘‘cognitive,’’ ‘‘problem solving,’’ 
and ‘‘positive reappraisal,’’ indicating that they were less likely to 
use these approaches to manage emotional stimuli. On the other 
hand, alexithymics had significant higher ‘‘personal distress’’ sco-
res on the IRI’s PD subscale. This higher score is associated with 
the alexithymic group greater activation than the non-alexitimic 
group in parietal and premotor areas, that is, participants with 
alexitymia activated more parts of their sensory and motor corti-
ces (i.e., bodily  regions) than control participants in response to 
emotional video clips, including the left precentral gyrus (BA4), 
temporal subgyral lobe, right parietal lobe (BA7), and medial/
superior frontal gyrus (BA6), which suggests their over-activated 
sensorimotor components. This study is consistent with fi ndings 
in terms of the overactivity in motor-related system in individuals 
with alexitymia. In his article about this topic Moriguchi (2008) 
conclude: “Our results also suggest that individuals with ALEX 
may stagnate in a basic and primitive level of mentalizing, and 
that ALEX is related to an immature state of inferring the mental 
state of others without suffi cient self-other differentiation. This 
may leave individuals with ALEX to be prone to being affected by 
others, leading to defi ciencies in emotional regulation.” As men-
tioned above, we expected, on the one hand, that high levels of 
outwardness, the tendency to focus on a frame of references that 
uses an externally anchored coordinate system (i.e. persons) to 
discriminate among own internal emotional states, positively cor-
relate with levels of personal distress as scored in PD subscale. On 
the other hand, we expected no relevant correlation in the inward 
group. Infact, inward group is more focused on the inner frame of 
references that predominantly uses a body-centered coordinates 
system; that is, they focalize primary on emotions starting with 
visceral activation to evaluate the events in the world.
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5. METHODS, PARTICIPANTS, PROCEDURES AND MATE-
RIALS
Our group included 27 subjects between the ages of 30 and 36 
years. All subjects spontaneously participated at the experiment 
and they were randomly extracted from different kinds of post-
graduate or specialization courses curricula. 
All the subjects were asked to perform two different tests, the QSP 
(Personality Style Questionnaire;  Picardi et al., 2003) and the IRI 
(Interpersonal Reactivity Index; Davis, 1980, Preston & de Waal, 
2002). All the subjects performed the test sessions individually 
and no fi xed times were given to fi ll the tests.
Two psychotherapists, with more than fi ve years of clinical expe-
rience, evaluated each subject with a clinical interview in order 
to estimate the inwardness/outwardness dimension. Group assi-
gnment scored 100% agreement.
The IRI is a 28-item, 5-point Likert-type scale that evaluates four 
dimensions of empathy: Perspective-Taking, Fantasy, Empathic 
Concern, and Personal Distress. Each of these four subscales counts 
7 items. The Perspective-Taking subscale measures empathy in the 
form of individuals’ tendency to adopt, in a spontaneous way, the 
others’ points of view. The Fantasy subscale of the IRI evaluates the 
subjects’ ability to put themselves into the feelings and behaviours 
of fi ctional characters in books, movies, or plays. The Empathic 
Concern subscale assesses individuals’ feelings of concern, warm-
th, and sympathy toward others. The Personal Distress subscale 
measures self-oriented anxiety and distress feelings regarding the 
distress experienced by others.
Table 1 - IRI item examples for each sub-scale
SUB-SCALES ITEM EXAMPLE 
Perspective-Taking “I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement
  before I make a decision”
Fantasy “I really get involved with the feelings of the
  characters in a novel”
Empathic Concern “I often have tender, concerned feelings for people
  less fortunate than me”
Personal Distress “When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain
  calm”
     
The QSP inventory is a 68 items self-evaluation questionnaire that 
evaluates the personality styles trough the 4 scales: Obsessive-
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prone, Depressive-prone, Phobic-prone and Eating Disorder-prone 
dimensions (17 items for each subscale). Matching the single di-
mensions scores, it’s also possible to obtain an estimation trough 
the Inwardness/Outwardness continuum and Field-dependent and 
Field-independent continuum (Arciero, 2006). 
The answers, (same as in the IRI questionnaire) are on a 5-point 
Likert-type scale.
Table  2 – QSP Outward items example
ORAL SESSION
ITEM ITEM EXAMPLE
Item 11 “I try to understand what others think about me”
Item 24 “I’m often worried about the possibility that my
  opinions could be criticized by others”
Item 63 “My own partner jealousy makes me feel very
  special”  
6. RESULTS
We carried out a Pearson correlation test between the QSP scores 
and the IRI scores.  There was a high positive correlation between 
the DAP scores and the Personal Distress Scale scores. We didn’t 
fi nd any correlation between the DEP, FOB and OSS scores and 
the other IRI scale scores (Fantasy Scale, Perspective-Taking Scale, 
Empathic Concern Scale). 
( r = .537, N = 27, p < .001 )
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Regarding the Outwardness/Inwardness dimensions we found 
a high positive correlation between the Outwardness dimension 
scores and the Personal Distress Scale scores.
( r = .562, N = 27, p < .001 )
Referring to the Field Dependent and Field Independent perso-
nality dimensions and the IRI scores, we found a high positive 
correlation between the Field Dependent dimension scores and 
the Personal Distress Scale scores.
( r = .553, N = 27, p < .001 )
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7. DISCUSSION
Our hypothesis about correlation between Personal Distress (PD) 
sub-scale score and outwardness one has been confi rmed. Parti-
cipants with high score on outwardness personality dimension, 
measured by the Personality Style Questionnaire (QSP), have a 
correlate high score on PD sub-scale  measured by  the Interperso-
nal Reactivity Index (IRI). As more as person’s emotional domain 
depends by evaluations of others (person and context), as much 
as the person is sensitive to emotional empathy (in a positive or 
negative way, depending upon the empathic stimuli). Outward 
participants show higher distress in front of negative empathic 
stimuli, because of their higher sensibility to other emotions. Inte-
restingly, we found a positive correlation between PD sub-scale and 
fi eld-dependent participants. As mentioned above, fi eld-dependent 
subjects are characterized by a weak propensity to differentiate 
perceptual and other experiences from their backgrounds or con-
texts. Logically, these subjects have developed across life span a 
high intersubjective competences. By the way, our study is just a 
preliminary research with the intent to verify if emotional empa-
thy correlate, in healthy subjects, with inwardness-outwardness 
dimensions of personality. As above described this correlation is 
to be deeper understood in the light of post-rationalist persona-
lity theory. We expect that further researches to be focused on 
the different ways people adopt to empathize, according to their 
personality style.  
REFERENCES
– Alvarez, W. A. & Shipko, S. (1991). Alexithymia and posttraumatic 
stress disorder. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 52, 317-319.
– Aniskiewicz, A. Z. (1979). Autonomic components of vicarious condi-
tioning and psychopathy. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 35, 60-67.
– Arciero, G. (2006). Sulle tracce di Sé. Torino: Bollati Boringhieri.
– Arciero, G. & Guidano, V. F. (2000). Experience, explanation, and the 
quest for coherence. In Neimeyer, R. A. & Raskin, J. D. (Eds.), Con-
truction of disorders. Washington D.C.: American Psychological Press, 
(Trad. It. Esperienza, spiegazione e la ricerca della coerenza. Articolo 
web dal sito www. IPRA.it).
– Baron- Cohen, S. & Wheelwright, S. (2004). The Empathy Quotient 
ORAL SESSION
143INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP - ENACTING INTERSUBJECTIVITY
(EQ). An investigation of adults with Asperger Sindrome or High 
Functioning Autism, and normal sex differences. Journal of Autism 
and Developmental Disorders, 34, 163-175.
– Berthoz, S. & Hill, E. L. (2005). The validity of using self-reports 
to assess emotion regulation abilities in adults with autism spectrum 
disorder. European Psychiatry, 20, 291-298.
– Bertolino, A., Arciero, G., Rubino, V., Latorre, V., De Candia, M., 
Mazzola, V., et al. (2005). Variation of human amigdala response 
during threatening stimuli as a function of 5’HTTLPR genotype and 
personality style. Biological Psychiatry, 57 (12), 1517-1525.
– Blair, R. J. R., Sellars, C., Strickland, I., Clark, F., Williams, A., & 
Smith, M., et al. (1996). Theory of mind in the psychopath. Journal 
of Forensic Psychiatry, 7, 15-25.
– Blair, R. J. R., Jones, L., Clark, F. & Smith, M. (1997). The psychopathic 
individual: A lack of responsiveness to distress cues? Psychophysiology, 
34, 192-198.
– Blair, R. J. (1999). Responsivesenn to di stress cues in the child with 
psychophatic tendencies. Personality and Individual Differences, 27, 
135-145.
– Blair, R. J. R., Colledge, E., Murray, L. & Mitchell, D. G. (2001). A 
selective impairment in the processing of sad and fearful expressions in 
children with psychopathic tendencies. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 
29, 491-498.
– Blair, R. J., Mitchell, D. G.., Richell, R. A., Kelly, S., Leonard, A.,  & 
Newman, C., et al. (2002). Turning a deaf  ear to fear: Impaired reco-
gnition of vocal  affect in psychopatic individuals. Journal of  Abnormal 
Psychology, 111, 682-686.
– Blair, R. J. (2005). Responding to the emotions of others: dissociative 
forms of empathy through the study of typical and psychiatric popu-
lation. Consciousness & Cognition, 14(4), 698-718.
– Blair, R. J. R., Budhani, S., Colledge, E. & Scott, S. K. (2005). De-
afness to fear in boys with psychopathic tendencies. Journal of Child 
Psychology and Psychiatry, 46, 327-336.
– Bormann-Kischkel, C., Vilsmeier, M. & Baude, B. (1995). The deve-
lopment of emotional concept in autism. Journal of Child Psychology 
and Psychiatry, 36, 1243-1259.
– Castelli, F., Frith, C., Happè, F. & Frith, U. (2002). Autism, Asperger 
Syndrome and brain mechanisms for the attribution of mental state to 
animated shapes. Brain, 125, 1839-1849.
– Cedro, A., Kokoszka, A., Popiel, A., & Narkiewicz-Jodko, W. (2001). 
Alexithymia in schizophrenia: A exploratory study. Psychological Re-
ports, 89, 95-98.
– Cleand, C., Magura, S., Foote, J., Rosenblum, A., & Kosanke, N. (2005). 
Psychometric properties of the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) for 
substance users. Journal of Psychosomatics Research, 58, 299-306.
– Dapretto, M., Davies, M. S., Pfeifer, J. H., Scott, A. A., Sigman, M., 
144 INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP - ENACTING INTERSUBJECTIVITY
Bookheimer, S. Y., & Iacoboni, M. (2006). Understanding emotions in 
others: Mirror neuron dysfunction in children with autism spectrum 
disorders. Nature Neuroscience, 9, 28-30.
– Davis, M. H. (1980). A multidimensional approach to individual diffe-
rences in empathy. Catalog of Selected Documents in Psychology, vol. 
10 MS. 2124, 85. 
– Davis, M. H. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: 
evidence for a multidimensional approach. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 44, 113-126.
– Davis, M. H. (1996). Empathy - A social psychological approach. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
– De Vignemont, F., & Singer, T. (2006). The empathic brain: how, when 
and why? Trends in Cognitive Science, 10, 435-436.
– Decety, J., & Moriguchi, Y. (2007). The empathic brain and its disfun-
ctyon in psychiatric populations: Implications for intervention across 
different clinical conditions. BioPsychoSocial Medicine, 1, 22.
– Dziobek, I., Rogers, K., Fleck, S., Bahnemann M., Heekeren, H. R., 
Wolf, O. T., & Convit, A. (2008). Dissociation of cognitive and emotio-
nal empathy in adults with Asperger syndrome using the Multifaceted 
Empathy Test (MET). Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 
38, 464-473.  
– Eisenberg, N., & Miller, P. (1987). The relation of  empathy to prosocial 
and related behaviors. Psychological Bulletin, 101, 91-119.
– Elzinga, B. M., Bermond, B., & Van Dyck, R. (2002). The relationship 
between dissociative proneness and alexithymia. Psychotherapy and 
Psychosomatics, 71, 101-111.
– Frewen, P. A., Dozois, D. J., Neufeld, R. W., & Lanius, R. A. (2008a). 
Meta-analysis of alexithymia in posttraumatic stress disorder. Journal 
of Traumatic Stress, 21, 243-246.
– Frewen, P. A., Lanius, R. A., Dozois, D. J., Neufeld, R. W., Pain, C., 
Hooper, J. W., Densmore, M., & Stevens, T. K. (2008b). Clinical and 
neural correlates of alexithymia in posttraumatic stress disorder. Journal 
of Abnormal Psychology, 117, 171-181.
– Frick, P. J., O’ Brien, B. S., Wootton, J. M., & McBurnett, K. (1994). 
Psychopathy and conduct problems in children. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 103, 700-707.
– Frith, U. (2004). Emanuel Miller Lecture: Confusions and controversies 
about Asperger syndrome. Journal of Child  Psychology and Psychiatry, 
45, 672-686.
– Gallese, V. (2008). Empathy, embodied simulation and the brain. 
Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 56, 769-781.
– Guidano, V. F. (1991). The Self in Process. New York: Guilford Press.
– Guttman, H. & Laporte, L. (2002). Alexithymia, empathy, and psy-
chological symptoms in a family contest. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 
43, 448-455.
– Hamilton, A. F.,Brindley, R. M., & Frith, U. (2007). Imitation and 
ORAL SESSION
145INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP - ENACTING INTERSUBJECTIVITY
action understanding in autistic spectrum disorders: How valid is the 
hypotesis of a defi cit in the mirror neuron system? Neuropsychologia, 
45, 1859-1869.
– Harpur T. J., & Hare, R. D. (1994). The assessment of psychopathy as 
a function of age. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 102 (4), 604-609.
– Haviland M. G., Shaw, D. G., MacMurray, J. P., & Cummings, M. A. 
(1988). Validation of the Toronto Alexithymia Scale with substance 
users. Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 50, 81-87.
– Haviland, M. G., Hendryx, M. S., Shaw, D. G., & Henry, J. P. (1994). 
Alexithymia in women and men hospitalized for psychoanalytic sub-
stance dependance. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 35, 124-128.
– Hill, E., Berthoz, S. & Frith, U. (2004). Brief report: Cognitive pro-
cessing of own emotions in individuals with autistic spectrum disorder 
and in their relatives. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 
34, 229-235.
– Hill, E.,s & Frith, U. (2003). Autism, mind and brain. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
– House, T. H., & Milligan, W. L. (1976). Autonomic responses to mo-
deled distress in prison psychopaths. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 34, 556-560.
– Hyer, L., Woods, M. G., Summers, M. N., Boudewyns, P., & Harrison, 
W. R. (1990). Alexithymia among Vietnam veterans with posttraumatic 
stress disorder. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 51, 243-247.
– Irwin, H. J., & Melbin-Helberg, E. B. (1997). Alexithymia and disso-
ciative tendencies. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 53, 159-166.
– Johnson, J. A. & Cheek, J. M. (1983). The Structure of Emapthy. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 45 (6), 1299-1312.
– Kohler, W. (1929). Ein Altes Scheinproblem. Die Naturwissenschaften, 
17, 395-401. (Translated by Erich Goldmeyer in 1971, An old pseu-
doproblem).
– Kosson, D. S., Suchy, Y., Mayer, A. R., & Libby, J. (2002). Facial affect 
recognition  in criminal psychopaths. Emotion, 2, 398-411.
– Krystal, J. H., Giller, E. L. Jr., & Cicchetti, D. V. (1986b). Assessment 
of alexithymia in posttraumatic stress disorder and somatic illness: 
Introduction of a reliable measure. Psychosomatic Medicine, 48, 84-94.
– Mann, L. S., Wise, T. N., Trinidad, A., & Kohanski, R. (1995). Alexi-
thymia, affect recognition, and Five Factors of personality in substance 
abusers. Perception Motor Skills, 81, 35-40.
– Minio-Paluello, I.,  Baron-Cohen, S., Avenanti, A., Walsh, V., & Agliotti, 
S. M. (2008). Absence of Embodied Empathy During Pain Observation 
in Asperger Syndrome. Biological Psychiatry. In press.
– Moriguchi, Y., Onishi, T., Lane, R. D., Maeda, M., Mori, T., Nemoto, 
K., Matsuda, H., & Komaki,  G. (2006). Impaired self-awereness and 
theory of mind: An fMRI study of mentalizing in alxithymia. Neuroi-
mage, 32, 1472-1482.
– Moriguchi, Y. Decety, J. Onishi, T., Maeda, M., Mori, T., Nemoto, K., 
146 INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP - ENACTING INTERSUBJECTIVITY
Matsuda, H., & Komaki, G. (2007). Empathy and judging other’s pain: 
an fMRI study of alexithymia. Celebral Cortex, 17, 2223-2234.
– Moriguchi, Y. Ohnishi, T. Decety, J. Hiracata, M. Maeda, M. Matsuda, 
H., & Komaki, G. (2008). The human mirror neuron system in a po-
pulation with defi cient self-awareness: an fMRI study in alexithymia. 
Human Brain Mapping. In press.
– Picardi, A., Mannino, G., Arciero, G., Gaetano, P., Pileri, M. F., Ardu-
ini, L., & Reda, M. A. (2003). Costruzione e validazione del QSP, uno 
strumento per la valutazione dello stile di personalità secondo la teoria 
delle ‘organizzazioni di signifi cato personale’. Rivista di Psichiatria, 38, 
13-34.
– Preston, S. D., & De Wall, F. B. M. (2002). Empathy: Its ultimate and 
proximate bases. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25, 1-20.
– Richell, R. A., Mitchell, D. G., Newman, C., Leonard, A., Baron-Cohen, 
S., & Blair, R. J. (2003). Theory of mind and psychopathy: Can psycho-
pathic individuals read the ‘language of the eyes’? Neuropsychologia, 
41, 523-526.
– Rubino, V., Blasi, G., Latorre, V., Fazio, L., d’Errico, I., Mazzola, V., 
Caforio, G., Nardini, M., Popolizio, T., Hariri, A., Arciero, G., & Ber-
tolino, A. (2007). Activity in medial prefrontal cortex during cognitive 
evaluation of threatening stimuli as a function of personality style. Brain 
Research Bulletin, 74, 250-257.
– Sayar, K., Kose, S., Grabe, H J., & Topbas, M. (2005). Alexithymia and 
dissociative tendencies in an adolescent sample from eastern Turkey. 
Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 59, 127-134.
– Sevens, D., Charman, T., & Blair R. J. R. (2001). Recognition of emo-
tion  in facial expressions and vocal tones in children with psychopatic 
tendencies. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 162, 201-211.
– Shamay-Tsoory, S. G., Tibi-Elhanany ,Y., & Ahron-Peretz, J. (2007). 
The green-eyed monster and malicious joy: the neuroanatomical bases 
of envy and gloating (Schadenfreude). Brain, 130, 1663-1678.
– Singer, T. (2006). The neural basis and ontogeny of empathy and 
mind reading: Review of literature and implication for future research. 
Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 30, 855-863.
– Stanghellini, G. & Ricca, V. (1995). Alexithymia and schizophrenias. 
Psychopathology, 28, 263-272.
– Sutker, P. B. (1970). Vicarious conditioning and sociopathy. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 76, 380-386.
– Taylor, G. J., Parker, J. D. & Bagby,  R. M. (1990). A preliminary investi-
gation of alexithymia in men with psychoactive substance dependence. 
American Journal of Psychiatry, 147, 1228-1230.
– Taylor, G. J., Bagby, R. M. & Parker J. D. A. (1997). Disorder of affect 
regulation: alexithymia in medical and psychiatric illness. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
– Taylor, G. J., & Bagby, R. M. (2004). New trends in alexithymia rese-
arch. Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 73, 68-77.
ORAL SESSION
147INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP - ENACTING INTERSUBJECTIVITY
– Widom, C. S. (1978). An empirical classifi cation of female offenders. 
Criminal Justice and Behavior, 5, 35-52.
– Williams, J. H., Water, G. D., Gilchrist, A., Perrett, D. I., Murray, A. 
D., & Whiten, A. (2006). Neural mechanisms of imitation and mirror 
neuron functioning in autistic spectrum disorder. Neuropsychologia, 
44, 610-621.
– Witkin, H. A., Moore, C. A., Oltman, P. K., Goodenough, D. R., Fried-
man F., Owen D.R., & Raskin, E. (1977). Role of the fi eld-dependent 
and fi eld-independent cognitive styles in academic evolution: a longi-
tudinal study. Journal of Education Psychology, 69 (3), 197-211. 
– Zlotnick, C., Shea, M. T., Pearlstein, T., Simpson, E., Costello, E., & 
Begin, A. (1996). The relationship between dissociative symptoms, 
alexithymia, impulsivity, sexual abuse, and self-mutilation. Compre-
hensive Psychiatry, 37, 12-16.
148 INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP - ENACTING INTERSUBJECTIVITY
THEORY OF MIND AND 
INTERSUBJECTIVITY: HOW 
TASK SOCIAL PARTNERS, 
ATTACHMENT REPRESENTATION 
AND CAREGIVING SETTINGS 
INFLUENCE MENTALIZATION
ANTONELLA MARCHETTI1, DAVIDE MASSARO1
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship between the 
development of Theory of Mind and the structural and socio-relational 
aspects of domestic and scholastic interactive contexts. In particular it 
explores the changes in ToM performance at the light of the use of specifi c 
social partners in ToM tasks, of the attachment representation, and of the 
children’s past experience of caregiving contexts. One hundred thirty-one 
pre-school children (4 and 5 years), chosen on the basis of three different 
caregiving contexts (from 0 to 3 years: Home, Day-nursery, Family-time) 
were given two theory of mind tasks to assess understanding of mind 
and two versions of the Separation Anxiety Test (Family and School 
version) to assess attachment representations. Results show differences 
between performances at the two ToM tasks, highlighting the impor-
tance of social and relational factors in mind understanding. Moreover, 
although data confi rm the existence of a link between the good quality of 
the representation of attachment and ToM performance, past contextual 
and relation-signifi cant experiences seem to play a role in determining 
the specifi c characteristics of this link.
Keywords: theory of mind, attachment, caregiving contexts, intersubjec-
tivity
1. THEORETICAL FRAME
The research on Theory of  Mind (ToM) development have supplied 
many evidences to support the idea that the ability to understand 
both our own and other people’s mental states can be relevant to the 
individual’s social development. Several studies show that social 
and cultural factors would contribute to the development of ToM 
(e. g.  Astington, 1999; Repacholi & Slaughter, 2003; Antonietti 
et al., 2006). The purpose of this study was to investigate the ToM 
development from a social and cultural perspective: it recognizes 
1 Department of 
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University of 
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a crucial importance to the role of intesubjectivity , assuming that 
the development of ToM abilities is a multilateral issue (Astington, 
1999; Arranz et al., 2002; Jenkins et al., 2003). More specifi cally, 
this study aims to integrate and deepen the emergent evidence from 
3 different spheres of research into ToM: 1) the role of signifi cant 
social partners (caregivers) when they are used as characters into 
ToM tasks; 2) the possible infl uence of children’s  past experience 
of caregiving contexts (Home, Day-nursery, Family-time), 3) the 
link between the security of the attachment and ToM development. 
Age effect and interactions between these conditions will be also 
considered. 
1.1 ToM tasks with a socio-affective connotation or emotional 
content. 
One of the fi rst attempts in using a new methodology (and there-
fore different context and situation) to explore ToM was made by 
Harris and his colleagues (1989): they asked whether children are 
able to forecast emotions correctly, bearing in mind simultaneously 
beliefs and desires (see also e. g. Bosacki & Astington, 1999; De 
Rosnay & Harris, 2002). They found that children between 3 and 
7 years of age are progressively more capable to describe the emo-
tional reactions of a person on the basis of a personal estimation 
of the situation, rather than on the basis of a objective evaluation 
of that own situation. The child progressively understands that 
the emotion depends on the relationship between desire and the 
“expected” reality, however in some cases what really happens 
can be very different from the “expected” one. Symons and his 
colleagues (1997) moved their focus from the classic false belief 
task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Perner & Wimmer, 1985) to a 
richer one, more respectful of the variety of elements which are 
usually implied in real situations. They substituted the decepti-
ve box and the moved object with a human character or even a 
signifi cant social partner, with the intention of implementing the 
interpersonal processes and make the test more real. They found 
that the presence of an emotionally relevant character does not 
affect 5-6 year children’s ToM performance by itself; instead, the 
nature of the action played by this new character – autonomous 
and self-willed rather than based on external constrictions – has 
important repercussions. Symons & Clark (2000) verifi ed that 
the performance of the 5-year-old children in the false belief task 
changes when the caregiver shows his/her intention of modifying 
his/her own position. In the same way Nguyen & Frye (1999) 
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investigate the understanding of mental states which characterize 
social interaction: they redefi ned the traditional task in terms of 
comprehension of desires, beliefs and emotions which come from 
the necessity to interpret a social situation in which characters’ 
mental states interact. Children’s performance seems to be infl uen-
ced by the presence of multiple mental states: if 5 year-old children 
show a greater capacity of differentiation, 3 year-olds have trouble 
in understanding the desires, when the characters do not agree 
on them. Nguyen & Frye (1999) hypothesize that the capacity to 
recognize and manage the congruity or incongruity in characters’ 
mental states forms the understanding of social situations. De 
Rosnay and colleagues (2004) explored ToM development using 
both a classic version of the false belief task (a simplifi ed version 
of the dog-rabbit test of the experiment 2 from Harris et al., 1989) 
and the MIST (mother-infant separation task from De Rosnay & 
Harris, 2002). The MIST is a video-based task that aims to eva-
luate children’s reactions to the departure of the mother together 
with the infant positive expectation that the mother is returning. 
De Rosnay and colleagues used two different versions of the MIST, 
based on high and low expressed emotion conditions. In the fi rst 
one the principal character of the story (a child) is explicitly upset 
for the mother’s departure; in the other one the child appears re-
laxed when the mother leaves. The results showed a gap between 
false belief and emotion understanding: children had a better 
performance in false-belief question than in emotion attribution. 
The results also showed that the absence of any negative reaction 
make the prediction of the principal character’s emotion (but not 
of his/her false belief) easier.  
1.2 ToM and attachment
The existence of a link between the theory of attachment and ToM 
has been proved by a substantial amount of scientifi c evidence.
With regard to the mother’s role, Symons and Clark (2000) showed 
that the child’s performance in false belief tasks with reference 
to the caregiver at 5 years of age is predicted  by the sensitivity 
and maternal distress shown when the child is 2. Meins and col-
leagues (1998) highlighted a signifi cant relationship between the 
maternal sensibility (Ainsworth et al., 1971) measured when the 
child is 6 months old and his/her ToM ability measured with a 
variety of tests done between 45 and 55 months. In particular they 
focused on maternal mind-mindedness,  – the mother’s proclivity 
to consider her child like a person with a mind – and found out 
a link between this propensity and child’s ToM performance. 
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Meins and colleagues (2003) showed further evidences to consider 
mind-mindedness – more than the general concept of maternal 
sensibility – and attachment security as possible predictors of ToM 
understanding. Considering the child’s role, Fonagy and collea-
gues (1997) explored the correlation between the security of the 
attachment, measured with the separation anxiety test (Klagsbrun 
& Bowlby, 1976), and the competence of the children in ToM, 
measured using the belief-desire task (Harris et al., 1989) at a 
pre-school age and during the fi rst few years at school. The results 
showed that the security of attachment is a signifi cant concurrent 
predictor of the ability of mentalization. Meins and colleagues 
(1998) found out that the security of attachment measured by 
the Strange Situation procedure (Ainsworth & Wittig, 1969) is a 
predictor of the performance of the 4 year-old child in ToM (see 
also Meins et al., 2002; Sharp & Fonagy, 2008). De Rosnay and 
Harris (2002) verifi ed the possible infl uence of the behaviour of 
affectively relevant people on the ability to understand emotions: 
in particular they used the MIST task to assess ToM, and the 
Separation Anxiety Test to measure the attachment security. The 
results confi rmed a close connection between the quality of the 
attachment relationship and the child’s ability of mentalization. 
Repacholi & Trapolini (2004) focused their attention on the at-
tachment relationship and ToM in pre-school children in order to 
evaluate how the attachment may predict children’s individual use 
of their social understanding across different relationships. The 
results showed that children with a less secure attachment had a 
lower ToM performance; moreover they also met more diffi culties 
to reason about mother’s beliefs than about stranger’s ones (see 
Greig & Howe, 2001).
1.3 Development and professional day-care contexts 
Life and job conditions drive always more often family to leave 
their child in day-care institutions, also when children are very 
young. In these new contexts children have the opportunity to 
establish new relationships both with caregivers and peers: these 
new patterns of arrangement may have different infl uences on 
the abilities - included ToM - which the children are developing. 
Belsky (2001) – in a recent review of fi fteen years of contributes 
on developmental risk associated with early child care – stresses 
the importance of non-maternal child-care effects on child de-
velopment, because he thinks that it is a valid and fundamental 
fi eld of research for the child’s well being. De Schipper and col-
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leagues (2003) explored the relation between the quality of the 
centre of day care (measured in terms of fl exible child care) and 
the children’s socio-emotional functioning. They found that the 
stability of care plays an important role for the development of 
socio-emotional functioning; in this sense the day-care centre 
can defi nitely contribute to the stability of this construct. The 
NICHD Early Child Care Research Group Network (2003, 2008) 
underlined some interesting links between non-maternal child 
care experience in the child’s fi rst three years and mother-child 
interactions when children are older. In general they found positive 
relations between these two variables under certain conditions. 
Spieker and colleagues (2003) tested both compensatory hypothe-
sis (the mitigation of the adverse effects of insecure attachment on 
cognitive and language development, by providing children with 
a more stimulating environment) and lost resources one (the idea 
that out-of-home care would negatively affect secure children’s 
ability development, see also Booth et al., 2003): they explored 
the possible link between child care and attachment security – on 
one side – and cognitive and language outcomes of low-income 
toddlers – on the other side. The results supported the compensa-
tory hypothesis, but not the lost resources hypothesis.
Though literature have not closely considered non-maternal child 
care effects on mind understanding development yet, it appears 
quite evident the presence of a connection between non-maternal 
child care and the general child development, included child social 
functioning and competence. 
2. AIMS
The aims of this study are: A) to explore possible links between 
children’s performance in a ToM task with a social reference 
and a ToM task emotionally connoted; B) to inspect the possible 
infl uence on ToM development carried out  by the contexts the 
child is exposed to in the period before going to the nursery school 
(from 3 to 6); C) to verify whether the quality of the attachment 
relationship is signifi cantly associated with the ToM. Age effect 
and interactions between these conditions will be also considered. 
3. METHOD
3.1 Participants
One hundred thirty-one Italian children (63 boys and 68 girls) 
from the fi rst year (4-year-old group, average age: 3.9; range 3.2-
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4.3) and from the second year (5-year-old group, average age 5.1; 
range 4.2-5.4)  of the nursery school1 participated in this study. 
The children were chosen on the basis of 3 different caregiving 
contexts experienced from the age of 0 to the age of 3: Day-nursery, 
Family-Time, and Home. 
The Day-nursery is the classic Italian institution for the reception 
of infants between 0 and 3; in this context children can usually 
socialize under the supervision of teachers and/or professional 
personnel. The child’s relatives are not commonly full present 
into the Day-nursery even if they are allowed and encouraged to 
stay with the child during the fi rst weeks of attending in order to 
facilitate the child to familiarize with the new context and people. 
The family time is a service for infants between 0 and 3 which 
allows children to carry out communal activities together with 
relatives (mother, grandmother, etc.); in this context children 
have always the opportunity to start socializing with new people, 
but unlike the Day-nursery, the presence of a child’s relative is 
constantly allowed. The Home is the familiar context: children 
between 0 and 3 who are cared at their own house, without the 
support of specifi c institution. 
All the participants of this study belong to an average socio-
economic and cultural level. Structural  information were gathered 
using a specifi c questionnaire.  
3.2 Procedure
The children were tested individually through two sessions in 
a quiet room of the school. Each session lasted 20-25 minutes, 
with an interval of 3-5 days between the two sessions. Before the 
assessment, a familiarization period was carried out.
The following tests were given to the children: 2 attachment rela-
tionship tasks – the family SAT (Liverta Sempio et al., 2001) and 
the school SAT (Liverta Sempio et al., 2001), the false belief task 
with social reference (adapted from Symons et al., 1997; Nguyen 
& Frye, 1999), and a belief-desire reasoning task (Harris et al., 
1989). The order of presentation was randomized.  
 
1 The nursery school is the institution for children from 3 to 6.
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4. INSTRUMENTS
4.1 The belief-desire task (Harris et al., 1989)
We used the second type of the belief-desire tasks originally used 
by Harris and colleagues. The character of the story, an animal, 
is tricked by Mickey, a despite friend, who exchange the charac-
ter’s preferred food or drink with another desirable one. Child is 
asked about the character’s feelings before and after discovering 
the substitution. Positive and negative emotions (happiness and 
sadness) are tested and emotion word order in asking questions is 
controlled. Therefore, four versions of the task (emotions X word 
order) were administered: two happiness versions which considers 
positive emotions, and two sadness versions which explores nega-
tive emotions. The belief-desire task has been used by Fonagy and 
colleagues (1997) to evaluate the possible relationship between the 
development of a ToM and the attachment security; it has been 
chosen because particularly appropriate for gathering the emotio-
nal component in understanding mental states. The coding system 
distinguishes between incorrect responses (0 points) and correct 
ones (1 point) both in the check questions and in the emotional 
forecast questions (sadness, happiness). The justifi cation of pre-
dicted emotion questions have been codifi ed following Harris and 
colleagues’ criteria (1989). The scores obtained in the 4 versions 
which make up the belief-desire task were unifi ed according to the 
emotion (for a minimum of 0 points and a maximum of 2): two 
scores were obtained, one relative to the performance with versions 
indicating the emotion of happiness and the other the emotion of 
sadness. A total score has been calculated from the sum of all the 
scores (for a minimum of 0 points and a maximum of 4).
4.2 First order false belief task with social reference (adapted from 
Symons et al., 1997; Nguyen and Frye, 1999)
This task has been specifi cally developed for this research: Symons 
and colleagues’ task (1997) has been integrated with Nguyen and 
Frye’s one (1999). The instrument by  Symons and colleagues 
(1997), who substituted the unexpected transfer of an object 
with the unexpected transfer of a person, was integrated with the 
work by Nguyen & Frye (1999) who proposed an intentional Vs. 
unintentional unexpected change of activity as motivation of the 
caregiver’s whereabouts The plot of the task has the following 
prerogatives: 1) a boy or a girl (depending on the sex of the exa-
mined child) has an interaction with his/her own caregiver. Two 
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caregivers, mother and teacher, as well as two contexts – family 
and school – are used; 2) the caregiver goes away explaining the 
reason for his/her absence, indicating the destination and promi-
sing to come back quickly: 3) unknown to the child, the caregiver 
changes his/her mind and moves to a different place.
The unexpected change can be determined by the caregiver’s wishes 
or by an external factor (internal Vs. external situation). Four ver-
sions of the task (context X motivation of the unexpected change) 
were administered. The replies to the check questions about the 
reasons for the caregiver’s absence and the false belief relative to 
the caregiver’s whereabouts have been codifi ed as incorrect (0 
points) and correct (1 point). 
The scores obtained with the four versions were sorted in pairs, 
according to the context and the motivation ( for a minimum of 
0 points and a maximum of 2). A total score was also calculated 
adding up all the four scores ( for a minimum of 0 points and a 
maximum of 4).
4.3 Separation Anxiety Test
Family SAT (Liverta Sempio et al., 2001). Starting from the ver-
sion used by Fonagy and colleagues (1997), the test was translated 
and updated by Liverta-Sempio et. al. (2001) using new photos 
and integrated with various aspects from the previous versions 
(Hansburg, 1972; Slough & Greenberg, 1990). 
It is made up of 6 items which present and describe situations of 
separation from the parents (equally divided in number between 
medium and strong intensity): e.g. “The mother and father are 
going away for the weekend and leaving (the child’s name) with 
the baby-sitter…(strong intensity); the mother is putting (the 
child’s name) to bed and then leaves the room…(medium inten-
sity)”. For each item there are 3 questions: the fi rst 2 are relative 
to the feelings (How do you think (the child’s name) feels?/Why 
do you think (the child’s name) feels (the sentiment indicated by 
the child)? The third is about the “coping” (What do you think 
(the child’s name) will do?).
The  coding system (Slough et al., 1988) brings to three scales: 
attachment index – the capacity to express vulnerability or need 
as far as the separation is concerned; self-confi dence index – the 
ability to show self-confi dence in coping with the separation; avoi-
dance index – the degree of evasion in discussing the separation. 
These three dimensions can be combined, adding the attachment 
and self-confi dence score to the inverse avoidance score, to obtain 
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a total score for the security of attachment (Fonagy et al., 1997). 
School SAT (Liverta Sempio et al., 2001). 
This test was developed on the basis of Family SAT, to evaluate 
the anxiety of separation within the school context with reference 
to the  relationship with the teacher. The criteria of administra-
tion, as well as the coding system of the children’s responses, are 
derived from Family SAT.
5. RESULTS
We will report the results about the fi rst order false belief task with 
social reference and belief-desire task. Then we will consider the 
relationship between these two tasks, as well as the possible diffe-
rences between caregiving contexts in terms of ToM performance 
and the score obtained at the Family SAT and the School SAT. 
5.1 ToM performance: a descriptive overview
Descriptive analyses show that the subjects’ performance at the fi rst 
order false belief task with social reference is constant and therefore 
apparently independent from the specifi c characteristics of the 
different versions of the task. These results do not replicate Symons 
and colleagues (1997) and Symons & Clark (2000) who found 
an infl uence of caregiver’s intentions on children performance. 
Considering all the sample, results showed a strong polarization 
of the performance at the fi rst order false belief task with social 
reference both for Family or School contexts, and for intentional 
or unintentional motivation  (respectively 44.7%, 45.5%,  and 
44.7%, 44.7% for the score 0, and 42.4%, 40.9%, and 41.7%, 
40.9% for the score 2). On the contrary there was no polarization 
for the performance at the belief-desire task. In both the emotional 
contexts we found an increase of the percentage of subjects who got 
1 point and obtained a medium performance (happyness version: 
0 point: 48.5%; 1 point: 17.4%; 2 point: 34.1%): sadness version 
(0 point: 44.7%, 1 point: 25.8% 2 point: 29.5%). 
In accordance with Harris et al. (1989) –  see also De Rosnay and 
Harris (2002) – it seems that the emotional factor is not  a facili-
tating factor; on the contrary it might hinder the correct passing 
of the test itself.
5.2 Age and ToM
Within the 4 year-old age group we fi nd a signifi cantly higher per-
formance at the belief-desire task than at the false belief task with 
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social reference (t=2.30 df 61 p < .05). The tendency is reversed for 
the 5 year-old group  (t=3.50 df 61 p < .01). These results support 
the idea of an age effect on the understanding of false belief but 
not on the processing of emotions based on beliefs (see for exam-
ple De Rosnay and Harris, 2002). In fact an ANOVA with age as 
independent variable shows that there is no signifi cant difference 
for the performance at the belief-desire task (F (1,130)=1.43 n.s.), 
while the performance at the false belief task with social reference 
differs signifi cantly (F (1,130)=28.06 p < .001). 
The social reference would infl uence the ToM understanding in 
a signifi cant way (see also Marchetti & Gilli, 1995; Battacchi et 
al., 2005), whereas the processing of emotion would probably 
take longer to consolidate and, therefore, it interferes with ToM 
performance across the two explored ages.
5.3 Age, caregiving contexts, and ToM
The interaction between age and context shows some note-worthy 
differences. 
The performance of 4 and 5 year-old children who experienced the 
Day-nursery is very similar to the general tendency found out for 
all the sample: the performance at the belief-desire performance 
is better than the peformance at the false belief task with social 
performance for the youngers (t=2.21 df 20 p < .05) while the 
difference is overturned for the olders (t=3.08 df 24 p < .05). 
For the children who experienced the Family-Time,  signifi cant 
differences persist only for the olders (t=2.06 df 20 p < .05), 
and they disappear for both of the age-groups when the children 
experienced the Home context. Thess data support the idea the 
context of life infl uences the development of the performance in 
the two ToM tasks considered.
5.4 Attachment, caregiving contexts and ToM
The 4-year-old children who experienced the Home context or the 
Family-Time obtained a signifi cantly higher score at the Family 
and School SAT than children who experienced the Day-nursery 
(F(2, 59) = 6.284, p < .01; F(2, 59) = 6.094, p < .01).
An ANOVA of the performance in the ToM tasks with the Family 
SAT as an independent variable was carried out. The results show 
that children with secure and ambiguous attachment obtained 
a higher score at the false belief task with social reference than 
children with an insecure attachment. No signifi cant differences 
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in the belief-desire task between the three groups of attachment 
were found. 
Grouping the children on the basis of the caregiving contexts, an 
ANOVA of the performance at the ToM tasks with Family SAT 
as an independent variable does not show signifi cant differen-
ces for the subjects who experienced the Family-Time. Instead 
among the children who experienced the Day-nursery, secure and 
ambiguous subjects had better results than insecure ones in the 
false belief task with social reference (F(2, 43) = 3.785, p < .05); 
in particular the differences were found in the total score of the 
school versions (F(2, 43) = 4.242, p < .05) and in the total score 
of the internal-motivation versions (F(2, 43) = 5.011, p < .05).
With reard to the children who experienced the Home context, the 
secure and ambiguous subjects did better in the two versions of 
the false belief task with social reference with the family context 
(F(2, 43) = 3.953, p < .05) and in the happiness version of the 
belief-desire task (F(2, 43) = 3.329, p < .05).
As for the School SAT as an independent variable, it seems that 
secure and ambiguous children who experienced the Family-Time 
had a signifi cantly higher performance than insecure ones in all 
the tasks (except for the happiness version of the belief-desire 
task) (total score of the false belief task with social reference F(2, 
43) = 4.33, p < .05; sadness version of the belief-desire task F(2, 
43) = 4.06, p < .05). In the other two caregiving contexts the re-
presentation of the attachment quality with the school caregiver 
does not determine any signifi cant variation as far as the given 
task performance is concerned. 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Our analyses on the performance at the false belief task with social 
reference show a polarization. The total success of a so consistent 
portion of the sample might be due to a general effect of the so-
cial component used in the task, even if no signifi cant differences 
were found between the four versions used. The polarization, on 
the other hand, can be explained in terms of the acquisition of 
social routines which would help – when available – the child to 
manage contexts and situations; therefore, they would support 
the relationships and the explanation of the behaviour in terms 
of mental states (Marchetti & Gilli, 1995; Battacchi et al., 2005). 
According to Haslam and Fiske (2004), ToM ability would not be 
the unique  component of our social capability. On the contrary 
ToM would be in many respects secondary to a wider relational 
ORAL SESSION
159INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP - ENACTING INTERSUBJECTIVITY
thinking, which would help people to mange relations among 
people rather than links among contents of other minds. In other 
words, we can imagine the existence of an indirect model to in-
terpret behaviour—a model based on social routine interpretation 
of a series of motivational and relational dynamics which more 
frequently characterized the child’s experiences. This explanatory 
outline, once acquired, would support a high level performance 
of the child in understanding the mental aspects which charac-
terize events; these events would be similar to those presented in 
the false belief task with social reference. The lack of differences 
between the 4 versions of the task leaves open the question about 
the specifi c factors which would cause the general effect of faci-
litation for this task. 
Marvin and Britner (1999) say that children, starting from the 
age of 3 – develop the ability to process some information (di-
screpancies between different points of view, the specifi city of 
caregiver’s goals, thoughts, and desires, past experiences like source 
of elements for interpreting the reality etc.) This emergent ability 
allows the child to establish a goal-oriented relationship with the 
caregiver. The children of our sample are plausibly developing 
this competence; they might be able to face the separation from 
the caregivers as presented in the false belief task with social 
reference; in fact it would be suffi ciently explained and therefore 
approachable by the common sense of the previous life experiences. 
Then, they would be able also to process the task on the basis of 
the information recognizable from the story—that is to say what 
the child knows and thinks about his caregiver’s movements.
Considering the performance in the belief-desire task (and in 
particular the sadness version), we had high percentage for the 
intermediate scores. The process of emotional components is a very 
complex activity, and their recognition seems to interact with the 
other social-relational dynamics involved in the context in which 
emotions are experienced. The possibility of making this connec-
tion seems to depend on the quality of the emotion: it would directly 
infl uence the ToM interpretation of the events. These results are 
coherent with the literature (e.g. Harris et al., 1989; De Rosnay 
& Harris, 2002): the emotional factor would hinder the correct 
passing of the test more than facilitate it.
The children’s performance in false belief task with social reference 
increases signifi cantly with age, whereas the improvement in the 
belief-desire task is much more restricted. The structure and the 
contents of the false belief task with social reference (e.g. a gre-
160 INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP - ENACTING INTERSUBJECTIVITY
ater contextual family sense and/or a greater coherence with the 
consequent expectations) might be able to help the child in his/
her ToM understanding, more than an important but exclusive 
focus on the emotional dynamics.
As for the caregiving contexts we found that the children who 
experienced the Day-nursery showed the same results for the 
ToM tasks found for the whole sample: if 4-year olds do better 
at the belief-desire task, 5-year olds have a signifi cantly higher 
performance at the false belief task with social reference. This dif-
ference disappears when we look at the children who experienced 
the Home context. Children who experienced the Family-Time 
context show a difference at 4 years (and thus a better score at 
the belief-desire task). This trend can be interpreted in terms of 
support of signifi cant affective-relational instances and ties. In this 
sense, the Day-nursery context seems to be the only one able to 
offer less support, as if introducing the child to a new context in 
which he/she has to establish a new relationship with a signifi cant 
caregiver slows down the development of the ability to effectively 
coordinate various instances in interpreting social life and, in the 
fi nal analysis, to interpret facts in terms of mental states. The lack 
of differences for the children who experienced the Home context 
is coherent with this interpretation: not only a greater stability of 
the maternal caregiver, but also a stronger defi nition of the con-
textual aspects could contribute to the development of ToM. The 
data concerning the Family-Time context group adhere to this 
viewpoint. In fact there is a difference only for the 4-year-olds. 
This context, which is intrinsically half-way between the Home 
and the Day-nursery, would better support the child in developing 
an emotional and affective competence than the Day-nursery 
context. Overall, it seems that these kind of results drive to focus 
on the pragmatic aspects of the day-care contexts. Caregivers of 
these centers should support relational needs of the child and his 
family, caring the delicate phase of the separation from parents 
and making the permanence in new spaces (and the establishment 
of new relationships) a useful opportunity of development for chil-
dren (e.g. Spieker et al., 2003;  Booth et al., 2003; NICHD Early 
Child Care Research Network, 2003; De Schipper et al., 2003). 
As far as the attachment relationship is concerned, children who 
experienced the Day-nursery obtained signifi cantly lower scores 
in the Family and School SAT total scale scores compared to chil-
dren from the other two contexts. A premature exposition to new 
contexts and signifi cant alternative relationships could interfere 
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with the development of relational competences. In the same way 
we can interpret the differences between the attachment groups 
at the ToM tasks. Considering the Family Sat,  we found that the 
representation of the attachment seems to cause a variation in the 
ToM performance, above all for the children who experienced the 
Day-nursery. It is plausible that for the children who experienced 
the Home context and the Family-Time the past consistent relatio-
nal and contextual experiences guarantee a better development in 
ToM. Considering the School SAT, the largest signifi cant difference 
was found between secure/ambiguous children  and insecure ones 
at ToM tasks, for the children who experienced the Family-Time. 
The Family-Time looks like an half-way reality between Home and 
Day-nursery: it does not favor the ToM and relational competence 
transition like Home context does, but, differently from the Day-
nursery, it does not hinder the transition completely. 
This study seems to confi rm the existence of a close connection 
between social, emotional and relational factors in interpreting 
human behaviour using the ToM. However each of these elements, 
taken individually, does not apparently infl uence the child’s ToM 
abilities to a great extent. Caregiving contexts seem to play a rele-
vant role in this interactive equilibrium, contributing to the child’s 
success to understand and mange intersubjectivity. Future studies 
may try to comprehend and deepen the specifi c mechanisms which 
regulate these interactions in order to identify the dynamics which 
consistently contribute to the development of the comprehension 
of intersubjectivity.
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SOCIAL GAMES BETWEEN 
BONOBOS AND HUMANS: 
EVIDENCE FOR SHARED 
INTENTIONALITY?
SIMONE PIKA
ABSTRACT
Triadic social games are interesting from a cognitive perspective because 
they require a high degree of mutual social awareness. They consist of 
two agents incorporating an object in turn-taking sequences and require 
individuals to coordinate their attention to the task, the object, and to 
one another. Social games are observed commonly in domesticated dogs 
interacting with humans, but they have received only little empirical at-
tention in nonhuman primates. Here, we report observations of bonobos 
(Pan paniscus) engaging in social games with a human playmate. Our 
behavioural analyses revealed that the bonobos behaved in many ways 
similar to human children during these games. They were interested 
in the joint activity, rather than the play objects themselves, and used 
communicative gestures to encourage reluctant partners to perform 
their role, suggesting rudimentary understanding of others’ intentions. 
Our observations thus may imply that shared intentionality, the ability 
to understand and share intention with other individuals, has emerged 
in the primate lineage before the origins of hominids. Implications for 
intersubjectivity will be discussed.
Keywords: shared intentionality, social games, communicative signals, 
great apes
1. INTRODUCTION
From early childhood, human infants interact with others dya-
dically in coordinated, turn-taking play sequences, so-called 
social games (Trevarthen, 1979). As objects are integrated, these 
games become more complex and triadic, requiring coordination 
of attention both to a task and object and to one another (Ratner 
& Bruner, 1978). Triadic games have also been documented in 
interactions between dogs and humans (e.g. Mitchell & Thompson, 
1993), humans and dolphins (Kuczaj & Highfi ll, 2005) and betwe-
en dolphins (McBride & Hebb, 1948). In contrast, social games 
in non-human primates (hereafter primates) are almost always 
dyadic, rarely involve objects and if so usually in a competitive 
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way (Pellegrini & Smith, 2005). Apes sometimes show triadic 
engagement, but these interactions appear different from those 
observed in children, especially with regards to joint attentional 
episodes (e.g., Tomasello et al., 2005). Consistent with this view are 
recent results by Warneken and colleagues (2006), who compared 
the cooperative skills of children and human-raised chimpanzees 
in two problem-solving tasks and two triadic social games. In the 
social games, the adult human partner was instructed to suddenly 
stop participating to provoke the subject into responding in ways 
that might reveal their understanding of the cooperative nature of 
these games and the roles required. While most children tried to 
encourage the human playmate to resume his role by using com-
municative signals, this was never observed in the chimpanzees.
One interpretation of these results is that primates may be inte-
rested in achieving individual goals, whereas children are also 
capable of pursuing shared goals (Warneken et al., 2006). It has 
been argued that such observations provide evidence for what 
might be a uniquely human form of social intelligence (Tomasel-
lo, et al., 2005), the ability to share intentions (Bratman, 1992). 
Shared intentionality refers to collaborative interactions in which 
participants (1) are mutually responsive to one another, (2) pursue 
a shared goal, (3) and coordinate their plans of action for pursuing 
the shared goal (Bratman, 1992). Here, we report observations 
of four bonobos (Pan paniscus), who engaged spontaneously in 
different types of triadic social games with human playmates. 
In line with previous methodology (Ross & Lollis, 1987), we 
deliberately interrupted these games to investigate if the bonobos 
encouraged the recalcitrant partner to perform her role by using 
communicative gestures. 
2. METHODS
Study site: The sanctuary Lola ya bonobo houses about 50 wild 
born individuals of all age-sex classes in four enclosures, containing 
natural forests, water basins and numerous objects (e.g. balls). The 
two enclosures concerned in this study were 14 and 10 hectares 
woodland areas, which included 12 and 13 individuals respectively. 
Participants and data collection: Observations took place during 
February-April 2006, 6-7 days a week, for about 6-8 hours per 
day. Social games were initiated between three humans (SP, AK, 
and CP) and four bonobos: KD and ML (infants), LS (subadult 
female), and KW (adolescent male). In each case the human play-
mate tried to instigate a social game involving various objects on 
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an ad-libitum basis. Once a triadic interaction was established and 
was relatively stable, the human playmate suddenly and delibera-
tely stopped the interaction. Interactions were fi lmed using a digital 
camcorder (Panasonic NV-GS 250). We recorded the number of 
gestural signals that individuals produced before and after the 
interruption. We defi ned gestures as expressive movements of limbs 
or head or body postures directed towards a recipient in a goal-
directed and mechanically ineffective way, receiving a voluntary 
response (Pika, in press). Gestures were coded as intentionally 
produced, if accompanied by eye contact, and/or waiting after 
signal production; expecting a response (Pika, in press). 
Table 1 lists the different gestures considered for this study.
Data analysis: SP coded all gestures from videotapes. Ten percent 
of all videotapes were recoded by a second observer. There was 
80.0% agreement between coders concerning classifi cation of 
gestures, using a Cohen’s Kappa reliability test (Altmann, 1991).
Table 1. Communicative gestures produced by different bonobo individuals before 
and after disruption of triadic social games
BEG Signaler outstretches her right or left hand
 with palm facing up toward the recipient.
GRAB Signaler takes hold of the recipient with
 the whole hand; fi ngers are bent.
HEAD BOB Signaler bows the head up and down
 toward the recipient.
OFFER Signaler extends her arm with an object
 in her hand and holds it in front of 
 recipient.
PALM OPEN AND CLOSE Signaler outstretches her right or left hand
 with the inside facing sideways while
 opening and closing the hand.
PROTRUDED LIPS Signaler sticks out her lips and upends
 her upper lip; the teeth are visible.
TOUCH Signaler does a gentle and short (< 5 sec)
 contact using her fl at hands, body part
 or feet.
STOMP WITH FOOT Signaler brings the sole or heel suddenly
 and forcibly against or upon the ground,
 object, or walks in a pounding manner.
WIGGLE LEG Signaler shakes the lower extremities from
 side to side in front of the recipient.
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3. RESULTS
We observed four different triadic social games with four different 
bonobos interacting with a human playmate. When a game was 
deliberately interrupted (only the object splash game stopped 
naturally), individuals reliably produced gestures in an attempt 
to reengage the reluctant partner. All the observed gestures were 
part of the bonobos’ natural repertoire (Pika et al., 2005). 
Social game 1, “Hand-splash”: This game was observed on 
two different days with the two infants. KD, sitting alone in the 
waterbasin, initiated the fi rst game by splashing water with his 
legs. SP also splashed water, using her hand as the object of play. 
In response, KD approached SP, sat down next to her, while SP 
continued splashing more water. Then she abruptly stopped the 
game, leaving her hand in the water. KD responded by grabbing 
and touching her hand. SP splashed more water and then stopped 
the game for a second time, this time taking her hand out of the 
water. KD responded by touching SP’s hand. SP did not react, 
and KD then grabbed her hand. SP responded by continuing the 
game a total of seven times (see supplementary video clip 1). No 
communicative gestures were recorded during the game but as 
soon it was interrupted the infant generated the gestural signals 
grab and touch. This game was also instigated three times with 
ML, who also used the gestures grab and touch as soon as the 
game was interrupted.
Social game 2, “Object-splash”: This game occurred between SP, 
the infant KD, and a round, hard Makalakonki fruit. The interac-
tion started when SP lifted the fruit out of the water and let it drop, 
producing a splash in the direction of KD. The fl oating fruit was 
retrieved by KD, carried to SP, and offered to her. SP took it and 
repeated the procedure. Again, KD went off to retrieve and offer 
the fruit to SP. The game was repeated four times until KD started 
interacting with a conspecifi c. KD only produced communicative 
gestures (offer) as soon as the game was interrupted.
Social game 3, “Fruit-ball: This game was observed on two diffe-
rent occasions between CP, the bonobo male KW, and a grapefruit. 
It started with KW playing with two grapefruits while facing CP 
through the wired mesh of the enclosure door. KW pushed both 
fruits through the door mesh, joggled, and rolled them on the 
ground. Accidentally, one fruit rolled out of reach. CP initiated 
an interaction by rolling it back. KW played with it, but then lost 
it again. Again, CP rolled it back. KW joggled it around, pulled 
it into the enclosure, and pushed it out with two feet, this time 
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letting it roll to CP. Then CP and KW rolled the fruit back and 
forth repeatedly. Suddenly CP stopped the game, and joggled the 
fruit in front of KW. KW looked at CP and used different gestures 
(beg, stomp against the door, head bob, palm open and close, 
protruded lips) until CP rolled the fruit back. The game went on 
for 10 minutes, interrupted two more times by CP. Each time KW 
looked at CP and subsequently used the gestures head bob, palm 
open and close, protruded lips, respectively head bob, stomp, 
palm open and close, protruded lips to reinstate the game (see 
supplemental video clip 2). In addition, the game was interrupted 
twice by other group members who tried to get the fruit or wanted 
to play with KW. KW played shortly with them, always protecting 
the fruit. Both times he returned and restarted the game with CP 
by rolling the fruit to him.
Social game 4, “Object-throw”: This game was observed on three 
different days between the bonobo LS, the human playmate AK, 
and a nut. LS found a nut in the sand of the enclosure, stuck her 
hands through the door mesh and spontaneously threw it to AK. 
AK handed it back and LS threw it back to her. This time AK 
also threw it back to LS. After a few more iterations, AK suddenly 
stopped the game. LS fi rst looked at her then performed a variety 
of gestures (wiggle her leg, beg; see supplemental video clip 3). 
Suddenly she found a different object, a yellow cap, and restarted 
the game by throwing it to AK. AK threw the nut back, but LS 
now preferred the cap. When AK stopped the game again, LS used 
different gestures (wiggle her leg, protruded lips, beg). Then AK 
restarted the game throwing back the yellow cap. On the second 
occasion, AK threw the cap, and LS threw it back. Then AK stop-
ped the interaction and LS performed the gestures protruded lips 
and beg. Other animals then interrupted the game. On the third 
occasion, AK and LS played with a nut again. When AK stopped 
the game, LS wiggled her leg and protruded the lips. AK continued 
to play more rounds and then stopped the game again. This time 
LS used the gesture beg and protruded her lips.
4. DISCUSSION
We described four different social games played by four bonobos 
interacting with human playmates and different objects. Our 
observations showed that bonobos readily engaged in these kinds 
of triadic games, by playing different but complementary, inter-
dependent, and parallel roles. These observations are in line with 
previous observations in some non-primate animals, particularly 
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dolphins (e.g. Kuczaj & Highfi ll, 2005) and dogs (e.g. Mitchell 
& Thompson, 1993). Similar observations have been described 
for primates, but they were anecdotal and restricted to language-
trained and/or human-raised apes, who received extensive training 
(e.g. Crawford, 1937; Gomez & Martin-Andrade, 2002; Matevia 
et al., 2002). The bonobos of this study used gestures in a fl exi-
ble way to achieve a social goal, namely to reengage a suddenly 
passive partner. Our results contrast with a recent comparative 
study on children and chimpanzees (Warneken, et al., 2006). In 
this study, upon encountering a reluctant partner, the chimpanzees 
immediately switched from a superfi cially social action to an in-
dividual attempt or complete disengagement. Contrarily, children 
tried to reorient the experimenter toward the game and his part in 
the cooperative interaction (Warneken, et al., 2006). The authors 
suggested that the children, but not the chimpanzees, had learned 
to form with others a joint goal and joint intentions for reaching 
that goal. Importantly, the chimpanzee results were used to argue 
in favor of a fundamental cognitive difference between humans 
and primates in terms of the ability to share intention. Our study 
suggests that it may be premature to draw fi rm conclusions about 
an animal-human difference in this cognitive domain. We are less 
pessimistic also because (a) in other paradigms chimpanzees have 
been observed to use communicative gestures to solicit reluctant 
partners (e.g., Crawford, 1937), (b) gorillas have been observed 
to initiate triadic games with humans (e.g., Gomez & Martin-
Andrade, 2002), and (c) dog-human play may fulfi ll criteria 
for shared intentionality outlined before (Mitchell & Thompson, 
1993). However, attempts at re-engaging a reluctant partner are 
only one observational criterion for shared intentionality, and 
may not represent the right tools to elucidate the underlying 
psychological processes. In addition, it might be argued that the 
described games may be familiar or ritualized between the bonobos 
and their human caretakers, suggesting that their behavior was 
the outcome of simple operant conditioning processes. We do not 
think that this is a valid interpretation because the object-splash 
and object-throw games were spontaneously invented and most 
likely novel to the infants. It could also be argued that the bonobos 
used the human playmates as simple tools to restart interesting 
events, rather than perceiving them as partners in a joint activity 
with a shared goal. Although this interpretation seems plausible 
for the games played by the infants, it is more diffi cult to defend 
in the case of the object-throw and fruit-ball game played by the 
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older individuals, in which both participants behaved as if they 
had joint and complementary goals. Crucially, the bonobos were 
not interested in gaining possession of the objects per se, but they 
used them to enable a joint social activity. 
In sum, the bonobos’ performance in these cooperative interactions 
resembled those of human children (e.g., Ratner & Bruner, 1978) 
and, following Bratman (1992), showed two crucial criteria for 
shared intentionality: the partners were mutually responsive to one 
another; and together they were pursuing a shared goal, the social 
game. Children may go a step further by coordinating their plans 
of action and joint intentions to allow role reversal. This requires 
that both participants understand and jointly attend to both roles 
of the interaction and implies a true understanding of communi-
cative intentions: to help the other with the complementary role. 
The communicative attempts of the bonobos to restart the game 
seem to provide evidence that they understood and attended to 
both roles of the game, although they never attempted to take 
on the role of the human playmate, perhaps pointing to a crucial 
difference between apes and humans. 
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ABSTRACT
The sense of shared values is a specifi c aspect to human sociality. It origi-
nates from reciprocal social exchanges that include imitation, empathy, but 
also negotiation from which meanings, values and norms are eventually 
constructed with others. Research suggests that this process starts from 
birth via imitation and mirroring processes that are important foundations 
of sociality providing a basic sense of social connectedness and mutual 
acknowledgement with others. From the second month, mirroring, imi-
tative and other contagious responses are by-passed. Neonatal imitation 
gives way to fi rst signs of reciprocation (primary intersubjectivity), and 
joint attention in reference to objects (secondary intersubjectivity). We 
review this development and propose a third level of intersubjectivity, 
that is the emergence of values that are jointly represented and negotiated 
with others, as well as the development of an ethical stance accompanying 
emerging theories of mind from about 4 years of age. We propose that 
tertiary intersubjectivity is an ontogenetically new process of value ne-
gotiation and mutual recognition that are the cardinal trademarks of 
human sociality. 
Keywords: intersubjectivity, development, reciprocation, value nego-
tiation.
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the general sense, the concept of Intersubjectivity captures 
the way a person understands and relates to another. It is the 
phenomenon by which we share experiences with one another. 
Intersubjectivity implies that there must exist a bridge between 
my self-acquaintance and my acquaintance of others. In this 
paper, we discuss these issues from a developmental perspective. 
We identify 3 levels in the early development of intersubjectivity, 
the third one corresponding to what we posit as the foundation 
and main constitutive element of human sociality. Specifi cally, we 
explore the development leading the young child from a capacity to 
imitate, a capacity that we share with many other animal species, 
to the emergence of negotiation and mutual recognition that we 
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propose are cardinal features of human sociality. The concept of 
intersubjectivity is a common notion used to capture the product 
of interpersonal interactions that emerge from infancy and by 
which children begin to understand others’ thoughts and emotions. 
Traditionally, intersubjectivity has been associated with language 
communication. It was assumed that only conventional language 
could make intersubjectivity possible. In the last few decades, 
however, new empirical research forced to broaden the meaning 
of intersubjectivity and to clarify its underlying mechanisms in 
ontogeny. Even if language radically transforms human ways of 
communicating, much evidence now exists in the fi eld of infancy 
showing that intersubjectivity is an important aspect of psychology 
from the outset development, long before children learn to speak 
(Trevarthen, 1979).
2. FOUNDATIONS OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY
The philosophical problem of intersubjectivity was fi rst raised in 
the context of the internal private mind postulated by Descartes 
in the 17th Century. The Cartesian proposal is that “the only single 
mind that I can have direct access to is my own mind”. This claim 
allowed the conclusion that our fi rst self-experience is a purely 
mental and solipsist experience. This notion left wide open the 
question of how we eventually got to know the mind of others. 
The post-Cartesian standard question became “How do I know 
the mind of others?” In contemporary philosophy and cognitive 
sciences, various models are proposed to answer this question. 
A cognitivist solution suggests that to have access to others’ 
mind requires necessarily the sharing common representations 
and meanings that are essentially given by language and meta-
representational abilities, in particular the ability to generate 
“theories of mind”.  Such theories of mind would be based on 
either pure hypothetico-deductive representations or “theory-
theory”(Baron-Cohen, 1995; Leslie, 1991; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 
1997) or on an embodied simulation and other mirror or built-in 
empathic systems (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Goldman & Stri-
pada, 2005; Gallese, 2007).
Some philosophers point to the limits and inconsistencies of such 
accounts to resolve the “others’ mind” understanding issue that 
was left out by Descartes. In particular, there are good empirical 
reasons to think that above and beyond either theory-theory or 
simulation processes, non-conceptual (pre-theoretical and non 
simulation) processes might also underlie the apprehension, if not 
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understanding of other’s mind (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008) These 
processes would include the direct detection of perceptual features 
pertaining for example to the bodily movements, motor signature 
and embodied emotional expressions of others, particularly facial 
features detected from birth (Rochat,  2001). Gallagher (2005), for 
example, proposes that the understanding of others rests essentially 
on the detection of embodied interactive or interpersonal practices. 
Embodied interactive practices would constitute the primary access 
by which we understand others. Following Gallagher, from a very 
early age infants would be attuned to the way others choreogra-
phed with facial expressions and postures what they feel and what 
might be on their mind as they interact with them. This proposal 
would entail that infants are born perceptually prepared to capture 
and eventually develop a sense of shared experience, certainly not 
born simply caught up in solipsist experiences and passively shut 
off from their social world. From the start, there would be some 
awareness of others structured within some basic intersubjectivity 
framework. Contrary to the pioneer ideas proposed by early psy-
chologists, infants are not born in a state of confusion or a-dualism 
in relation to either objects or people (Rochat, 2001). 
Next, we describe how intersubjectivity seems to develop from 
birth and in the course of the fi rst 4-5 years of life. We propose 
that from basics biological mechanisms that are innate, namely 
mirroring and imitation mechanism that are the necessary founda-
tion of intersubjectivity, infants quickly develop intersubjective 
propensities that entail reciprocation and mutual recognition, both 
trademarks of human sociality. 
We proposed elsewhere that the sense of shared experience and 
of shared values develops primarily in a process of reciprocation 
that goes beyond the process of imitation and mirroring as copying 
(Rochat & Passos-Ferreira, 2008b). If an innate inclination to copy 
and simulate the behaviors of others could provide a basic sense of 
social connectedness and mutual acknowledgment of being with 
others that are “like me”, these innate processes are essentially not 
creative, leading nowhere in themselves. In a strict sense, imitation 
and mirroring are closed loop “tit for tat” systems. More processing 
is therefore needed to allow for the social construction of meanings 
that drive human transactions (Rochat & Passos-Ferreira, 2008b). 
If mirroring processes might enable individuals to bridge their 
subjective experiences via embodied simulation (Gallese, 2007), 
human inter-subjectivity proper develops from reciprocal social ex-
changes and the constant negotiation of values with others. Infants 
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and young children develop to become Homo Negotiatus, and not 
just to become Homo Mimesis (Rochat & Passos-Ferreira, 2008a).
3. LEVEL OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY
We distinguish levels of “inter-subjectivity” beyond the primary 
vs. secondary distinction introduced years ago by Trevarthen 
& Hubley (1978), Trevarthen (1979) and Bruner (1983). We 
review this development up to 5 years of age when children show 
explicit understanding of the mental states that drive others in 
their behaviors, beliefs, and decisions (i.e., “theories of mind” in 
Wellman, 2002). 
This development leads the child from neonatal imitation to the 
development of reciprocation starting at 2 months of age. By two 
months infants already appear to transcend basic mirroring pro-
cesses by manifesting fi rst signs of reciprocation in face-to-face 
exchanges (primary intersubjectivity). They soon engage in triadic 
intentional communication with others about objects (secondary 
intersubjectivity, starting approximately 9 months) and eventually 
begin to negotiate with others about the values of things, including 
the self as shared representations (tertiary intersubjectivity, starting 
approximately 20 months). This development culminates with 
the ethical stance that children begin to take around their fourth 
birthday when they begin to manifest explicit rationale about 
what is right and what is wrong, as well as “theories” regarding 
the mind of others. 
The notion of tertiary intersubjectivity was proposed some years 
ago by Trevarthen (2006). In Trevarthen’s conception, the ter-
tiary level is the fi rst- and second-person refl ective and recursive 
intersubjectivity, in the sense of communicative understanding 
mediated by meta-representations, and symbolic references to 
actual and fi ctional worlds of imagination or joint pretense. We 
shed light on another feature of this third level of intersubjectivity. 
We are not particularly interested in the evident linguistic aspect 
that structured this third level. We investigate what is the interac-
tive structure involving child and second person. Not interested 
in the grammatical second person, an abstract objet, expressed 
by the words such as “you”, “thy”, “tu”, “voce”, we focus here 
on the “real” person the child is concretely interacting with and 
with whom he or she will negotiate values, meanings, status, and 
reputation.  
There are various levels of social connectedness associated with 
this development in relation to context, behavioral index, putati-
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ve underlying process and chronological age. We propose a road 
map that would take the healthy child, starting the second month, 
beyond the basic mirroring and imitative processes, toward reci-
procation, social negotiation, and ultimately the sense of mutual 
recognition and the explicit moral sense.
Table 1.
 TYPE CONTEXT BEHAVIORAL PROCESS AGE 
   INDEX 
I Mirroring Face-to-face Imitation Automatic birth
  engagement  simulation
II Primary Reciprocal Proto-  Emotional 2m.
 Inter- dyadic conversation, co-regulation
 subjectivity exchanges social 
   expectations
II Secondary Triadic Joint attention; Intentional  9m.
 Inter- exchanges social communication
 subjectivity about things referencing and intentional 
    co-experience
IV Tertiary Triadic Self-recognition Projection and 20m. 
 Inter- exchanges and embarrassment, identifi cation
 subjectivity about the use of possessives, of self onto 
  value of things claim of others
   ownership, 
   pro-social 
   behaviors
V Ethical  Decision Claim of Value negotiation From 4 y.
 stance regarding the ownership, with others,
  value of things, sharing, narration, 
  what is right distributive justice, meta-representation  
  vs. wrong theories of mind of reputation
(This table is reproduced from Rochat & Passos-Ferreira, 2008b)
3.1. Mirroring and Imitation
Imitation and mirror processes are important foundations for 
sociality, that entails the capacity to relate, interact and possibly 
re-present or simulate, hence “bridge” self with others’ experience. 
These capacities, called innate intersubjectivity by Trevarthen, 
(2006) show that humans are born with an innate communicative 
competence given by biological mechanisms that have an impor-
tant impact on learning, recognizing and thinking. In reproducing 
the behavior of others we create inter-subjectivity, bridging self 
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and others’ experience as suggested by current simulationist the-
ories that fi nd validation in the discovery of mirror neurons. The 
basic mirror processes expressed at birth probably correspond 
to innate social binding mechanisms. They are basic resonance 
processes (Gallese, 2003) that allow the child, from the outset, to 
match self and others’ experience. These mechanisms allow for a 
necessary starting state of implicit inter-subjective equivalence. 
Endowed with, and capable of such processes, infants from birth 
would automatically perceive others as “like them”. This basic, 
obligatory perception would be mediated by sub-personal innate 
mirror mechanisms (i.e., neural mirror systems). 
Developmental and comparative theorists see imitation as the 
basic mechanism, by which children develop empathy and the 
capacity to represent, think and speak. Imitation has also been 
considered for a long time as a mechanism by which children 
develop theories of mind, in addition to being the source of social 
connection and affi liation. 
The idea that imitation or mimesis, and the ability to simulate 
are at the core of what distinguish humans from other animals is 
a recurrent theoretical proposal in philosophical, psychological, 
and comparative theories (Tarde, 1890/1993; Donald, 1991 
Finnbongason, 1912). For Tarde (1890/1993), behaviors and 
ideas transmitted by imitation are not just copied as mirrors copy 
the world in their refl ections. Imitation is active in the sense of 
being selective. It is intentional, not just a source of contamina-
tion by reproduction. Finnbogason (1912) laid down a theory on 
“sympathetic intelligence”, that posits that performing a motor act 
or seeing it performed by a model can de facto be the same. This 
is a remarkable intuition of the current simulation and imitation 
theories in social cognition that now fi nd neurobiological validation 
in the discovery of mirror neuron systems (Goldman & Sripada, 
2005; Gallese et al., 2002; Meltzoff, 1995, 2007; Harris, 1992).
For a long time theorists have seen in imitation a central mecha-
nism driving the evolution of human societies and those abilities 
that set us apart as a species (e.g., complex abstract languages, 
explicit ethics, empathic feelings, technological inventions, cultural 
transmission). What these theories emphasize is that imitation is 
not only a copying capacity; it is also a source of innovation. It 
allows individuals to connect, build intersubjectivity and feel what 
other individuals feel. 
Since the discovery of mirror neurons, imitation has been under-
stood based on the mirror metaphor, as an automatic simulation 
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of others’ behaviors. We suggest that mirror metaphor should be 
replaced by the dynamic, open ended, and relational concept of 
reciprocation (Rochat & Passos-Ferreira, 2008b). Human socia-
lity is inseparable from sense of shared values. This sense arises 
from the interaction with others via complex “open” systems of 
reciprocation and negotiation. It cannot be reduced to early imi-
tation and mirroring processes that are, in a strict etymological 
sense, “closed” systems, in themselves copying mechanisms like 
mirrors refl ecting whatever is facing them. Taken literally, imi-
tation thus stands for a system of direct refl ection of what is out 
there, impoverishing of the process by which we actually relate 
and understand each other, a process that is in essence, selective 
and creative of new meanings (ideas, feelings, values) that arise 
from on-going social exchanges. 
For human sociality to develop, imitation and mirroring processes 
need to be supplemented by an open system of reciprocation. The 
refl ection arising from mirroring processes needs to be broken 
down and somehow by-passed. In early ontogeny, particularly 
starting the second month, mirroring, imitation, and other con-
tagious emotional responses tend to become more subtly attuned 
to interactive others. This fi rst social register of the neonate is 
by-passed in “proto” conversation with others, in the context of 
fi rst reciprocal exchanges that form open, as opposed to closed, 
loop systems. 
Imitation and mirroring processes are necessary but not suffi cient 
mechanisms for children to develop inter-subjectivity and sociality. 
Human sociality (i.e., the inclination to associate with or be in the 
company of others) entails more than the equivalence and connec-
tedness of perceptual experiences. It entails a sense of reciprocity 
that is more than the “like-me stance” or embodied simulation 
that researchers derive from early imitation (Meltzoff, 2007) or 
from the recent discovery of mirror neuron systems in the brain 
(Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Gallese et al., 2002; 
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Fogassi et al., 2005; Goldman & 
Sripada, 2005).
3.2 Primary Intersubjectivity: From basic mirroring to reciproca-
tion and social expectations
If imitation in the strict sense is a source of vicarious experiences 
that give individuals the opportunity to get “into the shoes of 
others” and possibly empathize with them, it is also a source of 
180 INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP - ENACTING INTERSUBJECTIVITY
ORAL SESSION
discovery and learning. Children learn primarily via observational 
and imitative learning, rarely if not at all, via the explicit instruc-
tion that prevails in Western cultures (Odden & Rochat, 2004; 
Rogoff, 1995; Boggs, 1985; Lancy, 1996). What is important to 
note is that observational and imitative learning is selective and 
intentional. New skills are not just learned by accident, or rarely 
so, typically scaffold by more advanced individuals who transmit 
their skills and knowledge to the apprentice or novice learner 
(Lave, 1988; Rogoff, 1990), a process that contributes to cultural 
learning in general (Tomasello, Kruger, et al., 1993). 
For novelty to emerge and knowledge to be transmitted via ob-
servation and imitation entails more than passive “random” and 
incidental learning. It entails reciprocation in the following basic 
sense. For learning to take place there is a mutual willingness on 
the part of the novice to observe the expert and on the part of the 
expert to be observed by the novice. Both protagonists meet in 
the reciprocal willingness to share attention toward each other, 
the novice observing the expert and the expert modeling for the 
novice. The reciprocal willingness to learn and to teach that is 
constitutive of imitative learning, when not purely incidental, 
makes the process break away from imitation in the strict sense 
of copying, mirroring or the direct “shadowing” of the other. 
Mutual attention and intention are involved. This is expressed in 
the reciprocal sharing of attention, each protagonist aware of and 
monitoring the other.
In this context, imitation becomes a source of selective transmission 
and learning, not just a mechanism by which individuals can create 
an inter-subjective bridge by simulating the subjective experience 
of others. It is a source of learning and novelty that is co-created, 
based on exchanges that are reciprocal.
The sense of reciprocity is expressed very early in the life of the 
healthy child. By two months, infants start to engage in face-to-
face proto-conversations, fi rst manifesting signs of socially elicited 
smiles toward others (Wolff, 1987; Sroufe, 1996; Rochat, 2001). 
Such emotional co-regulation and affective attunement are more 
than the mirroring process underlying neonatal imitation and 
emotional contagion evident immediately after birth (Meltzoff  & 
Moore, 1977; Simner, 1971; Sagi & Hoffman, 1976). From this 
point on, infants express a new sense of shared experience with 
others in the context of interactive face-to-face plays, what Colwyn 
Trevarthen (1979) coined as “primary inter-subjectivity”.
When infants start to engage in proto-conversation, they are quick 
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to pick up cues regarding what to be expected next from the social 
partner. In general they expect that following an emotional bid 
on their part, be it via a smile, a gaze, or a frown, the other will 
respond in return. Interestingly, adult caretakers in their response 
are typically inclined to reproduce, even exaggerate the bid of the 
child. If the child smiles or frowns, we are inclined to smile or 
frown back at her with amplifi cation and additional sound effects. 
There is some kind of irrepressible affective mirroring on the part 
of the adult (Gergely & Watson, 1999). 
The complex mirror game underlying social cognition does mani-
fest itself from approximately 2 months of age and from then on, 
infants develop expectations and representations as to what should 
happen next in this context. The still-face experimental paradigm 
that has been extensively used by infancy researchers for over 30 
years provides good support for this assertion (see the original 
study by Tronick, Als, Adamson, Wise, & Brazelton, 1978). Infants 
are disturbed when the interactive partner suddenly freezes while 
staring at them (Rochat & Striano, 1999). They manifest unmi-
stakable negative affects, frowning, suppressing bouts of smiling, 
looking away and sometimes even starting to cry. In general, they 
become avoidant of the other person, presumably expecting them 
to behave in a different, more attuned way toward them.
This reliable phenomenon is not just due to the sudden stillness 
of the adult, as the infant’s degree of negative responses varies 
depending on the kind of facial expression (i.e., happy, neutral, 
or fearful) adopted by the adult while suddenly still (Rochat, 
Striano, & Blatt, 2001). Also, it appears that beyond 7 months 
old, infants become increasingly active, rather than avoidant and 
unhappy, showing initiative in trying to re-engage the still-faced 
adult. Typically, they touch her, tap her, or clap hands to bring the 
still-faced adult back into the play, with an intense gaze toward 
her (Striano & Rochat, 1999). 
Numerous studies based on this still-face paradigm and studies 
using the double video paradigm, in which the infants interact with 
his mother seen on a TV (Murray & Trevarthen, 1985; Nadel et 
al., 1999; Rochat, Neisser, & Marian, 1998), all show that early 
on, infants develop social expectations as to what should happen 
next or what should happen while interacting with others. The 
diffi cult question is what do these expectations actually mean psy-
chologically for the child. What does it mean for a 2-month-olds to 
understand that if he smiles toward an individual, this individual 
should “normally” smile back at him? What does it mean that he 
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picks up the fact that amplifi ed and synchronized mirroring from 
the adult is an invitation for more bouts of interaction?
One could interpret these expectations as basic, possibly sub-
personal and automatic. Accordingly, face-to-face interactions 
are information-rich events for which infants are innately wired 
to pick up information, attuned and prepared from birth to at-
tend to and eventually recognize familiar voices and faces (e.g., 
De Casper & Fifer, 1980; Morton & Johnson, 1991). From birth, 
infants would be attuned to perceptual regularities and perceptual 
consequences of their own actions, wired to prefer faces, human 
voices, and contingent events as opposed to any other objects, 
any other noises, or any other random events. Accordingly, this 
would be enough for young infants to build social expectations and 
manifest apparent eagerness to be socially connected as shown by 
studies using the still-face experimental paradigm or the double 
video system. But there is more than what meets the eyes of an 
“engineering look” at the phenomenon (Rochat, 2009). It is more 
than just mechanical and requires another, richer look to capture 
its full psychological meaning. 
This proposal is based on evidence of developmental changes in the 
ways that children appear to connect with others and reciprocate. 
Infants rapidly go beyond mirroring and imitation to reciprocate 
with others in increasingly complex ways, adding the explicit social 
negotiation of values to the process. This development corresponds 
to the unfolding of primary and secondary (i.e., triadic exchanges 
of the infant with people in reference to objects in the environment 
by 7-9 months), and also a tertiary level of inter-subjectivity from 
at least 3 years of age. 
3.3. Secondary Intersubjectivity: From reciprocation to joint 
attention 
The sign of the emergence of the secondary intersubjectivity is 
the beginning of triadic interactions. At the secondary level, with 
the intentional communication about objects that emerges by 9 
months via social initiatives and explicit bouts of joint attention, 
infants break away from the primary context of face-to-face ex-
changes. They become referential beyond the dyadic exchanges to 
include objects that surround the relationship. Social exchanges 
also include conversations about things outside of the relationship, 
becoming triadic in addition to being dyadic. Exchanges become 
object oriented or objectifi ed, in addition to being the expression 
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of a process of emotional co-regulation. Infants now willfully try 
to capture and control the attention of others in relation to them-
selves via objects in the environment. At this point, however, the 
name of the game is limited to the sharing of attention just for 
the sake of it.  Children measure the extent to which others are 
paying attention to them and what they are doing. They begin to 
check back and forth between the person and the object they are 
playing with (Tomasello, 1995); or they begin to bring an event to 
the attention of others by pointing or calling for attention to share 
the experience with them. However, such initiative ends there, 
and is typically not followed through in further conversation or 
co-regulation. For infants, secondary inter-subjectivity in triadic 
exchanges is a new means to control their social environment, 
in particular the proximity of others as they gain new degrees 
of freedom in roaming about the environment (Rochat, 2001). 
By becoming referential, infants also open the gate of symbolic 
development. They develop a capacity for dual representation 
whereby communicative gestures stand for and become the sign 
of something else (e.g., a pointing gesture as standing for a thing 
out there to be shared with others). Communication becomes 
intentional, transcending the process of emotional co-regulation 
and affective attunement that characterizes early face-to-face, 
proto-conversational exchanges (i.e. primary inter-subjectivity). 
Yet, it remains restricted to the monitoring of whether others are, 
or are not, co-experiencing with the child.
Nevertheless, with the emergence of intentional communication 
and the drive to co-experience events and things in the environ-
ment, infants learn and begin to develop shared meanings about 
things. To some extent, they also begin to develop shared values 
about what they experience of the world, but this development 
remains limited. For example, when facing dangers or encounte-
ring new situations in the environment, they are now inclined to 
refer to the facial expressions of others that are paying attention to 
the same events (Campos & Sternberg, 1981; Striano & Rochat, 
2000). The meaning of a perceived event (e.g., whether something 
is dangerous or threatening) is now referred to others’ emotional 
responses, to some extent evaluated in relation to others, but it 
ends there. The process does not yet entail any kind of negotiation 
regarding the value of what is experienced. The world is essentially 
divided into either good (approach) or bad (avoidance) things and 
events. Such basic social referencing emerges at around 9 months, 
in parallel to the propensity of infants to share attention with others 
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and to communicate with them intentionally (Tomasello, 1999; 
Rochat & Striano, 1999). 
3.4 Tertiary Intersubjectivity: From joint attention to negotiation 
Next, we focus on this latter level that we introduce as a major 
extension of the fi rst two, both well accounted for in the literature 
(Bruner, 1983; Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978; Trevarthen, 1979; 
Tomasello, 1995; see table 1 above). At the tertiary level of inter-
subjectivity, objects and situations in the environment are not just 
jointly attended to (secondary inter-subjectivity), they become also 
jointly evaluated via negotiation, until eventually some kind of a 
mutual agreement is reached.
By the middle of the second year, triadic exchanges develop beyond 
basic social referencing and the sense of co-experience with others 
that is the trademark of secondary inter-subjectivity. The child 
now begins to engage in active negotiation regarding the values of 
things co-experienced with others. They manifest tertiary inter-
subjectivity, a sense of shared experience that rests on complex 
on-going exchanges unfolding over time: things that happened in 
the past, are manifest in the present and are projected by the child 
into the future. The prototypical expression of this new level of 
inter-subjectivity is the expression of secondary emotions such as 
embarrassment or guilt. 
In relation to the self, by 20 months, children begin to represent 
what others perceive of themselves and gauge this representation 
in relation to values that are negotiated. If they see themselves in 
a mirror and notice a mark surreptitiously put on their face, they 
will be quick to remove it and often display coy behaviors or acting 
out (Amsterdam, 1972; Rochat, 2003). They begin to pretend 
and mask their emotions (Lewis, 1992). In general, they become 
self-conscious, negotiating and actively manipulating what others 
might perceive and evaluate of themselves (Lewis, 1992; Rochat, 
2009). From this point on (18-20 months), children project and 
manipulate a public self-image, the image they now identify and 
recognize in the mirror. It is an image that is objectifi ed and shared 
with others, a represented “public” self-image that from now on 
will be constantly updated and negotiated in relation to others. 
Interestingly, by 20 months, children’s linguistic expressions begin 
also to include the systematic use of possessives, children starting 
to claim ownership over things with imperative expressions such 
as “mine!” (Bates, 1990; Tomasello, 1998). Such expressions 
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demarcate the value of things that are jointly attended in terms 
of what belongs to the self and what belongs to others. This value 
begins to be negotiated in the context of potential exchanges, bar-
tering, or donations. With the explicit claim and demarcation of 
property, the child develops a new sense of reciprocity in the context 
of negotiated exchanges of property, whether objects, feelings or 
ideas. At around the same age, children also begin to demonstrate 
pro-social behaviors, engaging in acts of giving and apparent be-
nevolence by providing help or spontaneously consoling distressed 
others (Zahn-Waxler, 1992). Self-concept, ownership claim, and 
a new concern for others bring the child to the threshold of moral 
development and the progressive construction of an explicit sense 
of justice (Damon, 1994). What follows in development is a new 
level of social reciprocity that is increasingly organized around an 
ethical stance taken by the child. But this ethical level of reciprocity 
develops between 3 and 5 years of age, and beyond.
4.CONCLUSIONS:NEGOTIATION AND MUTUAL RECOGNI-
TION TRADEMARK OF HUMAN SOCIALITY
Our intention was to revise the development of intersubjectivity, 
stressing that it originates from reciprocal social exchanges that 
include imitation, empathy, but also negotiation from which me-
anings, values and norms are eventually constructed with others. 
This process starts from birth via imitation and mirror processes 
that are important foundations for sociality providing a basic 
sense of social connectedness and mutual acknowledgement with 
others. Nevertheless, these basic mirroring processes are neces-
sary, but not suffi cient, to account for the early development of 
reciprocal exchanges that takes place from the second month on. 
Imitation and emotional contagion, taken literally as close-loop 
automatic mirror systems, are soon transformed into dynamic, 
ultimately creative exchanges that take the form of open-ended 
proto-conversations ruled by principles of reciprocation, and 
develops as negotiation and mutual recognition. As we intended 
to show, from the second month, mirroring, imitative and other 
contagious responses are by-passed. Neonatal imitation gives way 
to fi rst signs of reciprocation (primary intersubjectivity), and joint 
attention in reference to objects (secondary intersubjectivity). 
From 20 months, we proposed a third level of intersubjectivity, 
that is the emergence of values that are jointly represented and 
negotiated with others, as well as the development of an ethical 
stance accompanying emerging theories of mind from about 4 ye-
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ars of age. The tertiary intersubjectivity is an ontogenetically new 
process of value negotiation and mutual recognition that are the 
cardinal trademarks of human sociality. In conclusion, we tried to 
show that the way infants and young children connect to the social 
world develops dramatically with the emergence of active, creative, 
and increasingly complex reciprocal exchanges. The emergence of 
reciprocal exchanges allow for the social construction of meanings 
that drive human transactions, e.g., shared ideas or values such as 
trust, guilt, the sense of what’s right and what’s wrong, who is to 
be admired and emulated, who is commendable and has prestige, 
who is to be avoided and despised. 
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DYADIC EMOTIONAL REGULATION 
IN MOTHER AND INFANT 
INTERACTION AND MATERNAL 
ATTACHMENT AT NINE MONTHS
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ABSTRACT
36 mother/infant dyads at nine months, 20 of which had mothers with 
secure attachment models and 16 with insecure attachment models, exa-
mined using the Adult Attachment Interview, were video-recorded and 
coded with the Infant and Caregiver Engagement Phase (ICEP) coding 
system (Weinberg, & Tronick, 1999) to which some changes were made, 
to evaluate their emotional regulation. The 36 mothers (mean age = 34,05 
sd = 3,41), were Italian, and their socio-economic level was medium. The 
infants, 12 girls and 24 boys, (mean age = 9,31 sd = 0.82) were full term 
and did not present any pathologies at birth. The aim of the study was 
to evaluate the relationship between the security of maternal attachment 
and the styles of mutual regulation engaged in by the dyads when the 
infant is nine months old. Matching is defi ned as the extent to which 
mothers and infants share joint negative, neutral, or positive states at the 
same moment in time; mismatching is defi ned as any non-shared dyadic 
state in which the two partners are not in the same state of engagement 
(Tronick et al, 2005). Signifi cant differences emerged between the two 
groups in relation to coordinated and miscoordinated affective states. The 
secure mother dyads had a greater overall duration of affective matches 
with more positive matches than insecure mother dyads. The insecure 
mothers dyads had a greater overall duration of affective mismatches 
than secure mother dyads; furthermore they spent more time in negative 
matches than the former, who almost never engaged negatively in their 
interaction. In this perspective the secure mother dyads appeared more 
able to share emotions, particularly positive emotions than insecure mother 
dyads. The latter appeared less able to regulate the negative emotions of 
their infants (more negative matches). In relation to the different types of 
mismatches the insecure mothers displayed proportionally more positive 
states when the infant displayed negative states and more negative states 
when the infant was neutral. In brief, this study highlights the existence of 
signifi cant differences in the infant/mother dyads regulation modalities in 
relation to the different quality of the attachment model of the mothers, 
showing itself in the insecure mother dyads’ greater diffi culty in mutual 
regulation and in the regulation of negative emotions.
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1. INTRODUCTION 1
It is well-known that styles of emotional regulation employed in 
mother and infant interaction in the fi rst year both characterize 
the interaction and constitute it (Tronick, 1989, 1998; Beebe, 
1998; Beebe & Lachman, 2002). These styles appear to be fun-
damental not only in determining the development of an infant’s 
emotional regulation skills in the following years (Sroufe, 1995) 
but also guiding his subsequent social-emotional and relational 
development (Sroufe, Egeland, Carlson, & Collins, 2005). 
Experiments based on the Still Face paradigm (Tronick, 1989; 
Cohn & Tronick, 1983; Adamson & Frick, 2003) have demon-
strated that an infant at a very early age displays self-regulatory 
behavior – including self-comforting and looking away from a 
stressful stimulus. This behavior must interact with the regulation 
function of the caregiver in order to fully develop (Sroufe, 1995; 
Hofer, 1994), beginning with the infant’s requests for regulation 
which he starts to communicate to the caregiver through specifi c 
forms of expression (hetero-regulatory behavior) (Tronick, 1989; 
Bridges & Gronlick, 1995). Thus, a system of mutual regulation 
is created whose characteristics depend both on the infant’s re-
gulatory skills and the caregiver’s regulatory scaffolding function 
(Tronick, 2007; Weinberg, Tronick, Cohn, & Olson  1999). This 
system appears to be distinguished by mutual interactive regula-
tory processes involving coordinated emotional states alternating 
with miscoordinated emotional states (Tronick & Weinberg, 1997). 
During normal interaction, mother/infant communication appe-
ars to be characterized by processes of matching/mismatching/
disruption/repair in which the mother and the infant, after failing 
to coordinate their actions and intentions, effect successful repair, 
leading to the emergence of new coordinated emotional states 
(Tronick & Gianino, 1986). The sensitivity of the adequate mother 
in this perspective appears to be an “intermediate” sensitivity. She 
1 We would like to thank Edward Tronick for his indispensable suggestions made 
whilst this paper was being drawn up. We would also like to thank Professor Carlo 
Lenti who allowed data relating to this research project to be collected at the Infant 
Neuropsychiatry Unit of the San Paolo Hospital of Milano and Margherita Moioli 
and Giuliana Virzì for codifying the data.
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seems able to attune to the emotional states of her infant and, at 
the same time, repair the interactive errors she commits through 
not understanding or misunderstanding the infant’s messages. 
At the same time, the infant too shows his intent to repair the 
breakdown in communication with his mother, as illustrated by 
the experiments conducted with the Still Face paradigm (Cohn 
& Tronick, 1983). 
The experience of successful repair is a social-interactive process 
which is fundamental to personality development. It allows the 
infant to develop a representation of himself as effective, of his 
interactions as positive and reparable and, fi nally, of the caregi-
ver as reliable and available, and worthy of basic trust. In this 
way, thanks to the experience of successful repair and of negative 
emotions being repeatedly transformed into positive emotions, the 
infant constructs a positive emotional core in relation to himself 
(Tronick & Weinberg, 1997; Emde, 1991, 2005). In contrast, 
repeated disruption in communication and unsuccessful repair 
on the part of the mother can cause the infant to construct a ne-
gative emotional core of himself and a representation of himself 
as ineffective and of the mother as unavailable. 
The importance of the caregiver’s emotional availability in the 
development of an infant’s emotional regulation has led attach-
ment theorists to hypothesize that attachment patterns can be 
considered as styles of dyadic regulation of the emotions which 
the infant develops in interacting with caregivers (Sroufe, 1995; 
Cassidy, 1994). Secure attachment seems to be correlated to the 
possibility experienced by the infant of communicating positive 
and negative emotions to the caregiver, perceiving the caregiver 
as emotionally available and effective in emotional regulation. 
Other types of insecure attachment, however, seem to involve a 
restriction of this skill in the face of a diffi culty in regulation on 
the part of the caregiver. In this regard, a number of studies have 
highlighted the relationship between the sensitivity demonstrated 
by the mother towards the infant’s regulation in the fi rst months 
and his subsequent form of attachment (Cohn, Campbell, & Ross, 
1992; Kogan & Carter, 1996; Fuertes, Lopez Dos Santos, Beeghly, 
& Tronick, 2006). 
Few studies, however, have examined the factors which render the 
mother/infant regulation system adequate. Haft and Slade (1989), 
in considering responsiveness as a mother’s skill in sharing syntoni-
cally the positive and negative emotions of the infant, revealed an 
association between maternal internal working models as regards 
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attachment and her ability to attune to her infant. According to 
this study, mothers classed as secure using AAI demonstrate an 
ability to respond syntonically to the infant’s positive and nega-
tive emotional states during play sessions at 14 months, while 
dismissing mothers attune less to the negative emotions of their 
infants, not accepting their requests for comfort and consolation 
and attuning selectively to the infant’s positive experiences of 
autonomy and control. The mothers classifi ed as preoccupied 
appear to fi nd it diffi cult to attune to their infant’s entire range 
of emotions, in particular to his expressions of exuberance linked 
to the accomplishment of control and autonomy. A recent study 
by DeOliveira, Moran and Pederson (2005) confi rmed the Slade 
results, highlighting how maternal working models of attachment, 
measured using AAI, together with the styles mothers adopt with 
regard to their own emotions, measured by means of an inter-
view, appear to be associated with their methods of handling the 
emotions of their infants at 24 months. Secure mothers display 
an open and fl exible approach to their own emotions and those 
of their infant, dismissing mothers tend to minimize their own 
negative emotions of fear and sadness and also those of the infant 
while mothers with unresolved attachment patterns display great 
diffi culty in attuning to both. 
A few studies, however, have examined the relationship between 
parental attachment models and styles of regulating emotions. In 
this regard Feldman (2003) compared the co-regulation of po-
sitive affect during mother-infant and father-infant interaction. 
She found that security in paternal attachment is associated with 
greater synchrony between the father and the infant, an association 
which is not shown in mothers.
Some studies have, however, examined the conditions which may 
make maternal communicative and emotional regulation less 
adequate. Of these studies, those of Field (Field, Healy, Goldstein, 
& Guthertz, 1990) involving depressed mothers show that in de-
pressed mother dyads, infants of 3 months spend less time with 
their mothers in coordinated affective states, the greater proportion 
of these being coordinated negative affective states, than infants 
in non-depressed mother dyads. A longitudinal study by Tronick 
(Bell, Weinberg, Yergeau, & Tronick, 2004) revealed that in their 
fi rst year the infants of depressed mothers displayed fewer positive 
emotions in interaction with their mothers and a smaller proportion 
of coordinated positive affective states with their mothers. The-
refore, since there are no exhaustive studies into the relationship 
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between the security of maternal attachment and the individual 
and dyadic styles of regulation adopted by the mother and infant 
in the fi rst year, the examination of this subject is of particular 
interest. In fact, as was highlighted above, creating an adequate 
system of regulation between mother and infant in the fi rst year 
is a factor which promotes the establishment of secure attachment 
patterns, favoring the subsequent social-emotional development 
of the infant (Cohn, Campbell, & Ross, 1992; Kogan & Carter, 
1996; Riva Crugnola, 2007). The aim of our study, therefore, 
was to examine the possible differences in maternal and infant 
regulation and their mutual regulation in infant/secure mother 
dyads and infant/insecure mother dyads at 9 months. To this end, 
we observed the interaction of mother/infant dyads composed of 
secure and insecure mothers and their infants, video recording 
their interaction in a laboratory setting. On the basis of the above 
considerations and research studies as to the social-emotional 
functioning of the mother-infant dyad we expected that: (a) the 
infants of secure mothers would differ from those of insecure 
mothers as regards positive and negative engagement, displaying 
a higher level of positive engagement and a lower level of negati-
ve engagement; (b) secure mothers would display a higher level 
of positive engagement with their infants compared to insecure 
mothers and a lower level of negative engagement; (e) the dyadic 
quality of secure mother/infant interaction would be different to 
that of insecure mother/infant interaction, with more time being 
spent in coordinated emotional states (matches) and less time in 
miscoordinated emotional states (mismatches).
2. METHOD
2.1 Participants 
36 mother-infant dyads participated in our study. The couples were 
recruited at the beginning of a program organized by a service of a 
Milan hospital to follow infants during their fi rst year. The service 
is intended for mothers of infants and is aimed at monitoring the 
infant’s growth in early infancy. The 36 mothers were Italian, aged 
between 25 and 40 (mean age = 34,04 sd = 3,41) and primipara 
in the majority of cases (75%). All were cohabiting and in stable 
relationships. The mothers were middle and upper class and their 
mean educational level was 15 years, with a range of 8 to 18 years 
(47,2% were graduates, 47,2% had a high school diploma, 5,5% 
had a middle school diploma). 94,4% of the mothers were in 
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employment. The infants (12 girls, 24 boys) were full term and 
did not present any pathologies at birth. 
2.2 Procedure
The security variable of the internal working model of the mothers 
was evaluated when the children were 3 months old using the Adult 
Attachment Interview and relative coding system (Main & Gol-
dwin, 1994-1998). For what concerns mother-infant interaction, 
the mother-infant couples were video-recorded in the laboratory 
at nine months of age (infant mean age = 9,31 sd = 0.86). The 
laboratory was a suitably furnished play room containing a small 
mattress on which the mother and infant could sit or lie and a 
number of toys appropriate for the age of the infant. The mothers 
were instructed to play and interact with the infant as they would 
normally do at home. The video-recordings lasted at least 5 mi-
nutes and during this time the mother-infant pair was left alone 
in the laboratory room. 
2.3 Data coding
Maternal internal working models were evaluated using the Adult 
Attachment Interview and relative coding system (Main & Gol-
dwyn, 1994-1998) when the infants were 3 months old. Accor-
ding to the Main coding, autonomous secure attachment involves 
a consistent and objective narration of attachment experiences 
together with their valorization; dismissing attachment involves 
an inconsistent narration of attachment experiences with ideali-
zation of attachment fi gures, characterized by generally positive 
descriptions of the latter which are not supported or contradicted 
by specifi c episodes, diffi culty in remembering and underestima-
tion of these experiences; preoccupied attachment involves an 
inconsistent narration characterized by vagueness and prolixity 
together with persistence of feelings of anxiety and anger towards 
the attachment fi gure; unresolved/disorganized attachment is cha-
racterized by failure to elaborate traumatic episodes (mistreatment, 
abuse, etc.) and mourning; fi nally non-classifi able attachment 
involves the co-presence of contradictory mental states regarding 
attachment. The interviews were analyzed by the fi rst author, who 
is profi cient in the AAI coding system, having attended a specifi c 
training session with Mary Main. The video-recordings were coded 
using the Infant and Caregiver Engagement Phase coding system 
of Weinberg and Tronick (1999) to which some changes were 
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made with respect to a number of categories relating to playing 
with objects and attending to the infant. Tables 1 and 2 show the 
categories used for the coding of infant and maternal behavior, 
highlighting the modifi cations made with respect to the Weinberg 
and Tronick system.
Table 1. - Categories used to code infant behavior
INFANT CODES DEFINITION
General Negative Infant is negative, protesting or withdrawn.
Engagement GNE has two specifi c sub-codes: protest and
 withdrawn. When it is not possible to make
 a distinction code GNE.
Protest Infant is protesting with facial expressions
 of anger, annoyance, often with crying.
Withdrawn Infant is passive and minimally engaged
 with the mother and the environment.
Orientation to Objects Infant is looking, touching, playing with
Offered by the Mother* objects offered by the mother. 
Orientation to Objects Not Infant is looking, touching, playing with
Offered by the Mother* objects not offered by the mother.
Orientation to Infant is visually exploring the setting 
Environment without focalizing attention on any specifi c
 object.
Shifting Attention* Infant is shifting attention towards a new
 object or from an object to another.
Social Monitor Infant’s attention is directed towards the
 mother. He/she is looking at her.
Social Positive Infant is displaying facial expressions of joy,
Engagement astonishment and smiles. SPE is considered
 play with or without with objects, but with
 social play.
Comforted * Infant lets the mother comfort him/her while
 crying or annoyed. 
Sleep Infant is asleep.
Unscorable Infant’s face is obscured (e.g. his/her face is
 covered by the mother’s body or is outside
 the view of the camera).
Note. Categories with an asterisk were not provided in the original 
system, being introduced for the purposes of this study.
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Table 2. - Categories used to code maternal behavior
Weinberg and Tronick’s system uses mutually exclusive codes. 
Coding was done through continuous surveying per phases, re-
cording the beginning and the end of the behavior. The end of 
each behavior corresponded to the beginning of the following 
behavior. Infant and maternal behavior were coded separately 
and at different times. Two observers operating independently of 
ORAL SESSION
MOTHER CODES DEFINITION
General Negative Mother is negative, intrusive, hostile or
Engagement withdrawn. GNE has three specifi c sub-
 codes: Hostile, intrusive or withdrawn. When
 it is not possible to make adistinction code
 GNE.
Hostile Mother is hostile or annoyed. She does not
 help the infant if in diffi culty.
Intrusive Mother is intrusive towards the infant’s
 physical space, activities and the objects.
Withdrawn Mother is minimally engaged with the 
 infant’s activities.
Non-infant Focused Mother is not attending to the infant.  
Social Monitor Mother’s attention is focused on the infant
 and his/her activities. She is looking at him
 her.
Social Positive Mother is interacting with the infant through
Engagement facial expressions of joy and interest, with 
 positive vocalizations, motherese and social
 play. 
Exaggerated Positive Mother is showing exaggeratedly positive
Engagement engagement, continuous and intense.
Offer of Object * Mother is offering a new object to the infant
Involvement in the Play * The mother joins in the game with the object
 chosen by the infant
Call for Infant’s Attention* Mother is trying to draw the infant’s attention
 to her or to an object.
Comfort and Care* Mother is responding to the infant’s 
 uneasiness by nursing or comforting him
 her, or caressing or kissing him with a neutral
 tone.
Unscorable Mother’s face is obscured (e.g. her face is
 covered).
Note. Categories with an asterisk were not provided in the original 
system, being introduced for the purposes of this study.
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each other observed the behavior of the 36 mother-infant dyads. 
The rate of agreement between the observers was determined by 
the Cohen’s Kappa coeffi cient (1960), particularly suitable for 
comparing data gathered through multi-item code schemes. The 
result was 0.72 for the observation of maternal behavior and 0.71 
for infant behavior.
2.4 Data analysis
A specifi c program for sequential analysis, GSEQ (Gnisci & Ba-
keman, 2000; Bakeman & Quera, 1995), was chosen to process 
data resulting from behavior coding. This program calculates a 
number of simple statistics such as frequency and the duration of 
both maternal and infant behavior. Inferential tests were also used 
to compare the different groups and, for this purpose, the statistic 
packet SPSS/PC version 12.0 was employed. In order to examine 
infant and maternal behavior individually and in interaction with 
each other, two sets of data analysis were carried out:
1. Using the GSEQ sequential analysis program, we re-coded the 
mother and infant codes, grouping them according to their 
positive, negative or neutral affective state and adding together 
the durations of the previous codes. The fi rst analysis concerned 
the proportional duration of the infant and maternal affective 
states. Since the video-recordings lasted at least 5 minutes 
but were of different durations, in order to compare the data 
between dyads, we calculated the “proportional duration” of 
each observed behavior out of the total time of the play-session 
using the formula: “time spent on the selected behavior / total 
video-recording duration”. Possible differences in the duration 
of behavior in relation to group placement, i.e. between secure 
and insecure mothers and between the respective infants, were 
examined. 
2. The second analysis examined coordination/miscoordination 
of the emotional states of the dyad. We calculated the relative 
duration of the co-occurrence of various combinations of af-
fective states in mother and infant, comparing the secure and 
insecure dyads in this perspective. Matching is defi ned as the 
extent to which mothers and infants share joint negative, neu-
tral, or positive states at the same moment in time. Mismatching 
is defi ned as any non-shared dyadic state in which the mother 
and the infant are not in the same state of engagement (e.g. 
infant negative, mother positive) (Tronick, Messinger, Weinberg, 
Lester, LaGasse, Seifer, Bauer, Shankaran, Bada, Wright, Poole, 
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& Liu, 2005). It was also possible to calculate the total relative 
duration of matches and mismatches in the various dyads.
3. RESULTS
3.1 Mother’s models of attachment
According to the coding of the interviews, 20 mothers displayed 
secure attachment models (55%) and 16 displayed insecure attach-
ment models of which 6 were preoccupied (16,6%), 6 dismissing 
(16,6%), 4 disorganized (11%). Due to the limited number of 
subjects in relation to the different attachment models, we dicho-
tomized the data into secure/insecure.
3.2 Dyadic and individual characteristics of maternal and infant 
behavior
Analysis aimed at evaluating the relative duration of the different 
affective states of the infant and the mother and the coordination 
and miscoordination of affective states within the dyads was then 
carried out. For this purpose, we created new codes, combining the 
codes, using the GSEQ program, of the coding scheme previou-
sly used according to the affective state they represented within 
three categories: neutral affective states, positive affective states, 
negative affective states (see above and table 3). 
Table 3. - Individual and coordinated affective states defi nitions
COORDINATED INDIVIDUAL CODES 
AFFECTIVE STATES
Positive match: infant Infant positive: Positive Engagement, Orien- 
and mother positive tation to Objects Not Offered by the Mother, 
 Orientation to Objects Offered by the Mother
 Mother positive: Positive Engagement, Offer
 Object, Involvement in Play
Negative match: infant Infant negative: General Negative Engagement,
and mother neuter Protest, Withdrawal
 Mother negative: General Negative Engage-
 ment, Intrusive, Withdrawal, Extra Positive
 Engagement
Neutral match: infant Infant neutral: Social Monitoring, Orientation
and mother neutral to the Environment, Shifting Attention, Orien-
 tation to Another Person, Comforted, Unsco-
 rable
 Mother neutral: Social Monitoring, Comfort
 and Care, Call for Infant’s Attention, Non-
 infant Focused, Unscorable
ORAL SESSION
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We then calculated the relative duration of each affective state of 
the infant and of the mother (see table 4). Secure mothers differed 
from insecure mothers in their interaction with the infants while 
spending more time involved in positive affective states; on the 
other hand insecure mothers spent more time involved in negative 
affective states than the former. Infants with insecure mothers spent 
more time than infants with secure mothers involved in negative 
affective behavior for what concerns interaction with the mother.
Table 4. - Relative duration of affective states of infants and mothers of secure 
mother and insecure mother dyads
 Secure mother Insecure mother
 dyads (n=20) dyads (n=16)
 M Sd M Sd T df p
Infant positive .685 .120 .669 .169 -.342 34 .735
Infant neutral .305 .123 .257 .144 -1.054 34 .300
Infant negative .008 .026 .075 .105 2.478 16.482 .024*
Mother positive .394 .155 .242 .166 -2.821 34 .008**
Mother neutral .605 .156 .617 .155 .218 34 .829
Mother negative .000 .002 .137 .176 3.104 15.004 .007**
Note. * p<.05, ** p<.01 *** p<.001.
We then distinguished positive, negative and neutral coordinated 
states (match) (mother positive/infant positive, mother negative/
infant negative, mother neutral/infant neutral) and miscoordinated 
affective states (mismatch) (infant positive/mother negative, infant 
positive/mother neutral, infant negative/mother positive, infant 
negative/mother neutral, infant neutral/mother positive and infant 
neutral/mother negative) (see table 3). We calculated the relative 
duration of the coordinated affective states, in which mother 
and infant presented the same affective states concomitantly. In 
the same way we calculated the duration of the miscoordinated 
affective states, in which mother and infant presented different 
affective states concomitantly. We also calculated the overall 
relative duration of the states of match and mismatch. Analysis 
revealed signifi cant differences between the dyads, composed of 
secure and insecure mothers and their infants, both in relation to 
individual matches and mismatches and in relation to the overall 
duration of matches and mismatches (see table 5 and 6). 
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Table 5. - Relative duration of coordinated and miscoordinated affective states of 
secure mother and insecure mother dyads
 Secure mother Insecure mother
 (n=20)  (n=16)
 M Sd M Sd T df p
Infant positive – .321 .138 .184 .128 -3.049 34 .004**
Mother positive
Infant positive –  .364 .137 .405 .153 .851 34 .401
Mother neutral 
Infant positive –  .000 .001 .010 .028 1.407 15.075 .162
Mother negative 
Infant negative – .000 .000 .033 .052 2.512 15.004 .024* 
Mother negative 
Infant negative – .007 .024 .027 .060 1.337 34 .190 
Mother neutral 
Infant negative – .000 .001 .079 .107 2.935 15.005 .010** 
Mother positive
Infant neutral –  .232 .114 .182 .133 -1.212 34 .234
Mother neutral 
Infant neutral – .072 .037 .046 .043 -1.897 34 .066 
Mother positive 
Infant neutral –  .000 .000 .025 .031 3.205 15.011 .006**
Mother negative
Note.  *p<.05, ** p<.01 *** p<.001
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Table 6. - Relative duration of match and mismatch.
 Secure mother Insecure mother
 (n=20)  (n=16)
 M Sd M Sd T df p
Match .554 .106 .400 .146 -3.667 34 .001***
Mismatch .445 .107 .595 .147 3.535 34 .001***
Note.  *p<.05, ** p<.01 *** p<.001.
Secure mother dyads had a greater overall relative duration of 
coordinated affective states than insecure mother dyads. At the 
same time, signifi cant differences also emerged for what concerns 
individual matches. Secure mother dyads spent more time in 
coordinated affective states in which both partners had positive 
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engagement unlike insecure mother dyads which showed a shorter 
duration of positive affective states. On the contrary, insecure mo-
ther dyads spent more time in coordinated negative affective states, 
a type of match almost completely absent in secure mother dyads.
For what concerns overall duration of miscoordinated emotional 
states (mismatches) the insecure mother dyads spent on the whole 
more time in mismatches compared to secure mother dyads (see 
Table 6). Furthermore, signifi cant differences emerged in relation 
to the individual types of mismatch. In mismatch situations, when 
the infant displayed neutral emotional states the insecure mother 
expressed negative affective states unlike the secure mother. Fur-
thermore, when the infant expressed negative emotions, insecure 
mothers expressed positive emotions, a type of mismatch almost 
completely absent in secure mother dyads.
On the whole, secure mother dyads spent 55% of the total time in 
conditions of match and 45% in conditions of mismatch; insecure 
mother dyads, on the other hand, spent 40% in conditions of match 
and 60% in conditions of mismatch. For what concerns matches, 
all the dyads spent most of the time in positive match states: 32% 
secure dyads and 18,4% insecure dyads. In secure dyads neutral 
matches took up 23% of the total time and in insecure dyads 18% 
of the total time. The negative match was rarer: close to 0% for 
secure dyads and 3% for insecure dyads.
4. DISCUSSION
Thus, on the basis of maternal security/insecurity it is possible to 
construct a different profi le of the individual and dyadic styles of 
the two groups of mother/infant pairs.
For what concerns analysis of the relative durations in infants of 
insecure mothers, negative interaction with mothers was more 
present than in infants of secure mothers, who very rarely had this 
behavior. A greater occurrence of negative engagement behavior 
was also to be found in insecure mothers, as it was in their infants. 
However, compared to insecure mothers, secure mothers – like 
their infants – spent more time involved in positive engagement 
behavior. 
Signifi cant differences emerged between the two groups in relation 
to coordinated and miscoordinated affective states. Firstly, the 
duration of coordinated affective states was on the whole longer 
in secure mother dyads than in insecure mother dyads, with a 
greater ability to share emotions being seen as characteristic of 
secure mother/infant pairs. This confi rms our hypotheses and 
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also the Slade study (Haft & Slade, 1989) which revealed how 
secure mothers were more able than insecure mothers to match 
the emotions expressed by an infant of between 9 and 13 months. 
The DeOliveria study (DeOliveria, Moran, & Pederson, 2005) 
also revealed how secure mothers were more open and more able 
to understand the emotions of their infants at the age of 2 than 
insecure mothers. 
Furthermore, secure mother/infant pairs appeared more able to 
coordinate positive affective states than insecure mothers dyads 
which displayed a lower number of coordinated positive states. 
Insecure mother/infant pairs were distinguished with respect to 
secure mother dyads by greater matching of negative emotions, 
something which was almost completely absent in secure dyads. 
In the light of these fi ndings it may be hypothesized that infants 
with insecure mothers are less able to regulate their own negative 
emotions as is demonstrated by the greater length of time spent 
on negative engagement compared to infants with secure mothers 
and also by the sharing of negative states with their mothers. At 
the same time, insecure mothers seem less able to transform the 
negative emotions of their infant, remaining in a negative affective 
state when the infant is in a negative state unlike secure mothers 
who almost never engage negatively in their interaction. On the 
other hand the infants of secure mothers, like their mothers, 
compared to the infants of insecure mothers appear more able to 
maintain positive emotional states as is demonstrated by the gre-
ater length of time spent on positive engagement and by sharing 
them with their mothers. 
For what concerns the overall duration of miscoordinated emotio-
nal states, there were  overall signifi cant differences between the 
two groups, also in relation to the different mismatches. What is 
interesting is the difference between the two groups in relation to 
infant neutral emotional state. In this situation, insecure mothers 
adopted more negative behavior compared to secure mothers. This 
has also been demonstrated by Tronick (Tronick, Messinger, Wein-
berg, Lester, La Gasse, Seifer, Bauer, Shankaran, Bada, Wright, 
Poole, & Liu, 2005) in relation to pairs composed of mothers who 
had used cocaine during pregnancy and their infants. These pairs 
showed a higher percentage of mismatches of the infant neutral/
mother negative type than the control group in which mothers had 
not used cocaine. The second difference between the two groups 
of dyads for what concerns mismatches relates to when the infant 
expresses negative emotions. In fact, in concomitance with that 
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state, insecure mothers expressed positive emotions, a type of 
mismatch not present in secure mother dyads. 
With regard to this data it is interesting to note how the characte-
ristics of insecure mother dyads have some points in common with 
the depressed mother dyads studied by Tronick (Bell, Weinberg, 
Yergeau, & Tronick, 2004) and Field (Field, Healy, Goldstein, 
& Guthertz, 1990) both for what concerns the predominance of 
negative emotions in the infants and mothers at an individual level 
and the greater proportion of affectively negative coordinated sta-
tes and the smaller proportion of positive emotional states. Early 
aspects of dysregulation also emerge in the dyads with mothers 
who had used cocaine studied by Tronick (Tronick, Messinger, 
Weinberg, Lester, La Gasse, Seifer, Bauer, Shankaran, Bada, 
Wright, Poole, & Liu, 2005), in which mother and infant engage in 
more negative matches and a greater number of mismatches, with 
infant negative/mother positive, compared to the control group. 
In the light of what has been observed thus far, the emotional 
regulation which distinguishes insecure mother/infant pairs from 
secure pairs, characterized by a lower proportion of coordinated 
emotional states with the presence of negative affective coordinated 
states and a greater proportion of miscoordinated affective states, 
could have a signifi cant effect on the subsequent social-emotional 
development of the infant at the level of both emotional expression 
and regulation and the security of attachment patterns and the 
formation of the fi rst cores of the self. In fact, it is well-known 
that an infant being able to share positive emotional states with 
the caregiver (Emde, 1991, 2005; Stern, 1985) and to see them 
validated by the latter, such as experiencing repair of affective 
mismatches (Tronick, 1989, 2004), is crucial in the fi rst stages of 
development. This experience provides an essential contribution to 
the formation of the fi rst cores of the infant self. At the same time, 
the predominance of negative emotional states in the infant and 
failure on the part of the caregiver to regulate them, by exposing 
the infant to experiences of non-reparation and the ineffective-
ness of his own ability to communicate, may affect the formation 
of relational and attachment models (Tronick, 1989, 2004) and 
have a disorganizing function in their formation (Lyons-Ruth, 
2003). The fact that the insecure mother is less able to match the 
infant’s emotions than the secure mother, demonstrated by the 
lower proportion of coordinated emotional states and, in particular, 
of positive coordinated states in the former dyad as compared to 
the latter, could also infl uence the ability of the infant to read and 
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recognize emotions. It is well-known that this ability appears to 
develop in concomitance with the ability of the mother to respond 
both contingently to the emotions of the infant (Gergely & Watson, 
1996) and syntonically, i.e. with the same rhythm and intensity 
(Nicely, Tamis-LeMonda, & Grolnick, 1999).
Our study has therefore been of use in highlighting the existence 
of signifi cant differences in the infant/mother dyads regulation 
modalities in relation to the different quality of the attachment 
model of the mothers, showing itself in the insecure mother dyads’ 
greater diffi culty in mutual regulation and in the regulation of 
negative emotions. It is also important to note that the different 
quality and duration of affective matches and mismatches seen 
in the mother-infant dyads observed, correlated with the different 
maternal attachment models, may be considered not only the 
expression of the system of attachment which connects mother 
and infant, characterizing its styles of regulation. Hypothesizing 
the existence of different motivational systems at the basis of 
mother-infant interaction, that of attachment for the purposes of 
protection and that of intersubjectivity  based on the sharing of 
experience (Stern, 2004), the greater/lesser presence of matches 
and mismatches in the dyads, understood as different ways of 
sharing affective experiences (Trevarthen, 1998) and not only 
as methods of emotional regulation, could in fact be considered 
as the expression of the different quality of the intersubjective 
relationship between mother and infant.
In a follow up to this study it would be interesting to examine at 
longitudinal level the effects of the observed diffi culties in regu-
lation in insecure mother dyads on the formation of attachment 
patterns in the infant and on his subsequent social-emotional de-
velopment. This aspect may have signifi cant clinical implications 
for what concerns the realization of preventive projects aimed at 
promoting adequate social-emotional development in the infant, 
by using the quality of maternal attachment and the styles of 
regulation between mother and infant which emerge during the 
fi rst year as early risk indicators.
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MOTOR INTERFERENCE 
IN ACTION SIMULATION
PEGGY TAUSCHE, ANNE SPRINGER, WOLFGANG PRINZ
ABSTRACT
Taking into account mirror neuron research with evidence from single-
cell recording in macaque monkeys and imaging studies in humans, there 
are shared representations of action perception and action execution (see 
for Common Coding Principle: Hommel et al., 2001). Perceiving other 
person’s actions seems to activate corresponding motor programs in the 
observer. This mechanism is ascribed to the mental simulation of observed 
actions. There is evidence that this mental simulation runs in real-time and 
works even when the action is temporally occluded (Graf et al., 2007). 
The present study focus on the question whether this mental simulation 
relies on motor representations. To investigate this, participants watched 
transiently occluded every-day actions and had to predict the action 
course after occlusion. Participants were assigned to three groups: per-
forming the simulation task only (No-Action Group) versus receiving a 
secondary task involving either high-motor activation (Action Group) 
or low-motor-activation (Passive Group). Results show that all groups 
show real-time simulation (replication of Graf et al., 2007), indicating 
that all groups fulfi lled the simulation task adequately. Moreover, there is 
evidence that motor interference in action simulation occurs more strongly 
in the Action-Group relative to the other Groups. This effect is enhanced 
when real-time simulation of occluded actions is more demanding due to 
longer occlusion. The presented results will be discussed in the context of 
motor simulation theory and ideas for future studies will be presented.
Keywords: action execution, action perception, action simulation, motor 
interference, shared representations
1. WHY WE ARE GOOD IN PREDICTING BEHAVIOUR
Imaging you are going on your bike in a pedestrian area of a big 
city. Hundreds of people cross your way and you have to predict 
the direction in which they will go as well as to consider the speed 
in which they walk. These predictions help to adapt your own 
behaviour (e.g. to avoid hitting a pedestrian) and to increase ef-
fectiveness to fi nd your way. Living in a social environment human 
beings are constantly making thousands of such action predictions 
and mostly they are not aware of it. More theoretically, it has re-
cently been proposed that these predictions arise from an internal 
simulation of the observed action, as derived by using the obser-
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ver’s own motor representations. This internal simulation allows 
predicting the process of the action based on the observer’s own 
motor experience. For instance, experts in performing a particular 
type of movement (e.g. classical ballet movements) were shown to 
have greater premotor, parietal and cerebellar brain activity when 
viewing moves of their own motor repertoire compared to those 
which are not in their repertoire (Calvo-Merino, Grezes, Glaser, 
Passingham, & Haggard, 2006).
Mirror neuron research with evidence from single-cell recording 
in macaque monkeys (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 
1996) and imaging studies in humans (Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, 
& Rizzolatti, 1995; Grezes, Armony, Rowe, & Passingham, 2003; 
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) have provided signifi cant insights 
on the neuronal correlates of the link between action execution 
and action observation. 
Specifi cally, they support that humans use common mechanisms 
for executing and observing motor actions (Prinz, 1997; see for 
Common Coding Principle: Hommel, Musseler, Aschersleben, & 
Prinz, 2001), which may enable predicting others’ ongoing beha-
viour (Blakemore & Frith, 2005; Prinz, 2006; Wilson & Knoblich, 
2005; Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001).
Evidence that action execution and action observation can inter-
fere with each other comes from Kilner and colleagues (Kilner, 
Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003). The authors demonstrated that 
participants show an increased variance in arm movement execu-
tion when they observe a human model executing a qualitatively 
different arm movement, rather than the same arm movement. 
This interference effect breaks down when participants watch a ro-
bot executing the same and different arm movements, respectively.
      
1.1 How Action Simulation Works
One central function of internal simulation is assumed to be the 
prediction of the sensory consequences of a certain movement. Self-
produced actions result in a highly correct correspondence of the 
predicted and actual sensory consequences (Blakemore, Wolpert, 
& Frith, 2000). The mechanisms of the internal simulation of 
other person’s actions are less clear. While observing an action of 
another person, the brain seems to simulate the observed action by 
mapping it onto our own motor representation of the same action 
(Schutz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007).
Recently it has been proposed that the internal simulation of ob-
served actions runs in real-time and works even when the observed 
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action is temporally occluded (Graf et al., 2007). Graf and colle-
agues used a paradigm, in which the participants perceived brief 
sequences of point-light actions. These sequences were covered by 
a short occluder followed by a static test posture. There were two 
independent variables, which were manipulated within-subject: 
the occluder time (100, 400 or 700 ms) and test posture time (the 
time which would go on by behind the occluder (100, 400 or 700 
ms)). The task of the participants was to decide whether the test 
posture was a continuation in the same visual angle, or whether it 
was rotated in depth. According to the real-time simulation hypo-
thesis, best performance in the unrotated trials (i.e., showing a test 
posture in the same visual angle) should occur when occluder and 
test posture time correspond. The internal representation of the 
action is updated in real-time and in turn, it corresponds to the 
upcoming test posture. Furthermore performance decreases as the 
time distance between occluder and test posture time increases, 
because of an increasing dissimilarity of the internal representation 
and the test posture.
2. AIM AND HYPOTHESES OF THE PRESENT STUDY
Based on the results by Graf and colleaques indicating a mecha-
nism of real-time simulation, the present paper focusses on the 
kind of representations which may be involved in this real time 
simulation mechanism. 
According to the mirror-neuron research cited above (Fadiga et 
al., 1995; Grezes et al., 2003; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), we 
propose that motor representations are a good candidate to be 
involved in processing observed actions. 
To investigate whether and to what extent action simulation draws 
on motor representations in the observer, we applied Graf et al.’s 
real-time simulation paradigm (as outlined above) in connection 
with an interference approach. More specifi cally, simulation per-
formance was measured within three groups: No-Action-Group, 
Action-Group and Passive-Group. The No-Action Group perfor-
med the action simulation task (i.e., a slightly modifi ed replica-
tion1 of the study of Graf et al. (2007). Participants in the Action 
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pedal responses and feedback for the given response (in contrast to fi nger responses 
and no feedback in the original paradigm, respectively).
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Group performed the action simulation task and an active motor 
task simultaneously. 
The active motor task involved executing circular movements on 
two separate cranks bimanually. In order to keep participants 
attended to the active motor task, the movements were either 
symmetrical or parallel ones (Swinnen, Jardin, Meulenbroek, 
Dounskaia, & HofkensVanDenBrandt, 1997). 
The Passive Group performed the action simulation task and a 
passive motor task simultaneously. The passive motor task corre-
sponded to the active motor task of the Action Group except of the 
fact that the cranks were motor-powered and moved by themselves. 
By using an active and a passive secondary motor task in the 
presented study, it was possible to disentangle two aspects of 
movement execution: motor command and sensory feedback 
(proprioception). 
In the Action Group the participants are required to send a motor 
command to their arms and they got back the sensory feedback, 
which fi ts to their sensory prediction made up in the forward model. 
In contrast the Passive Group received sensory feedback from their 
moving arms without giving a motor command. 
The present study addressed to the following hypotheses:
1 Real-time simulation hypothesis: A replication of the real-time 
pattern of Graf et al. was expected, i.e. best simulation per-
formance when occluder and test posture time corresponds. 
Furthermore simulation performance should decrease with 
increasing time distance between occluder and test posture time 
(distance effect).
2 Motor interference hypothesis: 
2.1 A decreased simulation performance was expected when 
movement execution during action simulation is required 
(Action-Group) compared to conditions where no motor 
execution is involved (No-Action Group and Passive-
Group). 
2.2 This motor interference should take place especially when 
simulation is demanding. This is the case when long occlu-
sion occurs (due to the fact that the internal model stays a 
long time without input). Differences between the groups 
are hypothesized due to motor interference.
3. METHODS
Participants: A total of 60 healthy participants (mean 24 years+/-3 
years; 31 female, all right-handed) took part in two single sessions 
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of about 90 and 60 minutes, respectively with a break of 1-2 hours 
in between2. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and were naive with respect to the purpose of the 
study. They were paid for their participation.
Material: We used 9 movie sequences showing of a point-light 
walker performing familiar every-day actions that involve the 
whole body (e.g., bowling or lifting something from fl oor). The 
stimulus-material has been provided by Graf et al. (2007) by use of 
a motion capture system (for further details see Graf et al., 2007). 
In line with Graf et al., we used point-light stimuli (instead of real 
motion pictures) in order to emphasize pure motion information. 
The duration of the sequences prior to occlusion lasted from 70 
to 275 ms. 
Design and Data Analysis: The experiment followed a mixed 
design, with the two within-subject variables and one between-
subject variable. As within-subject variables the occluder length 
(100, 400, 700) and test posture time (100, 400, 700) was ma-
nipulated. 
The factor occluder length was blocked and the order of blocks 
was balanced across participants with the restriction that two 
identical occluder lengths do not follow each other. 
Each block of occluder length was presented eight times; so that 
each participant performed 24 blocks in total (and 648 trials, 
respectively). As in the original simulation paradigm of Graf et 
al. (see above) participants had to decide whether the test posture 
was a continuation in the same visual angle, or whether it was 
rotated in depth.3
As a between-subjects factor the group was varied (No Action 
versus Action group versus Passive Group). As mentioned above 
the active motor task contained a continuous circular movement 
on two cranks in a self-chosen speed, whereas the passive motor 
task contained a motor-powered circular movement in the same 
manner.
Data analysis focussed on error rates. Reaction times were only 
ORAL SESSION
2 The break was included after half of the trials in order to give participants a 
resting period.
3 Each participant received a familiarization of all point-light actions and a practise 
phase of the simulation task prior to the experiment.
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analyzed for correct responses. Due to the fact that spatial and 
temporal aspects are mixed in the rotated trials the analysis in-
cluded only same (i.e., unrotated) trials.
      
4. RESULTS
4.1 Error Rates
As hypothesized in the real-time simulation hypothesis error 
rates4 were lowest when occluder and test posture time correspond, 
indicated by a signifi cant occluder x test posture time interac-
tion (F=(4,531)=11.634; p<0.001) over all three groups (see 
Figure 1). There was a signifi cant main effect of occluder time 
(F=(2,118)=3.822; p<0.05) with best performance in medium 
versus short and long occluder times. Furthermore there was a 
signifi cant main effect of test posture time (F=(2,118)=67.425; 
p<0.001) with increasing error rates with increasing test posture 
time. 
4 The relative error rates were arcussinus transformed prior to data analysis. This 
transformation is necessary, because relative error rates lack the prerequisite of 
variance homogeneity. Arcussinus transformation homogenises the variances of 
relative error rates (Steel, Torrie & Dickey, 1997).
      
Figure 1 - Mean and standard error of the error rates are plotted for different 
occluder times (100, 400, 700 ms) and different test posture times (TPT; 100, 400, 
700) over all three groups. Error rates are lowest when occluder and test posture 
time correspond (real-time hypothesis).
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After averaging over cells with the same time distance level (0 
and 300 and 600 ms, respectively) there was a signifi cant main 
effect of time distance, with increasing error rates with increasing 
time distance between occluder length and test posture time in all 
three groups (F=(2,38)>8.550; p<0.01) (see Figure 2). The time 
distance x group interaction did not reach signifi cance (F<1,3), 
indicating that all groups fulfi lled the simulation task adequately.
Figure 2 - Mean and standard error of the error rates are plotted for different time 
distances (0, 300, 600 ms) and different groups (No-Action, Passive and Action 
Group). In all three groups error rates are lowest when occluder and test posture 
time correspond (0 ms) and increase linear with increasing time distance. Further-
more the Action Group shows a signifi cant higher error rate when time distance 
was 0 ms (time congruency) in comparison to the No Action Group. 
According to the motor interference hypothesis a t-test showed 
a signifi cant higher error rate when occluder and test posture 
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time correspond in the Action Group compared to the No Action 
Group (p=0.056) (compare Figure 2). There was no main effect 
of group (F<2,5), indicating that the Action group did not show 
higher error rates per se.
A more detailed analysis of these corresponding cases (time con-
gruency) showed a signifi cant time congruency x group interaction 
(F=(4,102)=2.876; p<0.05). Post-hoc t-Tests showed that this 
interaction is driven by the fact, that there was no signifi cant 
difference in short occluder time conditions between the groups 
(p>0.12), but an increased error rate in medium and long occlu-
der time in the Action Group compared to the No-Action Group 
(p<0.05) (Figure 3). However, there was a signifi cant main effect 
of time congruency (F=(2,102)=29.391; p<0.001) with a linear 
increasing in error rates with increasing time congruency (100/100 
< 400/400 < 700/700) and no signifi cant main effect of group 
(F<2.5).
Figure 3 - Mean and standard error of the error rates are plotted for cases where 
occluder and test posture time correspond (i.e., time congruency) for all three 
groups. There was a signifi cant time congruency x group interaction. No difference 
in error rates between Groups were found in the short time congruency condition 
(100/100 ms), rather there was a parametric increase of error rates in medium 
(400/400 ms) and long (700/700 ms) time congruency conditions with increasing 
motor involvement of the Groups (No Action < Passive < Action Group). 
4.2 Reaction times
As hypothesized in the real-time simulation hypothesis there 
was a signifi cant occluder x test posture time interaction over all 
groups (F=(4,531)=12.802; p<0.001) with lowest error rates when 
occluder and test posture time correspond. Furthermore there 
were a signifi cant main effect occluder time (F=(2,108)=24.066; 
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p<0.001) with best performance in medium occluder times and 
a signifi cant main effect test posture time (F=(2,108)=91.155; 
p<0.001) with increasing error rates with increasing test posture 
time. Analyzing time distance (0 ms, 300 ms, 600 ms) showed a 
signifi cant main effect of time distance, with increasing RT with 
increasing time distance between occluder time and test posture 
time in all three groups (F=(2,38)>10; p<0.01). No other inte-
ractions with the factor group reached signifi cance (F<0.65). RT 
showed a similar pattern than error rates.
5. DISCUSSION
The present study provided evidence that persons use real-time 
simulation for prediction other person’s actions. Supporting the 
real-time simulation hypothesis, all three experimental groups (No 
Action, Passive and Action Group, respectively) show the real-time 
simulation pattern as suggested by Graf et al. (2007). This refl ects 
that the used paradigm worked in all three conditions properly, 
although there were dual-task options. Participants appeared to 
be able to simulate and predict actions both when they move and 
when they do not move.
Furthermore, the results show that this real-time simulation pat-
tern differs in dependence of the participants’ degree of motor 
activity. This supports the motor interference hypothesis stating 
that motor representations are involved in action simulation. More 
specifi c, it supports the prediction that the execution of movements 
interferes with the simulation of observed movements. This motor 
interference effect is characterized by a decreased benefi t from a 
time congruency between occluder and test posture time while 
performing a motor task simultaneously. However, this effect 
applies to more demanding (i.e., longer) simulation conditions. 
Interestingly there seem to be a parametric increase in error rates 
in the medium and long time congruency condition (400/400 and 
700/700, respectively) with an increasing amount to which the mo-
tor system of the observer is involved. While the No Action Group 
show the smallest involvement of the motor execution system (due 
to the fact that they only respond with their feet), the Passive 
Group involves a slightly higher amount of motor command (e.g., 
holding the knobs) and motor control (e.g., updating the position 
where the hands are moved to). In contrast the Action Group in-
volves the highest amount of motor involvement with a high level 
of action planning (due to the direction and kind of the circular 
movement), action execution (giving a motor command and tense 
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of the appropriate muscles) and motor control (correcting errors 
in action execution). While Kilner and colleagues demonstrated 
interference effects of a congruent biological movement observation 
on the acuity of action execution, this study showed interference 
effects of action execution on the prediction of action outcomes 
(i.e., action simulation of occluded actions).
As mentioned above, the present study indicates that motor inter-
ference in the Action Group is specifi c to cases where long periods 
of occlusion have to be bridged, i.e. when long real-time simulation 
is required. The fact that the interference effect appeared only in 
medium and long occlusion times and the fact that the error rates 
showed a parametric increase with increasing motor involvement 
of the groups (No-Action < Passive < Action Group) for medium 
and long occlusion conditions argues against pure dual-task costs 
due to working memory or attention effects. Therefore we propose 
(at least partly) overlapping mechanisms to be involved in the 
simulation and execution of motor actions.
Long simulation goes along with the fact that the internal model 
of the observed action is not being updated by visual input for a 
long time. This makes real-time simulation and prediction of the 
action output more demanding. The higher demanding character 
of longer simulation could cause motor interference in the Action 
Group only in medium and long occlusion cases. On the other 
hand, it is possible that the simulation process gets less accurate 
the longer it needs to be maintained. This could be due to adaption 
to the increasing number of possible outcomes of the occluded 
action. This increase of inaccuracy could be speeded up when 
humans do move due to the fact, that moving person’s change 
their own positions in every-day life and therefore need to have 
more fl exible simulation outputs. 
We have to keep in mind that the present study used stimuli 
showing full-body movements. More specifi cally, we found a mo-
tor interference effect in the simulation of full-body movements 
although the motor interference task involved a different kind of 
movement as the observed one, namely simple circular movements 
drawing with both hands. Accordingly, on the basis of the present 
study it is hard to specify which particular representations are 
shared when simulating and executing action (Prinz, 1997). Thus 
it seems promising to investigate how the interference effect may 
relate to effector mappings between executed actions and observed 
actions in future experiments. For instance, interference effects 
may be increased by an increased overlap between the observed 
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and the actively used action effectors. In fact, evidence for effector 
specifi city in action execution and action observation has been 
reported (Reed & Farah, 1995; Reed & McGoldrick, 2007). For 
example, Reed and McGoldrick (2007) used a dual-task paradigm 
where participants are ask to move a certain body part (arm versus 
leg) and to memorize posture of the congruent body part of another 
(virtual) person. When the participants moved and memorized the 
same body part (congruent effector condition) interference took 
place only when a short processing time is available. In contrast 
the authors showed facilitation when long processing times are 
offered. Taking into account that the participants in the presented 
study execute the secondary motor task and the simulation task 
simultaneously, it is likely that motor interference effects on action 
simulation are stronger when the observed and the executed action 
involve the same kind of effector. Such evidence would speak for 
shared representations in action execution and action simulation 
on the specifi c level of action effectors. 
Apart from this motor interference effects can be assumed to get 
stronger when the kind of executed and observed actions cor-
respond. For example, Jacobs and Shiffrar (2005) showed that 
walking observers have a decreased performance in evaluation 
the walking speed of point-light walkers compared to standing 
or cycling observers. With respect to the current results, it would 
be an interesting extension to disentangle two factors: the con-
gruency of moved and simulated effector and the congruency 
of the kind of executed and simulated action. Therefore, we are 
currently planning further studies that will contrast (a) congruent/
incongruent actions with regard to the type of action observed in 
the movies and (b) congruent/incongruent actions with regard 
to the effector involved in the observed action (e.g., observing an 
arm-related action while performing a leg-related action). If these 
manipulations are to be effective, the argument for common motor 
representations would be substantially strengthened.
As mentioned above the use of an active versus a passive secon-
dary motor task allowed it to disentangle the motor command 
and the sensory feedback, which arises from the movement of 
the arms. The fi nding that motor interference is strongest in the 
Action Group can refl ect the fact that giving the motor command 
seems to be the critical issue. These assumption would fi t to the 
theoretical framework of de Vignemont and Haggard (2008), in 
which they wonder ‘what is shared?’ in shared representations 
in action observation and action execution. The authors claim 
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that the “best candidate for shared representations of action is 
intention in action” (de Vignemont & Haggard, 2008, p. 1). The 
intention to move the crank is only given in the Action group of 
the present study. 
Future studies will investigate whether “motor interference” ad-
dresses to higher levels of the motor hierarchy like motor intentions 
as proposed by de Vignemont and Haggard. For instance, when 
contrasting a secondary motor planning task with a motor exe-
cution task in action simulation (like used in the Action Group of 
the presented study), one could hypothesize an increased “motor 
interference” in motor planning in contrast to motor execution.
Another in interesting future question refers to the specifi city of 
the interference effect of action simulation. Firstly, whether it is a 
more general effect operating on the level of task diffi culty. To test 
this, it is planned to contrast a motor and a purely cognitive type 
of secondary task, with the hypothesis that interference will take 
place only in the group which executes the secondary motor task. 
Last not least, thinking of human’s everyday actions leads to the 
question what motor interference means in respect to social situa-
tions. For instance, considering performance in team sports when 
persons have to move simultaneously to others, they would suffer 
from impairment in action simulation. Sportsmen would collide 
with each other or had trouble to predict trajectory of balls thrown 
by the opponent. Therefore one can think of “motor interference” 
also in terms of increased fl exibility in every-day life involving 
the simulation of our conspecifi c’s actions. For example, imaging 
you on your bike in the pedestrian area of the big city, you cannot 
benefi t from a mental simulation of the absolute direction and 
speed of each pedestrian, rather you need a fl exible adaptation 
taking into account your own movement and position changing. 
This idea fi ts well to a study done by Themanson and colleagues 
(Themanson, Pontifex, & Hillman, 2008). They could show that 
higher body fi tness (operationalized as walking movements on a 
treadmill) leads to an increased cognitive fl exibility, which was 
shown by a greater post-error accuracy and a higher error-related 
negativity in EEG in an Eriksen fl anker paradigm. The authors 
suggest that higher fi tness is related to an effective modulation 
of cognitive control in order to adapt the actual behaviour to 
the current situational demands. According to the authors this 
is enhanced in situations were accuracy (rather than speed) is 
important. Interestingly, in the presented study the participants 
were instructed to perform the simulation task (deciding whether 
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the test posture was rotated or not) as fast and as accurate as 
possible. Nevertheless the participants received response feedback 
(correct versus incorrect), which may have forced a focus on task 
accuracy and in turn, could have led to an increased cognitive 
fl exibility. Because this idea is highly speculative for interpretation 
of the presented results, future experimental accounts of how to 
address the hypothesis of enhanced fl exibility in action simulation 
in moving participants will be another interesting aspect to be 
discussed on the workshop. 
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INTERACTIVE SENSE-MAKING 
IN THE BRAIN
KRISTIAN TYLÉN1, MICAH ALLEN2
ABSTRACT
One of the great challenges for the advancing fi eld of ‘social cognitive 
neuroscience’ is to address issues concerning the neural underpinnings 
of human social interaction. Though some attempts have been made in 
this direction the conceptual frameworks underlying most existing para-
digms are often unelaborated and ambiguous to the structure of human 
interaction. This presentation has two overall aims: fi rst, to discuss which 
kinds of predictions logically follow from existing approaches to social 
cognition such as ‘simulation theory’ (ST) and ‘theory of mind’ (ToM), 
and why these might prove unproductive for the study of true social 
interaction. Following from this, we propose an alternative framework 
for neurocognitive studies of social interaction, rooted in enaction the-
ory. A central distinction in our approach is the differentiation between 
observing and participating in social situations. This distinction has not 
been appreciated by ST and ToM advocates whom tend to treat interac-
tion as continuous with the mentalistic act of ‘fi guring out the mind of 
the other’. We argue that contrary to observational social situations the 
nature of participatory interactions is not fully captured by reference 
to the autonomous, individual minds of the participants, but rather in 
their dynamic reciprocal couplings. These critically depend on material 
mediation. When engaging in interaction, participants enter into a shared 
referential space where bodies, acts and objects are perceived in a new 
functional perspective as mediators of social coordination and meaning. 
They become social symbols affording mutual responsiveness and co-
action. A social enactive conceptual framing of participatory interaction 
thus calls for new types of experimental questions, hypotheses and para-
digms geared to capture these cognitive and neurocognitive properties. 
We suggest three such testable predictions and bring these to a meta-
analysis of a series of existing functional brain imaging studies of social 
cognition, joint action and non-verbal communication. When comparing 
brain activation patterns in studies of what we term observational social 
situations with studies featuring an element of enactive interaction these 
do not fully overlap. Interestingly, a consistent pattern of activations in 
studies of interaction cluster in an area of the inferior frontal gyrus (rou-
ghly comprising BA 44, 45, and 47) not normally considered part of the 
so-called ‘social brain’. We suspect that this anatomical site might play 
a general role as an interface for socially interactive sense-making across 
expressive modalities of mediation (from bodies and objects to verbal 
language). Furthermore, the analysis supports our intuition that social 
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observation and interaction should not be treated in direct continuation 
(as suggested by ST and ToM) but as differentially organized cognitive 
phenomena – not as one, but two social brains.  
Keywords: participatory interaction, brain imaging, social enactment 
theory, material mediation, simulation theory, theory of mind
1. SOCIAL COGNITION - BRIDGING THE DIVIDE? 
Two infl uential approaches pervade the majority of existing co-
gnitive brain imaging studies on social cognition - theory of mind 
(ToM) and simulation theory (ST). No doubt, these are successful 
in their account of a diverse range of social phenomena, from the 
feeling of empathy to the detection of deceit. But there are aspects 
of our social life that seem to work neither by theory-making nor 
simulation. We will argue that to capture the true cognitive profi le 
of full-blown, cooperative social interaction other approaches are 
needed. 
Common to theory of mind and simulation theory is that they take 
as their point of departure the autonomy of the individual mind. 
From this perspective a social situation has one person trying 
to fi gure out the fundamentally inaccessible mind of another by 
metarepresentation or simulation of internal cognitive states. This 
might be what is going on in some situations as when we ‘passively’ 
observe social phenomena from a distal third-person perspective 
(De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007; Gallagher & Hutto, 2008). As 
such ToM and ST can possibly account for some of the cognitive 
processes involved in the detection of false-beliefs or the compre-
hension of someone’s intentional grasping. But these approaches 
seem unsuited to grasp the basic nature of participatory social 
interactions. Taking a ToM perspective on social interaction would 
entail something like two individual agents constantly working to 
‘bridge the gap’ by fi guring out the mind of the other. And in the 
simulation version the two interactants would understand each 
others’ actions by something like an immediate pre-conceptual 
simulation, which is then attributed to the discrete other. In both 
cases the experience is taken primarily to be about the other person 
and his/her special mental dispositions toward the one self. From 
this perspective it is far from obvious how we manage in relatively 
effortless and effi cient manners to achieve fi ne action coordination 
and joint sense-making. The emphasis on such ‘person-centered’ 
approaches as the grounds for participatory social interaction 
seems counterintuitive and unproductive. Rather than conceiving 
minds as individual representations that meta-represent one ano-
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ther, we suggest the human mind to be profoundly intersubjective 
in nature (Zahavi, 2008; Russel, 1998).  Following the ideas of 
e.g. De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) and Zlatev et al. (2008), we 
will sketch out an enactive approach to the study of interaction 
structured along two related lines: 1) participatory interaction as 
an instance of dynamic, reciprocal coupling and coordination, and 
2) attention to the special mediating role of the shared material 
environment in this process. Besides, we attempt to show how this 
conceptual approach can explain some of the recent fi ndings in 
functional brain imaging studies of social cognition, revealed by a 
meta-analysis of a series of studies on non-verbal communication 
and joint action. 
1.1 Interactive sense-making and material mediation
As indicated above, there might be good reasons for differentiating 
two distinct types of social encounters: 1) one in which we passively 
observe a social interaction from a third-person perspective, and 
2) one in which we are fi rst/second-person active participants in 
the social interaction (Tylén, 2007; De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007; 
Gallagher & Hutto, 2008). So far this important distinction has 
not been appreciated in ToM and ST approaches to social neu-
rocognition that have almost exclusively favored the fi rst type. 
As a consequence, fi ndings related to the observational type of 
social experience have been suggested as general models for social 
cognition (cf. e.g. Gallese et al., 2004). However, we will suggest 
that in social interactive encounters the structural dynamics of the 
whole situation is altered in fundamental ways, challenging these 
traditional models on several grounds. 
In the enactive account, when two people engage in reciprocal so-
cial interactive activities they become part of an emergent coupled 
system making up the interaction. The interaction itself is thus the 
minimal object of study while the individual minds entering the 
interaction can only be considered constituent “subparts” as their 
complementary roles are defi ned and constrained in relation to the 
interactional whole (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007). The object of 
mutual attention is thus not the participants’ individual mental 
states, but the shared perceptual space of bodies, objects and action 
that scaffold joint sense-making. Interactive social meaning is thus 
a mutual creation between brains, minds, and the material media-
tions that form the interaction. From this approach it follows that 
the persons involved are neither preoccupied with theory-making 
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nor simulation, but are continuously adjusting their actions in 
complementary ways by orientation of the dynamic matter of the 
interaction and mutual commitment to regulating social norma-
tive practices (Tylén et al, in review; Sinha & Rodríguez, 2008; 
Roepstorff & Frith, 2004). Such coordination dynamics include 
not only procedural practices of turn-taking and gaze-following 
and fi ne temporal motor coordination, but are likewise involved 
in scaffolding symbolic meaning construction. In both cases the 
driving force is found in aspects of our shared materiality.
The mediating impact of the material environment on human 
social cognition has been somewhat neglected in most approa-
ches to human cognition that often pursue a more mentalistic 
or metarepresentational account. But several recent advances 
in intersubjectivity fi nd our joint engagement with the material 
world to pave the way for new styles of symbolic thinking (Clark, 
2006; Sinha & Rodríguez, 2008; Gallagher & Hutto, 2008; Ro-
epstorff, 2008; Tylén et al, in review). Rather than being empty 
vehicles for encoded denotational meanings travelling between 
minds, social symbols primarily do their work in concrete local, 
contextualized settings by joint manipulation of their signifying 
materiality (Clark, 2006; Cowley, 2004; Kravchenko, 2007). 
Symbolic communication (e.g. in verbal languages, bodily gestures 
or material objects) is thus also a type of joint action (Clark, 1996) 
in which socially shared meanings are negotiated and grounded in 
specifi c social contexts by virtue of the social affordances of their 
materiality (Sinha & Rodríguez, 2008). Interaction is thus not 
about the participants involved, but about the subject matter. It 
is a collective ‘making sense of the shared material space’ between 
the participants. 
  
1.2 Shared attention, social meaning and responsiveness
From the dynamic structural architecture of participatory inte-
raction sketched out above it could be argued that participatory 
interaction is not even a cognitive enterprise and thus does not lend 
itself to traditional experimental cognitive studies of single subjects. 
This is not necessarily so. In the following we will consider three 
contrastive predictions characterizing the difference in cognitive 
profi le between the observational and interactive social encounters: 
1) differences in attention distribution of the interacting agents, 2) 
different semiotic profi les of the social meaning attributed to these 
situations, and 3) differences in the agents inclination to respond 
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or co-act. Though the empirical evidence is still sparse some of 
these predictions already fi nd support in recent behavioral studies. 
Though the experimenters might not fully subscribe to our concep-
tual prospects the main ideas are supported in a series of recent stu-
dies of infant cognition (e.g. Gergely et al., 2007; Senju & Csibra, 
2008; Senju et al., 2008). The experimental fi nding is that when 
an infant observes an experimenter’s behaviors from a third-person 
perspective, the infant seems to interpret the behaviors as expres-
sing the preferences of this specifi c experimenter. In contrast, when 
the infant is directly addressed by the experimenter’s ostensive cues 
(such as making eye-contact, nodding and vocalizing in ‘mothe-
rese’) the infant tends to interpret accompanying object-oriented 
behaviors as generalizable socially relevant information about the 
object world. In other words; in the fi rst (observational) situation 
the infant learns about the specifi c preferences and dispositions of 
the other person (the experience is about the person) and in the 
interactive situation the infant learns something about the shared 
object world (the experience is about the intersubjectively shared 
world of meaning) (Gergely et al, 2007). 
In support of our fi rst predictions outlined above, the studies seem 
to suggest quite different attentional strategies for the two types of 
social encounters leading to different kinds of ‘social meaning’. We 
speculate that this is due to differences in semiotic attitude to the 
scenes. Though quite compatible bodily actions or objects might 
be involved they become perceived in fundamental different ways. 
When we investigate another person in an observational fashion 
we might infer, explain or predict his/her behavior in terms of 
particular contents of mind and intentions towards the world. This 
style of ‘private sense-making’ is primarily dependent on indexical 
(causally explanatory) strategies (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007; 
Tylén, 2007). In contrast, when we engage in interactive encounters 
aspects of the material world gain another semiotic status; bodily 
movements, facial expressions and material object manipulations 
are suddenly perceived and employed as intentional mediators 
of the ongoing dynamic coordination: they become shared social 
symbols (Tylén, 2007; Tylén et al, in review; Clark, 2005). 
The last prediction that seems to follow from the proposed enac-
tive approach to social cognition is related to the social normative 
practices of interaction. In most cases when we are addressed 
ostensively by someone to take part in a joint action we will feel an 
almost automatic inclination to respond. Such addressing gestures 
are part of a distributed normative structure that is only realized 
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by the complementary turn-taking effort of both parties. One act 
calls for the other in a dialogical structure across participants. 
If a participant fails to respond, i.e. fulfi ll her role in this shared 
normative structure, the interaction is likely to break down (cf. 
e.g. Garfi nkel’s breaching experiments, Garfi nkel, 2002). 
The motivated predictions concerning differences in attention, 
semiotic attitude and responsiveness in relation to observational 
and interactive styles of social encounters are likely to be refl ec-
ted in functional brain activity of social agents engaged in these 
situations. Though so far this has not been systematically investi-
gated, a series of existing functional brain imaging studies might 
throw some light on the biological underpinnings of participatory 
interaction. 
 
2. THE SOCIAL BRAIN
In recent years, a still growing number of brain imaging studies 
address the neural underpinnings of social cognition. As mentioned 
above two well-established and infl uential approaches, ToM and 
ST (closely allied to the mirror neuron literature) have dominated 
this fi eld. The fi ndings are summarized under appealing titles like 
‘The meeting of minds’ (Amodio & Frith, 2006), ‘Understanding 
intentions in social interactions’ (Walter et al., 2004), and ‘A uni-
fying view of the basis of social cognition’ (Gallese et al., 2004). 
A common trait in these studies is – again - an ‘observational 
approach’ to social phenomena. While a full review of this large 
literature is beyond the scope of this presentation, we will attempt 
a brief overview of the basic functional anatomical fi ndings. These 
will be compared with a number of studies on joint action and 
non-verbal communication that can be argued to conceptually 
imply an element of interaction. Interestingly, the fi ndings do not 
fully overlap. Rather, the two clusters of studies involve a number 
of dissociate functional activations which could suggest (contrary 
to the expectancies of ST and ToM) that observational and inte-
ractive social situations are in fact subserved by partly dissociate 
systems due to their fundamental structural cognitive differences. 
2.1 Theory of Mind in the brain
One of the well-established paradigms in cognitive neuroscience 
is sometimes treated under the somewhat presumptuous headline 
“the social brain” (cf. e.g. Gobbini et al., 2007). It more or less 
implicitly defi nes ‘social’ in term of our abilities to ‘mentalize’, 
that is, to make inferences about the mental states of others. In 
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an extensive series of studies of ‘theory of mind’ and ‘mentalizing’ 
(cf. e.g. Castelli et al., 2000; Walter et al., 2004; Gallagher et al., 
2000, 2002; Gallagher & Frith, 2003, 2004; Amodio & Frith, 
2006; Fletcher et al., 1995; Kampe et al., 2003; Saxe, 2006; 
Schilbach et al., 2006, etc.) it has been suggested that a distinct 
pattern of brain areas including (among others) the temporal poles 
bilaterally, the right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), the right 
superior temporal sulcus (STS) and the medial prefrontal cortex 
(MPFC) are involved in explaining and predicting the behavior of 
other people regardless of the sensory modality or task involved.
A couple of these studies could potentially be of great relevance for 
the present conceptual purposes as they seem to entail an element 
of cooperative interaction. In Kampe et al. (2003) and Schilbach 
et al. (2007) the experimenters investigated functional brain 
activations related to subject-directed ostensive cues (Sperber & 
Wilson, 1986). Like in the behavioral studies of Gergely, Senju, 
Csibra and colleagues such cues could arguably be said to facili-
tate the initiation of social interaction. Still, when the activation 
patterns in MPFC largely replicate the fi ndings from other ToM 
studies it is likely due to the fact that no real interaction follows 
from these cues. They are thus merely expressing the intention to 
initiate a not yet realized interaction and in that sense they are 
still perceived as being about the particular mental dispositions 
of the depicted person.
2.2 Simulation in the brain 
Another cluster of studies on social neurocognition are founded on 
simulation theory (ST). Though we acknowledge that ST has a long 
history preceding Gallese and colleagues’ groundbreaking fi nding 
of mirror neurons in the F5 motor cortex of monkeys (Gallese et 
al., 1996), we will in the following brief overview primarily focus 
on the human mirror-neuron literature (e.g. Gallese et al., 1996, 
1998, 2004; Gallese, 2007; Buccino et al., 2001, 2004; Decety & 
Grèzes, 2006; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Newman-Norlund 
et al., 2008, etc.). The central idea is that the basic mechanism 
for understanding other people is not conceptual refl ection but a 
very direct and immediate mental simulation (mirroring) of the 
other’s emotions and actions. When we thus for instance recognize 
someone’s motor actions as intentional and meaningful it is because 
special populations of mirror neurons related to our own motor 
system simulate the action and thereby impose on us a similar 
imagined fi rst-person experience of intentional action. 
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Since single cell recordings in the human brain are not possible 
the existence of mirror neurons in humans cannot be directly 
validated as in the case of monkeys. Still, when investigating ac-
tion perception using functional brain imaging ‘mirror activation 
patterns’ are consistently found in compatible sites of the human 
brain including the rostal part of the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) 
and in the pars opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and 
adjacent areas of the premotor cortex homologue to the F5 areas 
of the monkey brain (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Furthermore, 
some brain areas involved in emotional affect (e.g. the insula) show 
the same mirroring behaviors (Gallese et al., 2004). Although it 
is likely that the mirror neuron system is involved in direct access 
to the emotions and actions of others it is not entirely clear how 
these simulations are ‘fed into our own decision making system’ 
to explain the actions of others and navigate social terrain (Gal-
lagher, 2007). 
Since the whole idea of a simulative understanding of other people 
is about ‘bridging fi rst-person and third-person experiences’ no ela-
borate predictions concerning the fi rst-person/second-person social 
encounter have yet come from this approach. However it has been 
suggested that the mirror-system might facilitate communication. 
The proposed anatomical sites’ partial overlap with Broca’s area 
(BA 44 and 45) of the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), a structure 
consistently found in studies of verbal language production and 
comprehension (cf. e.g. Price, 2000; Wallentin et al., 2005, 2006, 
among many others) has motivated some speculations concerning 
simulation being the basic underlying mechanism of human 
language (see Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004 or Gallese, 2007 for 
reviews). However, this is still the subject of ongoing debate (cf. 
e.g. Toni et al., 2008). A couple of recent investigations however 
do attempt (at least indirectly) to suggest how the mirror system 
might relate to fi rst/second-person participatory interaction. In 
two studies on the neural underpinnings of cooperative joint action 
Newman-Norlund and colleagues found activations of the human 
mirror system when two subjects had to continuously coordinate 
their actions in a complementary fashion to solve cooperative tasks 
(Newman-Norlund et al. 2007, 2008). Interestingly, a general fi n-
ding across these studies is that activation in some regions of the 
mirror system (e.g. the right IFG) is more enhanced in conditions 
of non-imitative, complementary actions than in imitative con-
ditions. This could seem counterintuitive since the mirror system 
has mostly been thought to involve imitative simulations, but 
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Newman-Norlund and colleagues hypothesize certain populations 
of mirror-neurons to be ‘broadly congruent’, context sensitive neu-
rons rather than strictly imitative, context independent neurons. 
The fi rst ones are thus supposedly involved in the planning of 
non-imitative, complementary actions (Newman-Norlund et al., 
2007a). Though these fi ndings are highly relevant and promising 
for our stated objective concerning the neural underpinnings for 
participatory interaction there are a couple of central issues that 
are not considered in these studies. These are related to joint sense-
making and its proposed material mediation, possibly related to 
other structures of the IFG.
         
2.3 Non-verbal communication in the brain
While ToM and ST pose ambitions towards a general theory of 
social cognition ironically this is not where we fi nd the most studies 
on participatory interaction. Rather these are often reported as 
instances of (non-verbal) communication. A series of studies on 
various kinds of non-verbal communicative mediation thus allow 
for meta-interpretations with regard to the proposed enactive 
framework of participatory interaction. These are studies that 
in their experimental design contrast communicative and non-
communicative conditions (cf. e.g. Lotze et al., 2006; Dietrich et 
al., 2007; Lawrence et al., 2006; Tylén et al., in press). Like in 
the studies on ostensive cues treated above they feature the expe-
rimental subject as the intended addressee of the communicative 
activity. Though it can be argued that this form of interaction is 
less strong than the case of joint motor action, conceptually they do 
involve an element of interaction in their framing of the subject as 
aa addressee and cooperative interpreter of social communicative 
meaning (Tylén, 2007; Tylén et al., in review). Interestingly, the 
brain areas involved in the studies of non-verbal communication 
do not consistently overlap with the areas found in studies of ST 
and ToM as might have been expected if these cognitive strategies 
had been subserving social interaction. Rather, activations gather 
in a cluster of areas of the IFG traditionally associated with verbal 
language and semantics.    
In an fMRI experiment, Lotze et al. (2006) contrasted the neural 
responses to three different kinds of right hand movements: isola-
ted hand movements (e.g. twisting a lid), body-referred movements 
(brushing teeth) and expressive gestures (e.g. holding up the index 
fi nger to threat someone). While the fi rst two are not intended as 
communicative signals the third mediates social communicative 
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meaning. In the body-referred and the expressive movement con-
ditions the experimenters found activity in the STS of the social 
brain network. This area has previously been associated with the 
perception of another person’s action (Gallagher & Frith, 2004). 
But, when the expressive gesture condition was contrasted with 
the body-referred movement condition only the left ventro-lateral 
prefrontal cortex (VLPRC)/Brodmann Area (BA) 47, was active. 
Interestingly, this area has previously been associated with seman-
tic processing in verbal language (cf. e.g. Dapretto & Bookheimer, 
1999; Fiez, 1997).
In another imaging study of brain regions associated with the per-
ception of non-verbal vocalizations Dietrich et al. (2007) found a 
similar pattern. They were interested in the fact that in addition 
to words in a natural language people make use of other types of 
vocalizations to express social meaning. For instance, affective 
bursts like laughter or cries have an intrinsic (indexical) social 
communicative function in signaling other individuals’ affective 
states, but in addition vegetative sounds such as belches and yawns 
are sometimes produced deliberately to signal arbitrary (symbolic) 
communicative meanings. This fact was manipulated in Dietrich et 
al.’s experiment. While being scanned subjects were instructed to 
classify different types of vocalizations including affective bursts 
(e.g. laughter) and vegetative sounds (e.g. snoring or belching) 
in terms of their presumed function: communicative signals vs. 
non-signals. As in the previous study, we could have expected 
the task in this study to involve mentalizing or simulation as it 
targets the recognition of communicative intentions. But when 
the experimenters contrasted vocal signals with non-signals an 
interesting additional pattern of areas normally not considered 
part of mentalizing or simulation were elicited. The hemodynamic 
responses resided in areas of the left hemisphere temporo-parietal 
junction, proposed to be an verbal ‘auditory-to-meaning interface’ 
in previous studies (cf. e.g. Hickok & Poeppel, 2000), together 
with some structures of the inferior frontal gyrus (left BA 47 and 
right BA 44 and 45). Again these are all areas consistently found 
in studies of verbal language and semantics. Besides, note that 
one of the prefrontal components (left BA 47) overlaps with the 
fi ndings of Lotze et al. (2006).
A third study of interest in this connection addressed aspects 
of ‘body language’; ways we direct motor acts at other people 
as signals recruiting “shared representations” (Lawrence et al., 
2006). The experimenters used an adapted version of the Profi le 
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of Non-Verbal Sensitivity or PONS test (Rosenthal et al., 1979) 
in a fMRI experiment assessing subjects’ understanding of non-
verbal communication. In the scanner subjects saw a series of short 
video clips showing an actor conveying various types of facial and 
bodily expressions and gestures, and were asked to rate them on 
either a non-social (face or body?) or a social (angry or happy?) 
decision task. The experimenters interpreted subjects’ behavioral 
responses (button presses) to the social condition in terms of their 
ability to empathize. Empathy is also normally considered part 
of our ‘theory of mind’ (Lawrence et al., 2006), yet in the main 
contrast between social perception and non-social perception, none 
of the regions supposed to be part of the ‘social brain’ were acti-
vated. Rather, similar to the previous examples the primary main 
effects are found in the dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC/
BA 46) and inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44) including Broca’s area 
bilaterally (among a couple of other sites). The authors interpreted 
these patterns of activation in terms of an orientation to ‘shared 
representations’. The same areas are however part of a common 
network involved in various aspects of language processing (cf. 
e.g. Hagoort, 2005).
Finally, in an event-related fMRI study on object mediated com-
munication Tylén and colleagues presented two contrastive types 
of images to subjects (Tylén et al., in press). In the test condition 
images depicted static scenes with confi gurations of everyday 
material objects that were manipulated in striking ways that se-
emed to call for a symbolic interpretation (e.g. chairs put out in 
the street to reserve a parking place or a bunch of fl owers left on 
the doorstep of a private home to express a declaration of love, 
etc.). The control condition had the same objects in their cano-
nical instrumental (or accidental) non-communicative contexts. 
Again, the main conditions thus contrasted communication and 
non-communication though in an externalized material mediation. 
The experimenters found that when subjects made communicative 
interpretations and explored the object confi gurations as sources 
of intentional social meaning they had enhanced activity in part 
of the fusiform gyrus and the pars triangularis of the IFG (BA 45). 
The studies on non-verbal communication introduced above 
(Lotze et al., 2006; Dietrich et al., 2007; Lawrence et al., 2006; 
Tylén et al., in press) are all concerned with a special type of social 
encounter; situations where bodily movements, facial expressions, 
vocal sounds, hand gestures and material objects are recognized 
as intentional signals addressing the subject to mediate social 
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meaning. And as such they call for a cooperative, interpretative 
attitude in the addressee. While from the point of view of the 
well-established approaches in social cognition, we could have 
expected ‘conceptual refl ection’ or ‘immediate simulation’ to be 
central components in such interactions related to for instance the 
recognition of communicative intent (Walter et al., 2004; Kampe 
et al., 2003; Schilbach et al., 2006; Gallese, 2007; Buccino et al., 
2004), areas of these brain networks seem to play a somewhat 
marginal role in the studies. Instead, we consistently fi nd activation 
in closely adjacent regions of the IFG. 
It might be noted that some of the fi ndings in these studies (e.g. in 
Dietrich et al. 2007; Lawrence et al., 2006) tap into areas of BA 44 
of the IFG that are also considered part of the mirror system and 
thus potentially could be interpreted in terms of mental simulation. 
Still, since the contrastive control conditions feature very similar 
vocalizations and gestures it is not obvious why the mirror system 
should be activated in the test and not the control conditions. 
Rather, the activations found in various neighboring sites of the 
IFG (BA 44, 45 and 47) could be seen as expressing a common 
trend; the same areas have thus been proposed as comprising the 
“unifi cation area” by Paul Hagoort (cf. e.g. Hagoort, 2005; see 
also Müller & Basho, 2004, for an interesting discussion). Rather 
than assigning very subtle differentiated functions to each of these 
Brodmann areas, Hagoort fi nds them to be closely functionally 
related as an interface for the integration of various aspects of 
semantic and pragmatic meaning in verbal language.
Since the same cluster of areas consistently show up in studies 
on the diverse range of expressive mediations from gesture to 
objects (e.g. also including ‘musical semantics’, Vuust et al., 2005, 
2006) we suggest to ascribe this ‘unifi cation site’ a more general 
function across expressive modalities as responsible for human 
interactive sense-making and meaning construction. This idea is 
consistent with the often posed proposition that verbal language 
both ontogenetically and phylogenetically evolves from non-verbal 
modes of interactive communication (Arbib, 2005; Donald, 2001; 
Tomasello, 1999; Zlatev, 2008).    
3. THE TALE OF TWO SOCIAL BRAINS 
Based on the socially enactive framework outlined in the initial 
parts of this paper we might hypothesize not one common me-
chanism and brain network for social understanding but several 
depending on the type of social task at hand. For the matter of 
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the current argument we will propose a rude and simplistic model 
comprising two such ‘social brains’, that is, two dissociate neural 
networks underpinning various types of social understanding. 
One system is thus concerned with an observational style person-
oriented approach and another - a interactive style object-oriented 
approach. The fi rst system is thus concerned with various strategies 
for extracting social information from the perceived behavior of 
the other. It may work by mentalizing or simulation (or both) 
but essentially serves the same goal; to ‘privately’ understand the 
other. The reviewed empirical literature suggests that the system 
anatomically comprises a distributed set of regions such as the 
MPFC, TPJ, STS and the temporal poles bilaterally plus the IPL, 
the pars opercularis of IFG and possibly the insula. 
The second system facilitates our engagement with other people 
in dynamic participatory interactions for purposes of joint sense-
making. In these situations, participants’ alignment of pragmatic 
implicatures, fi ne attentional attunement and complementary 
coordination entail mutual commitment to highly schematic social 
norms and practices in which roles are assigned and enacted. This 
socio-normative process is a triadic endeavor heavily scaffolded 
by material mediation in the form of mimetic and symbolic acts, 
objects and places affording mutual responsiveness. 
Far too few brain imaging studies have explicitly addressed the 
issue of participatory interaction in proper contrastive experimen-
tal manipulations. However, the few existing studies that can be 
argued to feature an element of interaction point to the ‘unifi cation 
area’ of IFG (BA 44, 45, 47) as one of the possible anatomical 
candidates for this interactive style of social cognition. 
3.1 Toward an Enactive Framework for the Study of Social Neu-
rocognition
By fi rst sight, a social enactive framework for interactive sense-
making would seem somewhat unfeasible to operationalize into 
concrete testable neurocognitive hypotheses. The idea that the 
cognitive profi le of participatory interaction is not fully represented 
and thus cannot be captured in the individual minds and brains 
of the participants but only in their complex dynamical couplings 
seems to call for something like hyper-scanning paradigms where 
two persons are scanned simultaneously while interacting. Such 
paradigms are not beyond reach but until they are up and run-
ning other testable hypotheses more suited for state-of-the-art 
functional brain imaging seem to follow from the conceptual ela-
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borations posed above. In the preceding, we have suggested three 
such hypotheses. One of these is that participatory interactions 
involve a special kind of joint attention to the mediating role of 
bodies, actions and objects. Another is that these interactions are 
structured by mutual orientation to socio-normative implicatures 
that assign complementary roles to the interactants. And a third 
hypothesis is that these normative structures and their material 
mediations afford for social engagement and thus evoke mutual 
responsiveness. Until further investigations are carried out along 
the lines proposed in this paper we suspect that at least some of 
the aspects of participatory interaction are subserved by brain 
regions of the IFG which consistently shows up in existing studies 
involving elements of interaction. 
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THE INTERGENERATIONAL 
TRANSMISSION OF ATTACHMENT 
DISORGANIZATION: THE ROLE 
OF FRIGHTENING/ANOMALOUS 
BEHAVIOR IN MOTHER-TODDLER 
INTERACTIONS
MARIA ZACCAGNINO1, DEBORAH JACOBVITZ2,
NANCY HAZEN2
The present research examined the intergenerational transmission of 
attachment disorganization. Previous studies have shown associations 
among mothers’ unresolved state of mind with respect to loss and trauma, 
mothers’ display of frightening/frightened behaviour with their infants, 
and infants’ display of disorganized behaviour during the strange situa-
tion. This study examined the continuity of frightening/frightened ma-
ternal behaviour over a 16 month period to further understand how the 
fear underlying a mothers’ unresolved trauma will be transmitted to her 
child.  A new method was developed to assess the quality of mother-toddler 
interactions during free play, toy clean-up and problem solving tasks.
Method: The sample consisted of 110 lower to middle class U.S. mothers 
and children. During their third trimester of pregnancy, 125 women were 
recruited from birthing classes and public service announcements on T.V. 
During this visit, mothers completed the adult attachment interview. 
When their infants were 8 months old, frightening maternal behaviour 
was assessed using a 9-point observational rating scale.  At 12 to 15 
months, infant attachment quality was assessed using Ainsworth (1978) 
Strange Situation.  Finally, at two years, mother-toddler interactions 
were videotaped in a laboratory setting. Within each session, dyadic 
interactions were rated on four 7-point scales -- secure base, hostility, 
disconnected, blurred boundary, and controlling behavior -- as well as a 
9-point frightening/anomalous behavior scale.
Results: Preliminary data demonstrate continuity in frightening caregi-
ving from 8 to 24 months.  Moreover, prenatal assessment of mothers’ 
unresolved trauma and the 12/15 month assessment of infant attachment 
disorganization forecast higher scores on the frightening/anomalous be-
haviour scale at 24 months.  Security of attachment in both the mothers 
and children forecast higher scores on the secure base scales and lower 
scores on the other scales.
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1. INTRODUCTION
According to attachment theory, the most important factor gui-
ding the formation of the attachment relationship is the reciprocal 
pattern of infl uence between the behaviors of the caregiver and 
infant: in particular, the child’s experience and confi dence on ca-
regivers availability and social interactions with her (Ainsworth, 
Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978; Bowlby, 1969/1982; van Ijzendoorn 
& De Wolfe, 1997). The investigation of these themes is directly 
linked to the more recent theories on intersubjectivity (for a review 
see Morganti et al., 2008), that is considered, in fact, as a basic 
aspect of social cognition that allows to share experiences and to 
be attuned other’s mental states in an immediate way. In fact, the 
fundamental thesis of the intersubjectivity is the impossibility to 
examine the subjective experience without the continuous sharing 
of it with the experience of the other persons (Liotti, 2001).
It has been widely acknowledged that the quality of dyadic interac-
tions with parents and/or caregivers, and in particular attachment, 
is crucial for children’s cognitive, social and emotional develop-
ment. So marked aberrations in attachment organization are asso-
ciated with developmental and mental health risks in children and 
adults (Solomon & George, 1999). However, only recently resear-
chers begun to focus and documented the processes that mediate 
relations between adult state of mind regarding attachment (as 
manifested in language during discourse of childhood experien-
ces in the Adult Attachment Interview, AAI, George, Kaplan, & 
Main, 1984, 1996), parenting behaviour (in particular, sensitive 
responsiveness) and children later socio-emotional development 
(Cohn, Cowan, Cowan & Pearson, 1992; van IJzendoorn, 1995). 
This study examined the intergenerational transmission of at-
tachment disorganization. The attachment transmission is not a 
simple and mechanical repetition of the experience lived in the 
past, but it is the result of elaborative processes that can be taken 
part in successive periods of the life and that have carried to the 
construction of a complex and stratifi ed representational world: the 
Internal Working Models, that it is assumed submitted mechanisms 
of the intergenerational transmission of attachment. 
Since before the birth of the child, the parents have working 
models about them like parents and of the child not still been 
born (Ammaniti, 1991; Brazelton & Cramer, 1990).  When the 
child has been born these models must be correct and syntonized 
in order to be adapt to the child’s temperament and needs. This 
task will be relatively easy if the internal working models of the 
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parents are coherent and well organized. Instead it will be more 
diffi cult, if the internal working models of the parents are disor-
ganized or insecure. If a high proportion of child’s attachment or 
autonomy signals is not considered or is amiss interpreted, the 
open communication inside of the attachment relationships will 
be prevented, since the material excluded defensively cannot be 
used for a correction of the errors. Therefore, this type of com-
munication will carry the child to develop some internal working 
models of inadequate himself, determining the inter-generational 
transmission of it.  Various studies noticed a stability over the time 
of the disorganized behavior (van Ijzendoorn et al., 1999), both 
that this has been fi nd out in the infancy, through the procedure of 
the Clown, both that has been noticed with the Strange Situation. 
Despite this, until now, the empirical studies that investigate the 
stability of the disorganized attachment models during the fi rst 
two years of life (Barnett, Ganiban & Cicchetti, 1999; Vondra et 
al. 1999), have underlined remarkable differences in the result 
and skids in the manifestation of the disorganized behaviors, 
evidencing therefore the necessity of further investigation on the 
topic, in order to being able to formulate more reliable hypothe-
ses. Less is known about how mothers’ unresolved trauma and 
infants’ attachment disorganization contribute to the quality of 
mother-child relationships during toddlerhood. Although the hi-
gher prevalence of disorganized attachment in high-risk samples 
(up to 77%) (Lyons-Ruth et al., 1993), suggests that it arises in 
chaotic environments where caregiving is inadequate, such as 
maltreatment (Crittenden, 1985; Lyons-Ruth et al., 1992), its 
occurrence in low-risk community samples (15 – 20%) indicates 
a more complex origin (van Ijzendoorn et al., 1999). As regard, an 
hypothesis has been drawn by the investigation on the difference 
of the attitudes between the mothers of the children classifi ed 
like “disorganized” (D) and the mothers of children with others 
pattern of attachment; thus a result of great relief is emerged: the 
mothers of the children classifi ed as D suffered, much more often 
of the other mothers, for the lacked elaboration of a mourning or 
of a serious traumatic events  (incests, violences), in the relation-
ship with own fi gures of attachment, and they had therefore an 
“unsolved” (U) state of mind regarding these traumas (Main & 
Hesse, 1990, 1992; Leon et al., 2004). Main and Hesse (1990) 
propose that the caregiver’s frightening fragments of memories 
and emotions associated with experiences of unresolved trauma 
lead to a parental expressions of fear. The authors contend that 
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when the potentially protective parent is also a source of fear, a 
disorganized attachment relationship may ensue, and have coined 
the phrase ‘‘fright without solution’’ to describe this phenomenon. 
Under these circumstances, (i.e., fright without solution) the child 
is faced with an insoluble dilemma that prevents the development 
of an organized strategy for the use of the attachment fi gure when 
distressed or prompts a breakdown of an existing strategy. In the 
absence or breakdown of an organized strategy for dealing with 
distress, odd, confl icted, contradictory, or inexplicable behaviors 
associated with disorganized attachment are displayed (e.g., 
stilling, freezing, repeated incomplete approaches to the parent, 
failing to approach the parent when distressed; Main & Hesse, 
1990; Main & Solomon, 1990). These disorganized behaviors 
appear to refl ect fear, apprehension, and confusion toward the 
caregiver rather than an organized response for making use of the 
attachment fi gure when distressed. Repeated experiences of this 
type can create in the child a predisposition to the development 
of conscience disorders that if joined to traumatic experiences 
during the life can lead to serious alterations, like the dissociative 
disorders (Liotti, 1992). This study investigated how different 
aspects such as maternal state of mind, refl ective functioning, 
maternal responsiveness to the child and sensitivity are carried out 
in the intersubjective experience (Zlatev, Brinck, & Andrén, 2008) 
of mother-child relationship and contribute to shape the child 
development. In particular, this study examined mother-toddler 
interactions during 2nd year of life through the development of a 
new method of evaluating the quality of relationship during a play 
session. The aims of the present study are: a) to examine the link 
between infant attachment patterns, mother state of mind with 
respect to relationship with her parents during childhood, and the 
quality of the relationship between mothers and toddlers; b) to 
examine mother-toddler interactions among children previously 
classifi ed as having a disorganized attachment.
Particularly, the present study examined three issues: 
1) Whether mothers who behave in ways that frighten their chil-
dren during the fi rst year of life continue to do so at age two;
2) Whether infants classifi ed as disorganized at 12 and 15 months 
continue to display odd, disorganized and disoriented behaviors 
at during the toddler years; 
3) The extent to which a mothers’ display of disorganized and 
disoriented speech during the adult attachment interview fo-
recasts her behavior with her child at age two.  
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2. METHOD
2.1 Sample
The sample is part of ongoing longitudinal study following 125 
lower-middle class U.S. families over time (Jacobvitz, Hazen, 
Curran, & Hitchens, 2004; Curran, Hazen, Jacobvitz, & Feldman, 
2004; Riggs & Jacobvitz, 2002).
The sample consisted of 110 lower to middle class U.S. mothers 
and children. During their third trimester of pregnancy, 125 
women were recruited from birthing classes, public service an-
nouncements on T.V. and fl yers distributed at maternity stores 
in the Austin area. The mean age of the parents was 30.5 years. 
A high percentage of them reported high educational with 60% 
beyond high school. 85% of them were Caucasian, 8% African 
American, 3% Hispanic and 4% biracial or other identifi cations.
2.2 Procedure
During the fi rst visit (third trimester of pregnancy), women com-
pleted the Adult Attachment Interview.  When their infants were 
8 months old, frightening maternal behaviour was assessed using 
a 9-point observational rating scale.  At 12 to 15 months, infant 
attachment quality was assessed using Ainsworth (1978) Strange 
Situation. All the AAI interviews and SSP videotapes were double 
coded by two trained Researchers. Signifi cant agreement was found 
in the three and four way classifi cation on both AAI and SSP co-
ding. Finally, at two years, 100 mother-toddler interactions were 
videotaped in a laboratory setting. Within each session, dyadic 
interactions were rated developing a new method to assess the 
quality of mother-toddler interactions. All the videotapes were 
double coded by two trained Researchers.
2.3 Assesment Instruments
Mother
• Adult Attachment Interview 
(Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 1985)
Parents’ mental representations of their childhood experiences 
with attachment relationships are organizing in working model 
of attachment, and it has been hypothesized that this set of rules 
determines parents’ sensitivity to their infants’ attachment be-
haviour and, in turn, shapes the infants’ own internal working 
models of attachment (Main & Goldwyn, 1992). To assess adults’ 
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internal working models or current “state of mind” with respect 
to childhood attachment relationships, George, Kaplan, and Main 
(1985) developed the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI): a semi-
structured interview that probes alternately for general descriptions 
of relationships, specifi c supportive or contradicting memories, and 
descriptions of current relationships with parents. Adults are asked 
to retrieve attachment-related autobiographical memories from 
early childhood and to evaluate these memories from their current 
perspective. The coding of the transcripts is not based primarily 
on reported events in childhood, but rather on the thoughtfulness 
and the coherency with which the adult is able to describe and 
evaluate these discussion of their attachment biographies (Main 
& Goldwyn, 1991; Main & Hesse, 1990). The interview, therefo-
re, does not assess the actual security of childhood attachments, 
and theoretically, a secure state of mind is not incompatible with 
an insecure attachment history throughout childhood. The AAI 
does not even measure adults’ perception of their parents’ current 
support in times of stress, because the interview may be classifi ed 
as secure even when the parents have died or when they still treat 
their adult children inadequately. The coding system of the AAI 
leads to adult attachment classifi cations in three main categories, 
that parallel the Strange Situation attachment classifi cations for 
infants (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978): Autonomous or 
secure adults (F), Dismissing adults (Ds), Preoccupied adults (E).
Some autonomous, dismissing, or preoccupied adults indicate 
through their incoherent discussion of experiences of trauma 
(usually involving the loss of an attachment fi gure) that they 
have not yet completed the process of mourning. Evidence for 
the continuing presence of unresolved responses to loss are lapses 
in the monitoring both of reasoning and discourse and reports of 
extreme behavioural reactions. These adults receive the additional 
classifi cation Unresolved (U), which is superimposed on their main 
classifi cation (Main & Goldwyn, 1991).
Child
• Strange Situation Procedure (Ainsworth et al. 1978)
This is a standardized procedure developed by Mary Ainsworth 
and coll. (Ainsworth et al., 1978), to assess the quality of attach-
ment between infant and caregiver. This 20-minute assessment is 
valid with children aged 12 to 21 months and includes two brief 
separations from, and reunions with, the parent. The mild stress 
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of these separations is intended to arouse the child’s attachment 
needs so that the usual pattern of attachment behaviour is elicited.
A four-group classifi cation is used to describe individual differen-
ces in the organization of infant attachment behavior (Ainsworth 
et al., 1978; Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 1985): Secure (Group 
B), Anxious-avoidant (Group A), Anxious-resistant (Group C), 
Anxious-disorganized or disoriented (Group D).
Mother and Child:
• 24 Months Mother-Child Interaction Scales 
(Jacobvitz et al., 2004; Zaccagnino et al., 2004)
Mother and children are videotaped in a laboratory setting during 
three different sessions: 20 minutes of free play, 5 minutes of toy 
clean-up and problem solving tasks. Within each session, dyadic 
interactions were rated on four 7-point scales -- secure base, 
hostility, disconnected, and controlling behavior -- as well as a 
9-point frightening/anomalous behavior scale. 
The secure base scale measured the extent to witch the interaction 
promote autonomy in the child; it’s important to consider both the 
parent and child’s behavior when assigning scores on this scale.  A 
sensitive parent generally is attuned, fl exible, warm, encourages 
autonomy, shows an interest in toddlers’ play and may help the 
toddler to stay engaged in play or shift attention from one play 
theme to the next (scaffolding), appropriately and promptly re-
sponsive to child’s initiations, especially when the child indicates 
a need for the parent, and engages in relationship-appropriate 
interactions.   During the play session, the parent displays a genuine 
sense of enjoyment in the being with the child, taking pleasure 
in the toddler’s discoveries. During the play and problem-solving 
tasks, the mother responds with empathy or help when child is 
distressed, communicating to the child that she genuinely cares 
for him or her.
Autonomy in this setting, is shown by a child who is able to fully 
explore the toys (looks busy), initiates interactions on occasion 
(to share a discovery, ask for help)  and is open on occasion to 
his mother’s play ideas.   Specifi cally, the child should look busy 
exploring since this is the job of a toddler in a room full of new 
toys.  At the same time, the child will initiate interactions and is 
comfortable sharing discoveries.  The child will try out some of 
the mothers’ ideas for new play themes but a sensitive mother will 
not persist with a particular play theme if the child is clearly not 
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interested. The child is able to ask for help when frustrated and 
the parent will respond immediately and appropriately.                                 
The controlling/interfering scale measured the extent to which 
parent is controlling toward child and may operate in a rigid 
manner.  The parent may take on a dictator-like role toward the 
child.  Parents’ own agenda dominates the interaction.  The parent 
may engage in mind reading rather than letting child voice their 
wants or needs.  Parent controls child’s problem solving rather 
than encouraging child’s autonomy. The parent doesn’t respect 
the child’s personal space as shown through hovering, physically 
restraining the child or moving the child’s hand during the play 
(not in the context of discipline). Further, the parent displays 
an intrusive lack of regard for the child’s wishes, autonomy, and 
development. 
The disconnected scale measured the extent in which the parent 
and / or the child are in separate spheres or arenas of activity or 
thought. This defi nition doesn’t depend on the amount of interac-
tion. A parent disconnects and moves into his own sphere when 
she breaks off her awareness of her child and lacks a supportive 
presence. She is on her own agenda. A child disconnects and 
moves into his own sphere when he no longer makes emotional 
bids or “checks in” with his parent. Disconnection involves a lack 
of shared pleasure from the dyad. The parent is unresponsive to 
or does not notice the child’s pleasure or discoveries. The child 
brightens at a discovery yet does not make an effort to share his 
discovery with his parent.  For example in one dyad the parent 
plays and explores the toys by herself for all the time and doesn’t 
respond to child’s requests or needs. 
The hostility scale for the  mother measured the extent in which 
the parent acts voluntarily in a way that results in distance in the 
relationship. The parent is critical or hurtful toward the child or 
may exhibit veiled hostility through jerky movement, impatient, 
and leaking anger. The hostility operates to distance the parent 
and child from each other. For example, in one dyad, the mother 
makes two directly hostile comments to the child, “Knock yourself 
out” and “what do you do with it, you punk”; the mother also 
uses jerky movements when handling the child and a mocking 
tone when playing with the phone.     
The hostility scale for the child measured the extent in which 
the chid acts in a way that results in distance in the relationship. 
The child engages in intentional non cooperativeness towards the 
parent. The child directs anger and actions toward the parent or 
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toward objects in the room. For example in some dyads the child 
repeatedly hits the mother with the toys in a angry way.
The frightening anomalous scale for the mother measured the 
extent in which the mother shows odd behavior during interac-
tion. The parent appears frightened or frights the child; also she 
looks disoriented, absent and shows contradictory behavior in 
simultaneous sequence. For example, in one dyad, the child hits 
repeatedly the mother with hammer; fi rst she laughs in a weird 
way and suddenly she becomes angry.  The mother may also act 
in a sexualised way towards the child.        
The frightening anomalous scale for the child measured the extent 
in which the child shows odd behavior during interaction. The child 
appears frightened or frightens the mom, shows disoriented and 
contradictory behavior. The child, when frightened, can also shows 
active care giving toward the parent aiming to assuage parent 
distress. For example, in one dyad, child is worried about mother 
even though there’s no reason to worry and keeps on asking the 
mom if everything is ok. Also he takes care of the mother during 
the entire session; for example he gives toys to her and says what 
to do in a controlling way.  
3. RESULTS
Subject’s classifi cations on the AAI were no associated with any 
family demographic variables including age, family status, edu-
cation or income.
Distribution of Adult Attachment Classifi cations in Sample
When considering the fi ve-fold distinction, 45.2% of the mothers 
were Free, 18.2% were Dismissing, 8.7% were Entangled, 23% 
were Unresolved, and 1.6% were Cannot Classify.
Distribution of Strange Situation Classifi cations in Sample
As regard the infant attachment quality: 9% of child were Avoi-
dant, 37.8% were Secure, 9% were Resistant, 42.3% were Disor-
ganized, and 1.8% were Cannot Classify.
Further, agreement between three-way attachment categories on 
the SSP and AAI was 62.9% (Kappa=0.297, p < 0.029); agreement 
on the secure/insecure classifi cation was 70% (Kappa=0.419, p 
< 0.023). There was a signifi cant association between the AAI /U 
category and categorical D rating on the SSP : agreement = 77.8% 
(Kappa=0.500, p < 0.009). In addition, we found a signifi cant 
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correlation between the U score on the AAI and the D score on the 
SSP (r = .45 p < 0.017).
Score on the frightening anomalous scale
The average rating scale scores for each of the groups are presented 
in Figure 1 and 2.
- Disorganized children signifi cantly differ from the other three 
coding for the score average of the Frightening anomalous scale 
(children) (F= 12,984, p < 0,001. Subscales: disoriented  F=6,448 
p < 0,001; frightened F=3,052 p < 0,032) and Frightening anoma-
lous scale (mother) (F= 8,506, p < 0,001. Subscales: disoriented 
F=7,803 p < 0,001). Total score for the frightening anomalous 
scale F= 16,997, p < 0,001.
Ratings on the frightening anomalous scale varied signifi cantly 
with D / not D coding on the Strange Situation.
Figure 1. Score on the frightening anomalous scale for the children classifi ed as 
secure, avoidant, resistant and disorganized
- Unresolved signifi cantly differ  from the other three coding for 
the score average of the Frightening anomalous scale (child) (F= 
5,693, p < 0,001. Subscales: disoriented F=3,531 p < 0,009; odd 
movement F=2,505 p < 0,046; frightened F=3,338 p < 0,013) 
and frightening anomalous scale (mother) (F= 6,325, p < 0,001. 
Subscales: disoriented F=3,906 p < 0,005; frightened F= 3,783 
p < 0,006; frightening F= 4,328 p < 0,003). Total score for the 
frightening anomalous scale F= 8,861, p < 0,001.
Ratings on the frightening anomalous scale varied signifi cantly 
with U/not U coding on the AAI
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Figure 2. Score on the frightening anomalous scale for the mothers classifi ed as 
free, dismissing, entangled and unresolved
There was a signifi cant correlation between both total scoring 
on the Frightening Anomalous scale for the mother (r = .49 p < 
0.013) and on the Frightening Anomalous scale for the child (r 
= .55 p < 0.01).
DISCUSSION
A central tenet of attachment theory is that parental behavior 
toward the infant (whose relationship is a constitutional aspect 
of intersubjectivity) is the primary determinant of individual 
differences in attachment relationships. Closely linked to this 
aspect, intersubjectivity appears (from neuroscience fi ndings) to 
be a pre-refl exive functional mechanism that is not necessarily the 
result of an explicit and conscious cognitive effort (Braten, 2008). 
Given the theoretical and clinical importance of elucidating the 
etiology of disorganized attachment, attachment researchers have 
been devoted to understanding the role of parental interactive 
behavior in the development of disorganized attachment relation-
ships. Moreover, mounting evidence suggests that a history of a 
disorganized attachment serves as a marker for later unfavorable 
outcomes in childhood and adolescence (Solomon, et al., 1995; 
Shaw et al., 1996; Carlson, 1998; Moss et al., 2004). 
Our research is one of the fi rst studies which aims to understand 
how mothers’ unresolved state of mind and infants’ attachment 
disorganization contribute to the quality of mother-child relation-
ships during toddlerhood. We examined the associations between 
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the expression of mothers’ unresolved states of mind, anomalous 
parental behaviour and disorganized attachment relationship. In 
particular, our study aimed to evaluate the stability and continuity 
of this associations, and so of the frightening caregiving, and of 
the disorganized attachment, from 8 to 24 months. Preliminary 
data demonstrate that security of attachment in both the mothers 
(assessed trough AAI) and children (assessed trough Strange 
Situation) forecast higher scores on the secure base scales of 24 
Months Mother-Child Interaction Scales and lower scores on the 
other scales. Vice versa, prenatal assessment of mothers’ unresolved 
trauma, displayed by disorganized and disoriented speech during 
the Adult Attachment Interview and the 12/15 month assessment 
of infant attachment disorganization, forecast higher scores on 
the frightening/anomalous behaviour scale at 24 months. So, 
mothers who behave in ways that frighten their children during 
the fi rst year of life continue to do so at age two and their infants 
classifi ed as disorganized at 12 and 15 months continue to display 
odd, disorganized and disoriented behaviors at during the toddler 
years. Such data has implications for understanding how the fear 
underlying a mothers’ unresolved trauma or loss is transmitted to 
her child. In fact, our preliminary data can support the hypothesis 
that the qualities of the mother-child interaction beyond infancy 
is responsible for the intergenerational transmission of attachment 
disorganization, since the frightening/anomalous behavior assessed 
at 24 months is linked to mother’s unresolved state of mind and 
child’s attachment disorganization. Thus even at age two we can 
support the Main and Hesse’s model (1998; 1990) consisting of 
three hypothetical associations: caregiver’s unresolved state of mind 
cause parental expressions of frightening behaviour that elicits fear, 
confusion, disorientation and ‘‘fright without solution’’ (Solomon 
& George, 1999) in infant, and contributes to the development of 
a disorganized attachment relationship. 
Moreover, our results are very encouraging about the validity of the 
frightening/anomalous scale for the 24 months, because it forecast 
mother’s unresolved state of mind and child’s attachment disorga-
nization. Although the Strange Situation is an ideal paradigm for 
the observation of the activation and collapse of the attachment 
system, its suitability for assessing both infant and caregiver be-
havior can be questioned. It has been suggested that observing 
anomalous parental behavior during the Strange Situation proce-
dure raises the possibility of common method variance that could 
lead to contamination with the observation of infant attachment 
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behavior during the same procedure, as the interaction that forms 
the basis for the assessment of anomalous parenting (Lyons-Ruth 
et al., 1999) includes the reunion episodes that are critical for 
assessing the attachment relationship. Such a situation is open to 
the suggestion that the assessment of maternal behavior could be 
unintentionally infl uenced by the fact that the coder unavoidably 
witnesses disorganized infant behavior throughout the procedure. 
Further exploration and more vigorous analyses of the categories 
and dimensions of anomalous behavior are particularly warranted 
then, to enhance our understanding of the patterns of anomalous 
behavior associated with disorganized attachment. Recent studies 
have underscored the importance of observing caregiver – infant 
dyads in conditions of stress (e.g., play without the use of toys) 
in order to increase the likelihood of observing collapses in the 
caregivers’ behavioral strategies and idiosyncrasies during brief 
periods of time (Abrams et al., 2006; Madigan et al., 2006). In 
extensions of this line of research, recent studies have begun to 
demonstrate that coding systems measuring anomalous behavior 
serve as potent tools for assessing clinical effi cacy in attachment-
based interventions (Benoit et al., 2001; Madigan et al., in press). 
There is currently, however, a dearth of intervention-based rese-
arch targeting the caregiver’s propensity to engage in anomalous 
behavior (Bakermans-Kranenburg et al., 2005). 
Nevertheless, at the momentary state-of-art much of the variance 
in disorganized attachment still remains to be explained, because 
anomalous parental behavior mediates only a small part of the 
association between unresolved states of mind and disorganized 
attachment. So, there is a transmission gap between unresolved 
state of mind and infant disorganized attachment that is analo-
gous to the transmission gap in organized attachment strategies 
(van IJzendoorn, 1995). Thus other factors yet to be uncovered 
must mediate the infl uence of unresolved states of mind on di-
sorganization of attachment. Genetic factors may be relevant, 
although behavior genetic evidence does not point in that direction 
(Bokhorst et al., 2003). As an alternative, the interplay between 
genetic vulnerability and experiences with anomalous parenting 
may be important in explaining why some children are affected by 
anomalous parenting whereas others remain resilient. Investigation 
of interactions between infant factors (e.g., pre – perinatal stress, 
temperamental characteristics), family variables (e.g., marital 
discord), and parental factors (e.g., mental health such as de-
pressive synthomps…), may also constitute valuable domains for 
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further exploration in order to more fully understand the media-
ting process between unresolved states of mind and disorganized 
attachment relationships. It is also possible that elaborations of 
existing assessments of maternal representations of attachment, 
such as hostile/helpless parental states of mind with respect to at-
tachment (Lyons-Ruth et al., 2003; Lyons-Ruth et al., 2005), may 
augment our understanding and provide further insight into the 
transmission between states of mind and attachment relationships. 
Additional directions for the investigation of the role of related 
representational processes in the transmission of attachment are 
suggested by the work on refl ective function (Fonagy & Target, 
2005) and mind-mindedness (Meins et al., 2001). There is some 
suggestion, for example, that the probability of the emergence of 
disorganization can be reduced by sensitivity-focused interven-
tions (Bakermans-Kranenburg et al., 2005). These authors have 
speculated that such interventions teach the parents to focus on 
their child’s behavior more closely, thus leaving less room for 
absorption or dissociation into past traumatic experiences in the 
presence of the child.
Researchers have demonstrated that the mechanisms involved 
in the development of attachment relationships may differ for 
mothers and fathers. For example, it has been well documented 
that sensitivity is implicated in the development of secure mother 
– infant patterns of attachment, however, sensitivity is a weaker 
predictor of secure infant – father attachment (Easterbrooks & 
Goldberg, 1984; Volling & Belsky, 1992; van IJzendoorn & De 
Wolff, 1997). It is imperative that we enhance our understanding 
and conceptualization of father – infant attachment relationships, 
including how it relates to the display of anomalous behavior and 
the subsequent development of disorganized attachment. Clearly, 
involving both parents would provide a particularly welcome 
window on the broader complexities of the origins of disorganized 
attachment relationships.
Finally, it’s important to underline how the present study could 
represents a connection between different research fi elds, like 
attachment theory and intersubjectivity, that share common 
interests like parents-child relationship, a crucial factor on the 
socio-cognitive development of the child. The state of consciou-
sness varies at the same time in two individuals joined from a grip 
relationship, like parents-child relationship. A careful analysis of 
the mechanisms below the disorganized attachment will be able 
to lighting the intersubjective processes below the aforesaid alte-
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ration of conscience (Liotti, 2005).The most intriguing area for 
future investigation, then, is the development and evaluation of an 
intervention program aimed specifi cally at reducing the caregivers’ 
display of anomalous behavior to mitigate the risk of disorganized 
attachment. This will be of particular import in high-risk and 
clinically based populations, where infants are at a substantial 
risk of developing disorganized attachment relationships with 
their caregivers. Third, there is a notable dearth of knowledge 
and research regarding the role of the father’s state of mind and 
behavior in the development of attachment relationships.
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DECISION-MAKING 
AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY: 
AN OVERVIEW.
ILARIA CASTELLI, ANTONELLA MARCHETTI
Decision-making – the ability to process multiple alternatives and 
choose an optimal course of action to achieve the individuals’ go-
als in a social interaction – has become a cross-current object of 
research among Economics, Psychology and Neuroscience (Sanfey, 
2007). The decisional behaviour and its psychological compo-
nents have been investigated through simple games requiring the 
division of a certain good into a social interaction, showing that 
decision-making can be conceived as a complex psychological 
process involving intersubjectivity.
The aim of this work is to provide an overview about the current 
knowledge of various components of decision-making in children 
and adults.
Such components have been investigated both on the behavioural 
and on the neural level through well-known games: the Ultimatum 
Game – the proposer makes an offer and the responder decides 
to accept (both players earn something) or to refuse (both pla-
yers earn nothing) – and the Dictator Game – the responder can 
only accept the offer.  Researches on adults showed that people’s 
behaviour contradict classical economic theories of ideally ma-
ximizing decision-makers (Camerer, 2003): in the Ultimatum 
Game the proposer usually makes good or even equal splits, and 
the responder tends to reject offers around 20-30% of the amount 
half the times. In the Dictator Game the proposer still offers good 
splits – even though lower then those of the Ultimatum Game.
Given the intersubjective connotation of the games, it is important 
to note that various components different from rational ones have 
been discovered and will be analyzed here: the sensibility to fairness 
(Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), the attribution of intentionality (Blount, 
1995; Rilling et al., 2004) and of mentalizing to the partner (Mar-
chetti, Castelli, & Sanfey, 2008), the presence of emotions (Pillutla 
& Murnighan, 1996; Sanfey et al., 2003; Harlè & Sanfey, 2007), 
the impact of physical appearance (Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999), 
the cultural domain (Henrich et al., 2005).
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Specifi c attention will be devoted to the development of decision-
making and intersubjectivity, since the studies on children and 
adolescents are quite recent and still show some contradictory 
fi ndings about the development of fairness (Murnighan & Saxon, 
1998; Harbaugh, Krause, & Liday, 2003; Sally & Hill, 2006; 
Marchetti et al., 2008; Sutter, 2007; Fehr et al., 2008) and of its 
links with other psychological abilities (such as moral development: 
Gummerum et al., 2008). Moreover, the role of structural variables 
such as gender and socio-economic status in the development of 
decision-making and intersubjectivity needs further studies.
Finally, in order to fi gure out a future path of research, some 
critical issues will be raised: the need for a direct assessment of 
fairness conception at various ages; the interest to deepen the role 
of intentionality understanding in decision-making; the plausibility 
to investigate interactions with various types of partners and into 
different contexts; the necessity to discover the possible changes 
in the neural basis of decision-making throughout development.
Keywords: decision-making, intersubjectivity, development, 
sharing games
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AN ANALYSIS OF TEACHER/
PUPILS CONVERSATION 
IN CLASSROOM DURING 
ERROR MANAGEMENT IN SOME 
ITALIAN PRIMARY SCHOOLS
CHIARA DEPRÀ, CATERINA FIORILLI, 
OTTAVIA ALBANESE 
Theoretical background
Literature has for a long time demonstrated that the classroom 
conversation is important in educational process (Pontecorvo, 
1999, 2004; Schegloff, 1992, 2000; Albanese, Fiorilli & Gnisci 
2007; Santagata, 2004, 2005). An important step in this process 
is the errors’ management and evaluation. The verbal interaction 
between teacher and pupils during the errors’ treatment is an 
interesting topic that allows to analyse the most effective conversa-
tional strategies to guarantee pupils’ participation  and to promote 
errors’ comprehension. Albanese, Fiorilli and Gnisci (2007) iden-
tifi ed some specifi c teachers’ conversational strategies infl uencing 
pupils’ error comprehension. These conversational strategies are: 
co-construction with pupils of the right answer, refl ection about 
the strategies adopted in a task, use of open questions, pupils’ auto 
and etero- correction, involvement of the entire classroom in errors’ 
treatment. We hypothesise that these strategies promote errors’ 
comprehension in children and enhance their own management 
better than others. Mathematics errors are very important  and 
their correction is very diffi cult at primary school level.
Aim of  research
The aim is to compare teachers’ conversational strategies used in 
the errors correction in mathematical problem solving activities 
and in Italian narrative text comprehension activities as in Fiorilli 
study (2007).
Participants
For mathematical problem-solving correction: six teachers and 
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their pupils, aged: 8-9 years (M= 8,6; d.s.= 3,73) of III class in 
Italian Primary Schools.
For Italian narrative text comprehension: thirteen teachers and 
their pupils, aged: 8-11 years (M= 10,56; d.s.=1,89) of III, IV, V 
class in Italian Primary Schools. 
All the teachers belong to different schools in Italy: Monza, Cornate 
D’Adda, Muggio’, Roma and Teramo.
Procedure
Video- recording of verbal interactions during mathematical 
problem- solving errors correction. Conversational data were tran-
scripted according the criteria descripted in Pontecorvo and Fasulo 
(1999). Data were analysed using conversational analysis criteria 
(Albanese, Fiorilli & Gnisci, 2007). We calculated frequencies of 
categories occurrence.
Results
The results show that these teachers during the correction of ma-
thematical problem solving errors use strategies which involve all 
the pupils (co-construction, pupils’ auto and etero- correction). 
In the text comprehension task errors correction, the teachers 
use no co-construction strategies but they prefer to suggest the 
correct answer. They use few open questions. These results reveal 
differences in teachers’ discourse practices related to the task. In 
our opinion it means that differences in conversational strategies 
depend on the situation in which communication occurs and on 
the task in which teacher and pupils are involved. According to 
educational perspective, the conversational strategies in mathema-
tical task promotes pupils self-correction better than conversational 
strategies in comprehension task.
Keywords: conversational practices, teachers error treatment, 
error comprehension
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ENACTING INTERSUBJECTIVITY: 
EMPATHY AS A CLINICAL 
INSTRUMENT
PERLA KLAUTAU
The limits of clinical strategies strongly embedded in verbal and 
interpretational approaches have been emphasized by a great 
number of scholars and clinicians. Many clinical situations and 
psychopathological experiences have proved to resist traditional 
settings and linguistic-based methodologies of interaction. A bro-
ader view of subjectivity — as situated, embodied and embedded 
—, and of therapeutic dialogue — as something deeply rooted 
in experiential features that are very frequently enacted, rather 
than discursively displayed — are needed. This research project 
explores the use of empathy as a crucially relevant tool in facing 
the challenges that come together with these assumptions. 
In order to give support to this usage of the concept, one has to put 
together theoretical and clinical arguments from different fi elds 
that may contribute to an improved understanding of subjectivity 
as living embodiment in the world, and mind as arising from situa-
ted, embodied action: philosophy (Husserl, 1931; Merleau-Ponty, 
1945, 1964; Todes, 2001), development and ecological psychology 
(Stern, 2000, 2004; Rochat, 2001; Reed, 1996; Gibson, 1977), 
psychoanalysis (Ferenczi, 1928; Kohut, 1959; Green, 1975; Win-
nicott, 1958; Widlocher, 2004), and enactive cognitive sciences 
(Cohen, 2000; Varela, 1991, 1999; Thompson, 1991, 2001).  
The starting point is the undisputed fact that newborns are min-
dful and present the innate capacity of emotional attunement with 
other newborns and adults, responding in different ways to subtle 
changes in affective states that people around them experience.
This capacity is in fact required as a foundational element of later 
full fl edged linguistic intersubjectivity, and proves the existence of 
innate mechanisms of apprehension of inner experiences lived by 
fellow humans. It is also a crucial feature in meaning-generation, 
in the emergence of autonomous agency, and the constitution 
of various modes of coupling with the environment — hence its 
relevance for clinical theory and practice.    
In the therapeutic scenario, taking empathy seriously entails a very 
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different kind of approach to the patient experiences, one in which 
the therapist is supposed to explore experiential awareness as a 
cognitive tool, enacting a different kind of presence, addressing 
the patient in a more active way, overcoming limits imposed by 
linguistically centered modes of operating in the relational domain. 
The fi rst part of this two-fold project is a theoretical exploration 
of the concept of empathy. Three key notions will be explored: 
empathy as a way of listening, as way of communicating, and 
as a therapeutic element. A second part will follow, with clinical 
experiments based on this approach.
Keywords: empathy, intersubjectivity, psychoanalysis, enaction
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GOOD THINGS TO ME BUT 
NOT BAD ONES TO OTHERS
LUISA LUGLI1, GIULIA BARONI1, CLAUDIA GIANELLI2, 
ANNA M. BORGHI2, ROBERTO NICOLETTI1
Embodied theories of cognition propose that neural systems for 
perception, action and emotion are also engaged during language 
processing (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Zwaan, 2004). Two dif-
ferent lines of research are relevant for our work. The fi rst shows 
that understanding action sentences activates the motor system. 
Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) found a congruency effect between 
the movement implied by action sentences (toward or away) and 
the movement performed to respond (toward or away from the 
body). The second indicates that reading positive words evokes 
movements toward our body (attraction), whereas processing 
negative words activates avoidance movements (Chen & Barg, 
1999; van Dantzig et al., 2008). These studies investigate the 
relationship of a given movement with a target-object without 
considering the social context in which the interaction with the 
object occurs. The present work aims at deepening  the study 
of the infl uence of social aspects on compatibility effects during 
language comprehension, in light of the rising increase of interest 
in social cognitive neuroscience (Lindblom, 2007; Lindblom & 
Ziemke, 2007) motivated also by the recent discovery of neuro-
physiological underpinnings of social behaviour such as mirror 
neurons (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti 
& Fabbri-Destro, 2008). 
The present work explores whether the interaction between self, 
others and objects modulates the motor system. Participants read 
sentences composed by an imperative verb implying a motion 
toward the self or another person and by an object described as 
positive or negative (e.g. The object is nice/ugly, bring it to you /
give it to another person). They responded whether the sentences 
made sense or not by moving the mouse toward or away from their 
body. Two experiments were run, in which the congruency between 
the direction implied by the sentence and the one requested in 
the response movement was modulated. In Experiment 1 there 
was always congruence between these two directions, whereas in 
Experiment 2 half of the trials were incongruent, based on the 
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supposition that the effect would be due to the goal of the action 
required, linked to the specifi c relational frame, rather than to the 
kind of movement to perform. 
Results revealed that the movements were modulated by the cha-
racteristics of the object and of the agent. Interestingly, partici-
pants tended to attract positive objects, but at the same time they 
refrained from offering negative objects to others. Implications 
of the results for embodied social neuroscience will be discussed. 
Keywords: embodied language, social cognition, stimuli valence, 
language comprehension
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TRANSITIONAL OBJECTS 
AND SHARED ATTENTION: 
DEVELOPMENTAL PATHS 
TOWARDS INTERSUBJECTIVITY
PEDRO SALEM
Referring to some of the remarkable socio-cognitive changes in 
infant development as the “nine month revolution”, Tomasello 
(2000) describes a new set of communicative behaviors that 
arise at the end of the fi rst year of life, that are characterized as 
goal-directed coordinated activities between infants and parents 
involving shared attention to objects or situations. At around nine 
to twelve months the frequency of the dyadic interactive behaviors 
between the mother and the child tend to decrease comparing to 
the triadic interactions that begin to emerge at this age. According 
to Tomasello (2000), young children start to engage in joint atten-
tional interactions when they begin to understand other persons 
as intentional agents like the self. They “tune-in” to the attention 
and behavior of adults toward outside entities, taking them as a 
new source of knowledge of the world and creating a shared inter-
subjective space that opens a brand new arena for social-cognitive 
development, including word learning and language, and new 
possibilities for infants to express themselves through symbolic 
play and cooperative activities. 
Among several psychiatrists and psychoanalysts that emphasized 
the emergence of object relations in the fi rst months following birth 
(Eagle, 1983), the psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott (1999) confers 
a particular importance to what he called transitional objects. 
The transitional object – whether a blanket, a doll or any of other 
suck-able, hug-able, and transportable physical object –, is an 
affective invested object used by the child as a substitute for the 
mother-child bond. The young child uses such objects, in part, to 
cope with the anxieties that arise from temporary separation from 
primary caretakers. At the origins, transitional objects constitute 
affective means created by children that allow them to behave with 
growing independence and to explore the world outside the sphere 
of a secure base provided by the mother. The establishment of a 
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shared reality through the development of the transitional space 
coexists with important infl exions on the development, like the 
fi rst signs of a new ability to play symbolically, to cooperate and 
to share in a context of emerging triadic exchanges.
The poster establishes some differences and similarities in the 
ways Tomasello and Winnicott describe the function of the object 
in infant development, focusing particularly some aspects of the 
intersubjective relations that characterize the end of the fi rst year 
of life of the child and the way they promote the emergence of 
symbolic play and the fi rst cooperative activities with their pri-
mary caretakers.
Keywords: object relation, shared attention, transitional object, 
intersubjectivity, symbolic play
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